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Abstract 
 
The main concern of this thesis is to analyze conflict in Pakistan, mainly 
the ethnopolitical conflict. It builds a case that conflict in Pakistan has 
been a product of the weakening of its social contract. This is both a 
qualitative and quantitative work which relies on both primary and 
secondary data as well as diverse techniques from historical interpretative 
analysis to econometrics. In addition to the ethnopolitical conflict, the 
thesis also contains an analysis of the factors leading to taliban 
recruitment in the current conflict. 
The thesis attempts to link the historical evolution and composition 
of social contract and the struggles over identity in pre and post 
independence era of Pakistan. It sets up a theoretical framework which 
defines the relevant concepts of identity, ethnopolitics, conflict, social 
contract, institutions and the saliency of socio economic determinants of 
conflict. To test this theoretical framework, an analytical framework is 
proposed which operationalizes these concepts. Data about the violent 
and non violent ethnopolitical conflict from 1972 to 2005 is collected, 
coded and put into a data scheme which helps us build the composite 
and individual pictures of this conflict through time. This database is 
unique to the extent of Pakistan. The thesis finds that the intensity of the 
major individual conflict have mostly followed an inverted U curve 
through time. Except for Balochistan, this is true for both the violent as 
well as non violent conflict. 
 The emerging conflict is then explained with the help of the decay 
of institutions of conflict management. These include both the formal 
and informal types. Two political and two economic institutions are 
selected for analysis which are part of the fiscal federalist scheme of the 
constitution. The findings suggest that consociational federalism has 
worked to bring down the intensity of conflict among the federating 
units. To investigate the political power dynamics, an original scheme of 
quantifying the political power gap in the state structure is employed and 
the emerging picture is then contrasted with the picture of ethnopolitical 
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conflict. Analysis also suggests that democracies have worked better at 
containing the conflict inside the institutions that were created for its 
management.  
The thesis takes up the saliency of the debate about the social and 
political horizontal inequalities, especially in Pakistani context and 
follows it with an econometric analysis of the data related to these 
inequalities and conflict. Linking grievances with the socio economic and 
political horizontal inequalities among federating units, the econometric 
results suggest that overall, larger inequalities led towards greater 
ethnopolitical conflict.  
This thesis also takes up the issue of current conflict in Pakistan 
between the state and taliban. A brief history of events in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan from the early 1970s is given to contextualize the current 
debate. The structural and agency factors leading to taliban recruitment 
are analyzed in this historical context. Issues of identity, history, 
horizontal inequality and decay of institutions provide a fertile ground 
for taliban recruitment in FATA and NWFP areas of Pakistan. The 
taliban then employ techniques adapted to this structural strata to 
maximize their recruitment. This discussion is essentially contained 
within the overall theoretical framework of the thesis. 
The saliency of the social contract in understanding the conflict in 
Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. A composite view of the 
explanatory framework of conflict in Pakistan is attempted in this thesis 
which will help formulate better policy options for conflict resolution, 
avoidance, mediation and management. 
Keywords: Social Contract, Conflict, Ethnopolitical conflict, 
Ethnopolitics, Non-Violent conflict, Violent Conflict, Pakistan,  Fiscal 
federalism, Institutions, Horizontal inequality, Taliban recruitment.  
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Samenvatting 
 
De politieke economie van conflicten. 
Het sociaal contract en het conflict in Pakistan. 
 
In dit proefschrift staat de analyse van het conflict in Pakistan centraal, 
waarbij de nadruk ligt op het etnopolitieke conflict. In dit onderzoek 
wordt gesteld dat het conflict in Pakistan voortvloeit uit de verzwakking 
van het sociaal contract. Er is gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve en 
kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden, van primaire en secundaire data en 
de analysemethoden variëren van historisch bronnenonderzoek tot 
econometrische technieken. Behalve het etnopolitieke conflict behandelt 
het proefschrift ook de factoren die leiden tot rekrutering door de taliban 
in het huidige conflict. 
Dit proefschrift beoogt de historische evolutie en opstelling van een 
sociaal contract in verband te brengen met de identiteitsstrijd in het 
Pakistan van voor en na de onafhankelijkheid. In het theoretisch kader 
worden de relevante concepten gedefinieerd: identiteit, etnopolitiek, 
conflict, sociaal contract, instellingen en de karakteristieke 
sociaaleconomische determinanten van conflicten. Om dit theoretisch 
kader te toetsen zijn deze begrippen geoperationaliseerd in een analytisch 
kader. Er zijn gegevens verzameld over het gewelddadige en niet-
gewelddadige etnopolitieke conflict in de periode van 1972 tot 2005. 
Deze gegevens zijn gecodeerd en geordend om het conflict door de tijd 
heen als geheel en in onderdelen in beeld te brengen. Deze database is 
uniek voor Pakistan. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de intensiteit van de 
voornaamste afzonderlijke conflicten meestal een omgekeerde U-curve 
beschrijft in de loop van de tijd. Behalve in Baluchistan geldt dit voor 
zowel de gewelddadige als de niet-gewelddadige conflicten. 
 Het ontstaan van een conflict wordt verklaard vanuit de 
verzwakking van instellingen voor conflictbeheersing. Hieronder vallen 
zowel de formele als de informele instellingen. Voor het onderzoek zijn 
twee politieke en twee economische instellingen geselecteerd die deel 
uitmaken van het fiscale federalistische systeem van de grondwet. Uit de 
resultaten blijkt dat consociationalistisch federalisme de intensiteit van 
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conflicten tussen de federale eenheden heeft verminderd. Om de 
politieke machtsverhoudingen te onderzoeken is een model ontwikkeld 
dat de leemte in de politieke macht in het staatsbestel kwantificeert. Het 
beeld dat hieruit naar voren komt wordt afgezet tegen het beeld van 
etnopolitiek conflict. Uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat democratieën er 
beter in slagen om het conflict te beperken tot de invloedssfeer van de 
instellingen die het moeten beheersen.  
Het proefschrift haakt ook in op het debat over sociale en politieke 
horizontale ongelijkheid, spitst dit toe op de Pakistaanse context en 
bevat een econometrische analyse van de gegevens over deze 
ongelijkheid en conflicten. De econometrische resultaten brengen 
grieven in verband met de sociaaleconomische en politieke horizontale 
ongelijkheid tussen federale eenheden en wijzen erop dat grotere 
ongelijkheid veelal leidt tot grotere etnopolitieke conflicten.  
 Dit proefschrift gaat ook in op het huidige conflict tussen de staat 
en de taliban in Pakistan. Als achtergrond voor het huidige debat wordt 
een kort historisch overzicht gegeven van de gebeurtenissen in 
Afghanistan en Pakistan vanaf begin jaren 70. De structurele en 
institutionele factoren die tot rekrutering door de taliban leiden worden 
in deze historische context onderzocht. Zaken die met identiteit, 
geschiedenis, horizontale ongelijkheid en verzwakking van instellingen te 
maken hebben bieden een vruchtbare bodem voor rekrutering door de 
taliban in de Pakistaanse gebieden FATA en NWFP. De taliban 
stemmen hun rekruteringstactieken af op deze structurele sociale 
kenmerken. Dit thema wordt hoofdzakelijk binnen het algemeen 
theoretisch kader van het proefschrift behandeld. 
Het belang van het sociaal contract voor het begrijpen van het 
conflict in Pakistan kan niet genoeg benadrukt worden. Dit proefschrift 
beoogt een samengesteld beeld te geven van het verklaringsmodel van 
het conflict in Pakistan als basis voor betere beleidsvoorstellen voor het 
oplossen, vermijden en beheersen van conflicten en voor het bemiddelen 
bij conflicten. 
 
  
 
1  Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is about conflict in Pakistan, mostly ethnopolitical conflict. It 
builds a case that conflict in that country has been a product of the 
weakening of its social contract.  This is both a qualitative and a 
quantitative work which relies heavily on both primary and secondary 
data as well as diverse techniques from historical interpretative analysis 
to econometrics.   
To explore the primary case, the thesis has to first define and lay out 
the problem and justify its relevance to academic and policy research. A 
theoretical framework of conflict and an analytical framework, which 
operationalizes the theoretical concepts, are then required to investigate 
the links between conflict and the components of social contract, the 
implicit agreement within a state that delineates the rights and 
responsibilities of the state and its citizens. It is therefore imperative to 
come up with a plan to measure and chart the course of conflict in an 
empirical set up. A major portion of this work relies on a primary 
conflict database which was constructed as part of this study and is 
unique, at least for Pakistan. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with the 
justification and relevance of this study. It then sets up a theoretical 
framework which defines the relevant concepts of identity, ethnopolitics, 
conflict, social contract, institutions and the saliency of socio economic 
determinants of conflict. To test this theoretical framework, an analytical 
framework is then proposed which operationalizes these concepts. For 
all its conflicts, Pakistan is a remarkably under researched country. 
Mostly this has to do with lack of data. A scheme of data is then 
envisaged taking account of both the violent and non violent character 
of conflict.  
In Chapter 3, the origins of ethnopolitical conflicts in Pakistan are 
traced back to the earliest days of its struggle for independence. The 
make up of the social contract and the institutions that compose it are 
then described in some detail to give the reader an idea of the complexity 
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of the problem at hand and also to set a historical context for the 
description of these conflicts and their explanation. The thesis argues 
that historical fears of the future, struggles of competing identities and 
the constitutional history of post independence Pakistan shape the 
formal as well as informal social contract of Pakistan. 
In Chapter 4, the primary ethnopolitical conflict database of this 
study is explained to help us describe the phenomenon. Since there is no 
uniform data about Pakistan‘s conflicts, the study would not have been 
possible without first collecting reliable data. The chapter describes data 
gathering techniques from newspapers, the construction of database and 
metrics; and the unfolding picture of conflict is given for each of the 
most important of these conflicts. The idea is to present composite as 
well as individual pictures of the nature, the stakeholders, the issues and 
progress of these ethnopolitical conflicts. This empirical core is 
important to quantify conflict and is put together after a reading of every 
page of 34 years of a major newspaper and supported by minor sources 
for periods of media censorship. Events have been noted, coded and 
tabulated. The period of study is from 1972 to 2005. 
Since a social contract needs institutions to carry it out, Chapter 5 
begins with a discussion of the formal and informal institutions created 
under the social contract. Important institutions in these categories, their 
health and the impact on the over all ethnopolitical conflict will be 
analyzed. Most important of these institutions are those created through 
the fiscal federalist scheme and the informal understanding among the 
federating units on the share in the power pie. Only leading institutions 
in each category will be discussed. To investigate the political power 
dynamics, an original scheme of quantifying the political power gap in 
the state structure is employed. It is argued that the health of these 
institutions influenced ethnopolitical conflict after 1972. 
Chapter 6 investigates the proposition that horizontal socio-economic 
and political inequalities contribute to conflict by generating grievances. 
The saliency of the debate about these horizontal inequalities, especially 
in Pakistani context is followed by an exploratory econometric analysis 
of the data related to these inequalities and conflict. The results of this 
exercise suggests that the horizontal inequalities in political, economic 
and situations of social access have a bearing on the ethnopolitical 
conflict between provinces/regions and the central government. 
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The components of the theoretical framework can be found in the 
different narrative of the current conflict between the Pakistani state and 
Taliban. Chapter 7 of this thesis is about the talibanization phenomenon, 
the conflict surrounding it and the factors that influence the militant 
recruitment. Since this conflict involves the strands of identity, history, 
horizontal inequality and institutions, therefore these structural factors 
will be discussed to bring the context into focus. The chapter further 
discusses the agency level factors affecting taliban recruitment since 
leaving those out will not help in explaining the phenomenon from a 
policy practitioner‘s point of view.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by reiterating the saliency of the social 
contract in understanding the conflict in Pakistan. The results of 
discussions in the rest of the thesis are combined to construct a 
composite view of the explanatory framework of conflict in Pakistan 
which will help formulate better policy options for conflict resolution, 
avoidance, mediation and management. The potential and limitations of 
the current study are discussed. It is suggested that in order to minimize 
conflict, the policy options coming out of this thesis are to reinforce 
those institutions which have worked well, to enforce those terms of the 
contract which have been ignored and to work towards narrowing the 
horizontal inequalities which have had influence in increasing the 
conflict.  
  
  
2  Through the Kaleidoscope 
 
 
Men enter into conflict not because they are different but because they are 
essentially the same 
2.1 Introduction 
An exercise in determining a fixed configuration of Pakistani 
sociopolitical taxonomy would have very little shelf life. The overlapping 
subdivisions do not lend themselves to easy categorization. Political, 
Ethnic, Sectarian, Economic classes; the list can stretch easily. The 
emerging picture is not stable either. A mere touch to the kaleidoscope 
and a new configuration appears. A single actor assumes and acts out 
multiple identities at the same time. Pinning a particular identity on an 
actor and then following him around the socio-political milieu would be 
a difficult scholarly enterprise. Through this maze therefore, one is 
forced to pick and choose a configuration for analysis; analysis which 
could help explain the forces pulling at the socio-political fabric in 
different directions.   
Ethnopolitical conflicts are one such configuration and perhaps one 
of the most important in the particular context of Pakistan.1 This 
introductory chapter is an attempt to build a theoretical framework for 
its analysis and the verification of the thesis that the health of the 
particular social contract in a multiethnic state has better explanatory 
power for these conflicts.  
The first order of business in this chapter would be to determine the 
degree of the need to study ethnopolitical conflicts, anywhere, but 
especially in Pakistan. The social and policy relevance is important and 
needs demonstration. It would be imperative to agree on precisely what 
questions we want to answer and define the scope of our study. Since 
ethnicity, politics and conflict are too unwieldy concepts to be 
undertaken in a single study, we would therefore proceed to identify an 
                                                 
 Melson and Wolpe, ‗Modernization‘ P. 1114, cited in Horowitz (1985) P. 100 
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appropriate interdisciplinary theoretical framework for our analysis. Such 
a framework needs a proper disciplinary embedding in order to benefit 
from the various strands of available literature on the subjects. All along 
this exercise, the particular Pakistani context will be used as a reference 
point to obtain internally consistent and precise theoretical and analytical 
frameworks which can help us define, describe and explain the problem.  
2.2 Why do we need to study it? 
Ethnicity and the conflicts defined by it are not for the abstemious. The 
‗birth principle‘ associated with it makes it particularly unpalatable to 
some. 
To the considerable extent that ethnic ties reflect the birth principle, they 
fall within the cartilage of those disagreeable phenomena disfavored by our 
ideals and therefore capable of securing only the reluctant attention 
reserved for distasteful subjects. (Horowitz 1985)2 
It is interesting to note the communists, the socialists, (and the 
Americans) dislike the idea alike. Only a grudging attention is paid to it 
after it is no longer ignorable. Those who study and theorize about 
ethnopolitical conflicts almost enjoy this unease of those who do not (or 
who will not). If the social scientist is him/her self from an ethnic 
minority, the label of ‗parochialism‘ is swift to follow in a country not 
much used to open discussions on sensitive subjects. Too often scholars 
associated with a particular school try to fit these conflicts into their 
favourite paradigms;  
Ethnopolitical conflict was often treated as if it were a manifestation of 
something else: the persistence of traditionalism, the stresses of 
modernization, or class conflict masquerading in the guise of ethnic 
identity. (Horowitz 1985)3  
This reluctance has left us with many shortcomings in our 
understanding of ethnopolitical conflict. Horowitz (1985) thinks it is also 
due to the episodic character of these conflicts. Its sudden coming and 
going shatters the periods of tranquility and ‗since the scholarship is 
reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of blood.‘ 4 Ethnic conflict 
is, of course a recurrent phenomenon. Horowitz (1985) gives a bird‘s eye 
view of the ethnopolitical conflicts in different parts of the world.5  
The persistence and frequency of these conflicts is borne out by 
statistics. Gurr (1993) had noted that some twenty million refugees are 
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fleeing from communal or ethnically based conflicts around the world, 
although his ‗Minority At Risk‘ project has been criticized for selection 
bias most notably by Fearon and Laitin(2003).  The reasons for these 
conflicts may not be limited to ethnic nationalism and the conditions 
that favour insurgency may have more explanatory potential as Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) show but the fact remains that Yugoslavia, Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia have disappeared as we knew them. The 
ability of conflict entrepreneurs, the prime movers in a conflict, to 
harness groups on the basis of ethnicity, for conflicts which have diverse 
political agendas, only goes to show that identity and the politics around 
it play important roles in mobilization of groups. 
The subject of this study, Pakistan, has herself passed the trauma in 
1971. Rwanda, Aceh, East Timor, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Burma, Kosovo, 
Kashmir, Somalia, Nigeria and Balochistan have something in common; 
ethnopolitical conflict. Gurr notes that only 27 of the 233 communal 
groups in his study have no record of political organization, protest, 
rebellion or intercommunal conflict since 1945 (Gurr 1993).6  
The international situation also plays a role in the emergence and then 
hibernation of these phenomena. After the Second World War the 
decolonization brought new issues and contexts for the ethnopolitical 
struggles. It now became more a question of possession of the state as 
against that of self-determination, though the rhetoric for these 
movements tried to copy from each other. The anti-colonial movements 
had created an appearance of unity that was slow to dissipate even after 
independence was won. Yet in a large number of ex-colonial states, the 
successful achievement of independence from colonial yoke was swiftly 
followed by ethnic conflict. It is not unusual to find routine 
administrative issues assume defining roles in ethnopolitics and result in 
protracted conflicts in these countries and regions. 
2.2.1 Ethnopolitical conflicts and Pakistan 
1971 was not the last time that Pakistan witnessed ethnopolitical conflict 
becoming the center of national debate. Balochistan in the 1970s and 
post 2003, assertion of Muhajir7 ethnic identity in Karachi in the 80s and 
90s, and Pukhtun nationalism during 1980s are uncanny reminders of a 
national nightmare. Ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has been 
increasing and the need is all the more acute to come up with a good 
explanation. Only that will lead to successful resolution.  
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Earlier studies in Pakistan have guided this present research through 
some of its trickiest labyrinths, yet we find them lacking a hard empirical 
core to support their findings. One reason for these is the lack of a 
comprehensive theoretical container. An example is Feroz Ahmed‘s 
claim that ‗ethnic movements are usually based on grievances of the 
disadvantaged groups concerning ethnic disparities‘, he may be striking 
the nail on the head in his quest to analyze what the groups are fighting 
over. It is the limitation of his analytical framework that there is no 
inbuilt degree of measurement in it. The result is that he comes up with a 
list of issues from provincial autonomy to allocation of resources to 
language and culture, but without an appropriate conceptual container to 
fit them in, with their proper weightage. Social contract as such has not 
been a subject of scholarly analysis in Pakistan and linking it to 
socioeconomic inequalities and the ethnopolitical conflict, in a verifiable 
way (something which this research attempts to accomplish) is non-
existent.  
A good diagnosis is a prerequisite to any prognosis and suggested 
remedy. Chapter 3 of this thesis thus describes the stakeholders, issues 
and intensity of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1971. The 
separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) automatically sets the initial cut 
off date for this study. The second reason for this cut-off date is the 
constitution of 1973. This constitution provided a new, formal, social 
contract. In our chosen theoretical framework in section 2.3, the scope 
of analysis can only be broadened to include the impact of a single, 
uniform, contract on the conflict, throughout the duration of study. The 
analytical framework also requires that our units of analysis be uniform 
over time. Since we will be largely using provinces/regions as our units 
of analysis for data related to institutions, poverty and human 
development, therefore it was inevitable to exclude the data related to 
the provincial framework of pre-1971 period. 
2.2.2 Questions all around 
This thesis will therefore attempt to answer the question; did the 
weakening of the Social Contract, as a result of decay of institutions of 
conflict management and acting through the agency of grievances, lead 
to ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan after 1971 and the current conflict 
between the state and radical militants? The attempt at an explanation 
will have to first answer some important sub-questions; what exactly is 
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the social contract in Pakistan, composed of? What issues, history and 
ideas came together for the evolution of the Pakistani version of a social 
contract? What are the formal and informal institutions created by this 
social contract? To what extent was the Pakistani fiscal federalism 
successful in fulfilling the role assigned to it in the broader social 
contract? How did the social contract in Pakistan break down? Has it 
broken down? Which institutions of conflict management decayed and 
how? What do we mean by ethnopolitical conflict? What form, style and 
content did the ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan take, after 1971? What 
is the extent of regional imbalances that are supposed to generate 
grievances? What grievances were generated by the (as yet assumed) 
breakdown of social contract?  
This study does not profess to (and could not be) a detached look at 
an observed phenomena. We need to know how to reduce the severity 
of ethnopolitical conflict (or any conflict for that matter) and maximize 
the likelihood of interethnic cooperation and conflict resolution. We also 
want to know about contextually adapted techniques of conflict 
reduction and the way to use them. This cannot be done without a 
proper diagnosis. The prognosis for a democratic, peaceful, prosperous 
and multiethnic political economy are at stake. 
2.2.3 What do we need to answer these questions 
For answering the above questions we need to come up with adequate 
theoretical and analytical frameworks. The theoretical framework is 
required to answer such abstract questions as the nature of ethnopolitical 
conflicts and the definition of terms like social contract, ethnicity and 
ethnopolitics. It is also required to answer the conceptual need for the 
study of this particular type of conflict as some scholars have questioned 
the very need of the field of ethnic conflict studies on a conceptual level 
(Gilley 2004). During this theoretical exercise the terms ethnicity, nation 
and nationalism will be used interchangeably to remain faithful to the 
words of the scholars quoted here.  
Then, an analytical framework will be required to furnish us with 
empirical tools with which the theory can be tested. This analytical 
framework will discuss more tangible concepts like institutions, 
development and inequalities.  
Both the above exercises will need to take into account the present 
work in general and that done in Pakistani context, in particular.  
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2.3 Ethnicity and Ethnic conflict, towards a theoretical 
framework 
Before a peek at ‗the kaleidoscope‘ and constructing a theoretical 
framework, it will be instructive to get some terms defined. This will 
guard against loose containers for highly complex abstractions. Since 
conflict in general and ethnopolitical conflict in particular is the 
explained phenomenon in this thesis, its definition and those of its 
antecedent terms are imperative. We therefore need to define ethnicity, 
ethnopolitical conflict and social contract. As Horowitz (1985) puts it; 
Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries 
with it traits believed to [be] innate. (Horowitz 1985)8  
The minimal definition of an ethnic unit…is ‗the idea of common 
provenance, recruitment primarily through kinship, and a notion of 
distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of 
cultural traits.‘9 This definition is employed to make better use of the 
data which is mostly available on a provincial/regional basis. F. Ahmed 
(1997), in applying the concept of ethnic group to the conditions of 
Pakistan, sets down language as the central defining feature of an ethnic 
group. But the unit of analysis in our study is the province/region or a 
dyadic setting as explained in chapter 4. The two are not, however, 
mutually exclusive as the politico-ethnic movements in Pakistan have 
themselves been employing the provincial typology, sometimes rather 
reluctantly, to articulate most of their demands.  
The term nationalist movements and nationalism are sometimes used 
synonymously with ethnopolitical movements. ‗Nationalism is primarily 
a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent‘ (Gellner 1983). The term ‗nationality‘ has been in 
common use in Pakistan to denote ethno-linguistic communities. It has 
been in the vocabulary of nationalist and Marxist advocacy groups- and 
now even right-wing-politicians from different provinces, as well as 
Marxist and nationalist scholars.  
The problems of language, culture, regional autonomy, allocation of 
resources between ethnic communities, and political participation have 
been subsumed under the rubric of "national question" or "nationality 
question. (F. Ahmed 1997)  
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Yet nationalism is such an abstract idea that one finds it difficult to 
observe it empirically. The alternative proposed by A. Khan (2005) is 
that of studying national movements; 
[Miroslav] Hroch argues that one should not just analyze nationalism but 
rather study national movements, because the term national movement 
has a significant advantage over nationalism in that it refers to empirically 
observable activity by concrete individuals and therefore their goals and 
demands, their forms of organization, their numbers and their social 
composition can be analyzed. (A. Khan 2005)  
Through an empirical approach we can analyze the ideology, the 
discourse, the rhetoric and the myth-making techniques and process of 
nationalism. But this empirical approach is required on two fronts. First, 
to evaluate how the politicized ethnicity has become a principle of 
legitimization of political systems and secondly to determine how 
effectively it has been used as an instrument for articulating and 
advocating the issues related to elite political competition. The terms 
‗nationalism‘ and ‗national movements‘ provide for the first requirement 
but may not be used effectively for the second. To cater to both the 
requirements, we need a term which can cater to the nexus of political 
legitimacy and the day to day politics of power, status and resources. The 
term ‗Ethnopolitics‘ will be used as it offers broader applicability than 
the terms ‗ethnic movements‘ and ‗nationalist movements‘. The 
imagined and the real are thus combined into one definition which is 
essentially constructivist. As Robertson (1997) concluded; 
[The constructed nature of ethnopolitics]… makes it possible to assess 
ethnopolitics as both real and imagined, and allows us to better understand 
the world of our making. (Robertson 1997) 
Ethnopolitical conflict then is the incompatibility between, and expression of 
interests by, the stakeholder, who have ethnopolitical motivations. This definition 
caters for the violent, non-violent, and institutional types of ethnicity 
based political conflicts. It also is general enough to take into account the 
conflicts over political legitimacy as well as those emanating from the 
more mundane politics within a state.  
2.3.1 The Theoretical Continuum 
This introductory chapter is not an attempt to present a new theory. It 
will rather attempt to give a broad outline of some of the most important 
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theories of conflict, pick up their salient elements and build up a case for 
their applicability to the Pakistan specific conflicts.  
There are ways to categorize conflict theories and some of the 
scholars discussed in these pages have come up with their own 
categories, depending on the way their work is structured or a particular 
scholarly tradition. An example is Amin‘s (1988) work on ethno-
nationalism in Pakistan, where he identifies three traditions of liberalism, 
Marxism and Islam and then analyzes the traditional, modern and post 
modern theories within each tradition. This style of taxonomy is 
adequate for ethno-nationalism but not for analyzing conflict in an 
ethnopolitical setting where the ‗imaginary‘ and the ‗real‘ are both part of 
the discourse.  
Without aligning with a particular school, A continuum is proposed 
so that theories which concentrate on the role of the state are at one end 
and those looking at the role of the separatist (or rebel or ethnopolitical) 
leadership (or peoples) at the other end. Along this continuum are placed 
theories which might be presented in wholly other configurations in their 
respective birth places. For now, the term structure and agency are 
deliberately avoided. 
Along the length of this continuum, we find the political science 
theories, described here mainly in the nomenclature used by Andreas 
Wimmer (2002), The Sociological School, The International relations 
approach, the Marxists and the Anthropological tradition. The border 
lines are not very sharp and it is easy to find some of these theories in 
another‘s domain. Some categorizations put theories together which 
address both the poles of this continuum. The grain of the argument 
runs thus; almost every theory has something to offer for this thesis, the 
endeavor will be to identify those elements which can prove helpful in 
the particular context of Pakistan. In doing so, theoretical and analytical 
frameworks will be built around the central thesis of this analysis. An 
unabashed openness for ‗received wisdom‘ will be required to benefit 
from ‗the state of the art‘.  
As an entry point into the discussion, Wimmer (2002) sees nationalist 
and ethnic politics not just a by-product of modern state formation or 
industrialization; rather, a bedrock for modernity itself,10 He categorizes 
four approaches conceptualizing the relationship between modernization 
and the politics of ethnicity and nationalism. The first of these 
approaches is the theory of rational choice. 
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2.3.2 On Rational Choice 
Starting at the people/separatist/leadership end of the continuum, the 
rational choice theory holds that under conditions of politicization of 
ethnicity, it makes sense for the individual to consider ethnic 
representation as meaningful when it comes to choosing political 
alliances.  
Rational or, public choice theory emphasizes the capacity of agents to 
shape their environment. The proponents of rational choice ‗recognize 
that structures determine the range of choices available to individuals, 
but, ultimately, they account for outcomes in terms of choices 
individuals make‘ (Hindmoor 2006).11 Models are built around conflict 
entrepreneurs and the choices open to them. Each of these choices 
carries a utility or ‗payoff‘ which accrues to the agent for pursuing that 
choice. The instrumental concept of rational choice also assumes that 
people act in self interest. It is more about means rather than ends.  
On a conceptual level, among the ‗rational left‘ Eric Hobsbawm 
makes the case for the ‗imaginary‘ nature of nationalism. According to 
him, nationalism rarely reflects long term traditions or systems of life. It 
doesn‘t even need language or religion or common historical experience. 
All these are social or political constructions and in essence, imaginary 
(Hobsbawm 1992).  
Horowitz (1985) criticizes the rational choice approach on the basis 
of what he says is the impossibility of organizing the increasing gains for 
everybody, in an economy of scarcity. He further contends that the 
ethnic conflict may not be motivated by calculations of material gain and 
that the rewards sought may lie in the area of psychic gratification, or if 
calculations of the participants are so relative that no benefit is 
considered a gain unless it comes at the expense of an opponent.12  
Rational choice theory is not supposed to be capable to explain the 
emotional euphoria which characterizes the ethnopolitical struggles. This 
however is not accepted by some of today‘s rational choice theorists. 
They contend that an individual can derive utility from pursuing an 
ideology, in the same way, as another individual, deriving utility from the 
pursuit of a purely materialistic goal. Measuring this utility in an empirical 
study might pose some problems but should be regarded as the price 
paid for the advantages of a testable model with clear outlines. The 
‗woodenness‘ of this theory aside, it makes a good starting point in the 
quest for explaining the ‗health‘ of the social contract in Pakistan. That 
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individuals base their decisions on calculations of gain and loss, is a 
straight forward and testable proposition. It answers, to a considerable 
extent, which components of a social contract are under consideration of 
an individual and even a group. The ‗economy of scarcity‘ may be a 
consideration for an economist or the state‘s planner but is not always a 
consideration for an individual. It is inevitable that some questions will 
be left unanswered in an explanatory quest and hence the need for a look 
at other promising theories.  
2.3.3 On Neo-Romanticism, Primordialism and Culturalism 
The neo-romanticist approach, the primordialists and the culturalists, 
have much in common despite having different disciplinary embeddings. 
They all start with the assumption that ethnicity constitutes a basic factor 
of social life, ever present across time and space.  
The strength of ethnic identity and the myths of predestination and a 
historic mission13 may partly explain the reconstitution, revival and 
enrichment of ethnic community in successful nationalist movements 
but fails to provide answers for the unsuccessful ones (Wimmer 2002). 
In the same vein, Ethnic conflicts are often labeled cultural conflicts 
because the division of ethnic groups has usually been ascribed to their 
cultural differences. Furnivall (1956) and Smith (1965) developed the 
theory of plural society. For Furnivall, the different ethnic groups only 
interact in the marketplace and such a society is held together by force 
supplied by the colonial power. This is a precarious social form. Smith 
(1965) emphasizes the cultural differences. The main characteristics of 
his formulation are;  
any institutional system tends towards internal integration and consistency, 
each of these differentiated groups will tend to form a closed socio-
cultural unit, … [second] … where culturally divergent groups together 
form a common society, the structural imperative for maintenance of this 
inclusive unit involves a type of political order in which one of these 
cultural sections is subordinated to the other … [third, plural societies] are 
defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict. (Smith 1965) 
The absence of consensus therefore requires regulation by force and 
will tend towards a ranked system of subordination and super-
ordination. Plural societies frequently undergo clash of values which 
threatens stability and leads to conflict. Identities at birth and the 
primordialist explanations may be significant in explaining group 
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formation but their value is more in the post facto ‗imaginary‘ exercise in 
identity formation and justification for ethnic grouping rather than being 
the prerequisites for any identity formation, ab initio.  
The belief in inevitability of subordination of some ethnic groups has 
fudged the relationships of ethnic groups among themselves. As 
Horowitz (1985) points out, many groups do not coexist in a ranked or 
hierarchical system at all.14 Most societies are configured such that every 
ethnic group has its own elite; the position of a group varies from one 
domain to another, none of them able to establish subordination or 
super ordination. Such systems are easily seen at work in the Netherlands 
and Austria.15 Horowitz even has a test question for distinguishing 
ranked groups from unranked groups. He asks whether each of the 
groups in contact possesses legitimately recognized elite. If so, the 
system is unranked. It is precisely this question that we ask ourselves of 
the Pakistani system and we find that the answer is in affirmative. This is 
in contrast to Ahmad‘s (1997) answer that;  
The different ethnic groups in Pakistan do not have an identical class 
composition. Nor do they have an equal or even proportional 
representation in the higher echelons of military and bureaucracy. 
Therefore, the venous elements of Pakistan's ruling class have a 
disproportionate representation of the various ethnic groups in society. 
This situation represents a case, not of cross cutting cleavages, but of 
overlapping of class and ethnicity to a large extent. (F. Ahmed 1997) 
On the basis of conflict data analyzed in chapter 5 and 6, we find that 
this is an overly simplified view, unsupported by any empirical data on 
the composition of elite in each ethnic group. I argue that Pakistan has 
all the hallmarks of unranked ethnic groups. There are high status 
Pukhtuns who are (or have been) members of the ruling clique. There 
are high status Sindhis and Balochis who engage the elite in other groups 
as their equals. The relative share in power circles for each group has 
also been the subject of the historical and constitutional social contract. 
Hence the disproportionate representation of ethnic groups in power is 
not due to overlapping of class and ethnicity but is due to the politics of 
exclusion and inclusion in power circles that concerns these elite and the 
evolving nature of informal social contract among them. This is not the 
same thing as politics of subordination and super-ordination. Hence it is 
important to use a framework which separates the loci of the elite from 
those of the masses, in the ethnic conflicts. These separate loci are 
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clearly seen at work in chapter 6 of this thesis where we see that issues of 
elite motivation have a different impact on ethnopolitical conflict than 
those issues which are essentially of interest to the masses.  
2.3.4 A Transitional Phenomenon? 
Some models view ethnicity and nationalism as transitional phenomena 
on the road to state building, modernity or a classless society.   
Ibne Khaldun (1332-1406) termed Asabiya as the natural feeling 
which exists due to blood relationship and the bonds derived there from 
(both political and religious). According to him these bonds were 
essential on the road to state building but were not enough to sustain the 
state and the power of this Asabiya or ethnicity invariably declines 
(Khaldun 1967).  
The Marxists also viewed it as a transitory phenomenon and more as 
an irritant in their dialectic of class struggle and societal evolution. Marx 
and Engels saw the national differences and antagonisms between 
peoples diminishing with every day and the eventual proletarian 
international society emerging (Marx et al. 2002).16 The second 
generation of modernization theorists within the Marxist tradition like 
Rosa Luxemberg and Bukharin were also of the same opinion but Otto 
Bauer and Karl Renner were notable exceptions who considered nation 
as the enduring form of society (Amin 1988).  
The most sustained criticism of the above Marxist position came 
from within the post-modernization writers of Marxist tradition. Nairn 
(1975) considered nationalism as an inevitable feature of capitalist 
development while Wallerstein and Phillips (1992), negating the 
primordial origins of identity, termed this sense of identity as the 
outcome of political power play within the developing world system. 
Contrary to this, Horowitz (1985) shows that ethnicity is often a more 
compelling and preemptive affiliation than social class is. He does that 
by utilizing Marxian assumptions against Marxian conclusions. These 
assumptions are 1) class is ascriptive i.e. given at birth 2) social classes 
are closed conflict groups, permanently composed. He argues that social 
mobility changes class but cannot change ethnicity and that more so than 
social classes, ethnic groupings are conflict groups (Horowitz 1985).17 
According to some other modernization theorists like Karl Deutsch and 
Ernest Gellner, modernization dissolves corporative and communitarian 
segregation; the resulting communicative integration brings more and 
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more people into contact and into competition with each other 
(Wimmer 2002).18 This may not be the definitive word on the dialectic of 
class struggle but certainly puts forward a strong case that ethnicity based 
conflict is not a transitional phenomenon and needs to be probed 
outside the Marxist framework. 
The Marxists of South Asia saw similarities between the nationality 
problem in the former Soviet Union and the linguistic and regional 
problems in the sub-continent. They had little difficulty in adopting the 
Marxist concept of nationality without critical re-examination (F. Ahmed 
1997). Ethno-politics was viewed as a form of elite politics but the 
Marxists loathed admitting that there must be something which often 
converts these into populist movements. ‗[These] variants of Modernist 
[and Marxist] theories … refer to a fully differentiated, universalist 
society leaving no room for ascriptive criteria and communal forms of 
integration (Wimmer 2002).19  
Besides South Asian Marxists, the other attack on the idea of ethnic 
nationalism came from the ranks of pan Islamists, the likes of 
Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), and Maududi (1903-1979); who resisted 
calls for unity based on an ‗Indian‘ identity.20 Both advocated Muslim 
nationalism. Some notions of this identity influenced the processes 
leading up to the creation of Pakistan and even afterwards. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
2.3.5 Functionalists, Modernists and Statists 
The functionalists go whole hog on modernization theory and the 
position that nationalism (and ethno-politics by implication) constitutes 
an integral part of modern society as it is empirically known to us. This 
position may be seen as occupying the other extreme of our continuum 
where the process of nation-state building takes the center place in 
analysis. The functional needs of a modernizing society explain the 
success of nationalism. A modern state needs the political integration 
and intercommunication of large ethnic groups and this is what 
legitimizes the elitist attempt to congeal them together. Gellner (1983) 
maintains that this facilitates industrialization. This statist theory of 
nationalism, most consistently formulated by Breuilly (1994), ‗stands in 
sharp contrast to the [primordialists and culturalists] … view[s]‘ 
(Wimmer 2002).21  
 Through the Kaleidoscope 33 
 
The centralist state in Pakistan seems to have pursued this model to 
the extent that some scholars labeled it as a state-nation instead of a 
nation-state (A. Khan 2005).22  The state facilitated the birth and 
nurturing of a new class, cutting across ethnic and linguistic barriers, 
which Alvi (1983) calls ‗Salariat‘.23 The attempts of the state in this 
homogenizing project and its unequal rewards have sometimes been 
resented by the ethnopolitical elite who see it as yet another step towards 
the socio-economic inequality of their people and a threat to their own 
political survival. The nationalist discourse by the state and the counter-
nationalism of minorities24 put strains on the social contract and 
engenders conflict. This is a valuable piece for us from the functionalist 
theory.  
Wimmer (2002) goes a step beyond this statist theory and holds that 
modernity itself is cast in nationalist and ethnicized forms.25 For him, the 
politicization of ethnicity is the result of the overlapping and fusion of 
three notions of peoplehood, on which the project of political modernity 
is based, the people as a sovereign entity, the people as citizens of a state, 
and the people as an ethnic community.  
These three notions of peoplehood were fused into one single people writ 
large-replacing the Grace of God as the central point around which 
political discourse draws its circles. (Wimmer 2002)26  
These three circles gave birth to democracy, citizenship and national 
self-determination in the world order of states. This trinity can also be 
seen confusing all but a few of the Pakistani scholars who have 
investigated ethnopolitical conflicts in their country. ‗The Grace of God‘ 
never left the arena and democracy, citizenship and national self-
determination had to contend with it in the limited space of political 
discourse and administration. Sometimes called the extra burden of the 
Pakistani politics,27 it has been a part of the governance structure, 
legislation, politics, and even the raison d‘être of the state as defined by 
the constitution.28  Few analysts mastered the requisite complexity to 
factor it in.  Jalal (2000) has dissected the origins of religious identity and 
traced it all the way back to Shah Wali-ullah (1703-1762) but in her 
comparative study of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Jalal 1995) she 
ignores this and evaluates and redefines democracy, citizenship, 
sovereignty and the nation state. Her argument for a more decentralized 
governmental structure to be better able to arbitrate between ethnic and 
regional movements, could have packed a little more punch with this 
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fourth ‗indeterminate‘.  A. Khan(2005), in his very incisive (discussed 
below) analysis, has discussed at length the role of religion as a tool used 
by the state and centrist forces to de-legitimize the assertion of ethnic 
identities and the consequent strains in the political economy. Among 
the other few, Jahan (1972), Amin (1988) and Ahmed (1991) have 
studied the functionalist impact of religion on state formation and 
political economy of Pakistan.29 
The ‗collective fears of the future‘ engendered by an insistence on an 
identity supposedly under threat, has some explanatory potential as 
indicated by Lake and Rothchild (1996). Perhaps the only Pakistani 
modernist religious theorist who is not afraid of multiple identities 
sharing the same public space and allows religious sanction for ethnic 
identities and a basis of nationalism, within the religious discourse, is 
Javed Ghamidi; 
The consciousness of constituting a single nation on the basis of 
pigmentation, race, language, traditions and homeland has been woven 
into the nature of man. (Ghamidi 2008)30 
2.3.6 Foucault’s Schema 
On a tangent from our continuum, it is perhaps the right entry point into 
this debate for A. Khan‘s (2005) approach to the question of ethnic 
nationalism. He used Foucault and Gordon‘s (1980) schema while 
looking at ethnic conflict as essentially a power struggle between 
dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups and at the same time 
highlighting the role the state plays in the lives of individuals. For 
Foucault et al, there are two major systems of approach to the analysis of 
power: the contract-oppression approach and the dominant-repression 
approach. In the contract-oppression approach power is ‗an original 
right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty‘ as a social 
contract. The second, domination-repression approach does not espouse 
any contract and therefore no abuse of power. Here; 
 the pertinent opposition is not between legitimate and illegitimate, as in 
the first…, but between struggle and submission. (Foucault and Gordon 
1980).  
At an even more basic level the first approach can be traced back to 
Hobbes (1651), who argued for bringing man from ‗a state of nature‘31 to 
constitute a state as a social contract and rule by an absolute sovereign. 
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Rousseau then saw the sovereign itself wholly constituted by the 
participants of a social contract; 
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that 
the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, 
although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are 
everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, 
until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights 
and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in 
favour of which he renounced it. (Rousseau 1762)32 
The contractarian theory has been very flexible and has found 
application in a variety of traditions. Boucher and Kelly (1994) give a 
broad outline of the three main traditions of moral, civil and 
constitutional contractarianism and this present study will generally 
remain within the latter two traditions. Focusing on these, we find that 
while Locke and Rousseau were mainly concerned with the location of 
sovereignty as in a vertical contract between the ruler and the ruled 
(Hobbes) and that horizontal one between and among the community 
members (Locke), we can see that in both these situations the contract 
can be either formal and/or informal. Linking the formal and informal 
social contract in Pakistan, I prefer to take Foucault‘s first scheme as the 
broader theoretical grid for three reasons. 
First I don‘t think that a domination-repression approach is 
appropriate for ethnic groups which are unranked. Ethnic groups, taken 
as indivisible entities, might work in a ranked system but it would be 
wrong to assume a uniformity of views among the elites and the people 
at large, on the ethnic question. In a way, A. Khan (2005) should rightly 
not be concerned with people‘s perspective since his framework sees 
ethnic conflict only as a power struggle among the elites. In an 
explanatory framework with the ambition of analyzing the mechanism of 
conflict, the issues which motivate the masses cannot be avoided. 
Another reason for taking the contractarian route is the desired 
outcome of the study. Any study of conflict should be as much geared 
towards better conflict management as it is towards a better 
understanding of it. In fact the two are seldom mutually exclusive. For 
any theoretical framework with this ultimate goal, it should account for 
the mechanism of conflict. The plural society framework originally 
intended to explain conditions of instability but it failed to give a 
mechanism of conflict. The plural society model also envisions the 
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interaction of whole ethnic groups without taking into account the role 
of the political leadership and the nature of elite political struggle 
(Ranking and Un-Ranking). Taking the domination-repression approach 
(essentially a cultural pluralistic view of society) doesn‘t leave much in 
the course of managing the conflict. It shuts the door on attempts to 
find out as to what the ethnic groups are fighting over.  
Thirdly, A. Khan (2005) asserts and correctly so that;  
[I]n colonial India, the British colonialists controlled the political unit, the 
state, whereas Indians inhabited the national unit, society. The relationship 
between the two was that of domination and exploitation ... With the 
passage of time, it turned into a complex web of networks in which the 
state and society were both found asserting themselves against each other. 
The concept of rulership in (Pre-colonial) India was not based on the idea 
of contract but of incorporation, in which rulers not only outranked 
everyone but could also encompass those they ruled. Local lords 
maintained a social order based on cosmological concepts and through 
ritual action. (A. Khan 2005)33  
This is a true reflection of the state of polity before independence but 
this is not necessarily true after 1947. It is important to see if this 
relationship underwent any change. In my view it underwent a 
metamorphosis and assumed more of a contractarian nature.  
Two important factors point to this change in the relationship. The 
post-independence shared elements in the polity may occupy a small 
place in the cultural whole but they may be the most relevant elements 
for determining relations among different ethnic groups. One such 
example in Pakistan is the claim of the conservative right regarding the 
place of religion and religious values in society (discussed above as the 
‗Grace of God‘). The other element is the shared colonial experience of 
the people which imparted common conceptions of legitimacy, which 
impede conflict. There is a long history of constitutional struggles in the 
courts, in Pakistan, where the civil society and the politicians challenged 
(sometimes successfully) the dictatorial political dispensations. These two 
factors may not provide absolute protection against intense conflict 
(1971 case in Pakistan) but no attempt to explain conflict in today‘s 
Pakistan will be relevant without accounting for these centripetal forces. 
The constitution and its regulatory framework should be accounted for 
in this debate.  
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The intelligentsia in Pakistan itself prefers to cast the debate today in 
contractarian terms 34(though the nature and specifics of this contract are 
not under much discussion). It is on these bases that I take Foucault‘s 
first scheme as I believe that the question in Pakistan today is more of a 
contractarian nature than that of domination-repression. This approach 
also caters well for the right balance on our state-people continuum.  
Having come thus far in our quest for a theoretical framework, Figure 
2.1 is a snapshot in time, a conceptual container which can account for 
the many complexities of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan. The idea is 
not to show the causal links among the complex theories and concepts 
but to chart the direction of the flow of ideas. In Chapter 7, some of its 
elements will also be used to analyze the structural factors behind taliban 
recruitment. The elements discussed till now will differ from those 
following, in the sense that both these groups of ideas make a 
theoretical-analytical interface between them. The analytical elements of 
this conceptual container will be elaborated upon in the following pages.  
Figure 2.1:The Conceptual Container for Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan 
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2.4 The Analytical Interface 
To put this theoretical debate into an analytical framework we need to 
employ empirical handles. For this purpose we start again from the 
people‘s end of the continuum, looking for analytical tools, collected 
from the elements of the theoretical frameworks just discussed. The 
focus is on mobilization phenomena and the central thesis of our project 
i.e. the social contract.  
Social contract is the implicit agreement within a state that delineates 
the rights and responsibilities of the state and its citizens.35 The most 
visible such concord to be found in a modern state is its constitution, a 
viable basis for operationalizing the otherwise abstract concept of social 
contract. The social contract of a state is arrived at through a context 
specific historical evolution. Historical experiences, Constitutional 
dispensation, the process of formation of state and the consensual points 
in the political discourse (Read above Wimmer‘s ‗notions of 
peoplehood‘), all help compose this social contract. However these social 
contracts do not always exist in a 0,1 binary mode. Most of these 
contracts may exist in a society but under some stress. Mostly they are 
meant to provide viable dispute settlement and sharing mechanisms with 
a degree of fairness. The institutions for these purposes are mostly part 
of the contract itself, the breakdown or inadequate functioning of which 
may lead to failure of the state. The state of health of this contract 
explains the nature and intensity of ethnopolitical conflicts. The more 
fragile the health, the larger the grievances generated and the greater will 
be this conflict.36 It is the Pakistani constitution of 1973 that will be 
under scrutiny for the type of social contract it provides, the mechanisms 
enshrined in it to ensure that this social contract is enforced and the 
tools for conflict management in case there is a dispute vis a vis the 
social contract. In addition to the constitution, the pre-partition37 events, 
the resolutions of the founding Muslim league party and the pledges of 
the founding fathers to different groups, will have to be factored into 
this social contract. 
Of the above mentioned components of social contract, the 
constitution is perhaps the most important. The Constitution does not 
explicitly refer to a ‗social contract‘ (in terms of rights and privileges), 
and no act of law or document has ever fully set out the social contract's 
terms. As Dixit (1996) argues; 
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If constitutions are contracts, they are very incomplete ones…. The 
reasons are ... (1) the inability to foresee all the possible contingencies, (2) 
the complexity of specifying rules, even for the numerous contingencies 
that can be foreseen and (3) the difficulty of objectively observing and 
verifying contingencies so that the specified procedures may be put into 
action. (Dixit 1996) 
Yet at the same time, constitutions enshrine certain immutable 
principles; a separation (and specification) of powers among the parties 
to the contract and a system of checks and balances over the contracting 
parties. A full treatment of the subject of social contract and its 
composition in Pakistan is undertaken in the third chapter of this thesis. 
There, most of the specifications of the Pakistani case are fleshed out.  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) emphasize the distinction between 
constitution that governs the whole policy process and individual 
instances of policymaking within this constitution. Dixit (1996) calls the 
outcome of any particular policy making exercise, a policy act. The 
framework used in this thesis will use the actual provisions of the 
constitution and the policy acts that flow from it as the constituent part 
of the formal social contract.  
2.4.1 Measurement of both Violent and Non-Violent Conflict 
Since this thesis is about conflict, it is important to specify what 
constitutes conflict in the analytical framework. The incompatible 
interests of different parties in a conflict can be expressed in more than 
one form therefore it will not be wise to remain confined to the 
conventional ideas of violent conflict. The latent conflict expressed in 
belligerent press statements, demonstrations, arrests and government‘s 
administrative actions are all indicators of a political conflict and as such 
will be part of our analytical framework.38 This will be in addition to the 
more overt indicators of conflict namely injuries and deaths.  
2.4.2 Institutions of conflict management 
Good institutions may help reduce ethnic conflict (Easterly 2001). Social 
contracts need institutions to carry them out. These institutions are 
essential for management of conflicts arising out of the different 
interpretations of the terms of contract. The degradation of state 
institutions chips away at the social contract. In particular it is vulnerable 
to the weakening of those institutions which are meant for conflict 
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management in a multiethnic state. This weakening of institutions is both 
a cause as well as an indicator for weakening of the social contract. 
Conversely, the weakness of a social contract is manifested, inter alia, 
through the weakness or failure of these institutions. Murshed (2002) has 
traced the weakness of these social contracts to the; 
 … legacy of colonialism which institutionalized mechanisms favouring 
settlers over indigenous peoples, … divide and rule favouring one ethnic 
group over another, … market controls to create rents for settlers to the 
cost of locals, … and the expropriation of land and resource rents, ... 
Precolonial ethnic rivalry over territory and assets, … and the failure of 
longstanding independent states to strengthen mechanisms of political 
representation, … also lie behind weak social contracts. A single ethnic 
group (or a subset) often assumed power in the immediate post-
independence era (the 1960s), subjugating others and concentrating the 
fruits of state power – public employment, other public spending and 
resource rents – into its own hands ... A final complexity in fatally 
weakening social contracts was the interaction of these ‗domestic‘ factors 
with external events. (S. Murshed 2002) 
This thesis will look at the formal and informal institutions of conflict 
management. The constitution has given birth to policy making tools like 
the National Finance Commission (NFC) award. This tool and the 
subsequent individual awards are policy acts and children of the wider 
social contract. The constitution of 1973 spells out how the resources 
have to be apportioned, how the federation will compensate the 
federating units (FUs) for their natural resources, How the FUs are to be 
represented in the legislature and how jobs in the civil services are to be 
allocated. Taking cue from Azam and Mesnard (2003), the social 
contract between different groups can best be seen at work when the 
state fulfils its implicit promise to make a fiscal transfer to all of society‘s 
members. This brings us to the issue of fiscal federalism in Pakistan 
which, along with other institutions of conflict management, will be 
analyzed in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
2.4.3 The patterns of Grievances and Horizontal Inequalities 
There is yet another link between the breakdown or weakening of social 
contract, the failure of institutions of conflict management; and the 
expression of conflict. Substantive grievances at the elite and masses 
level are required to mobilize group expressions of conflict. These 
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grievances often arise due to perceptions of unequal treatment. 
Considering that parties in conflict act rationally, or within a bounded or 
myopic rationality (S. Murshed 2002), the expression of violent or non 
violent conflict becomes feasible to them. From the state end of the 
analytical continuum, institutional weakness is thus connected to 
conflict; 
Poor economic governance and state weakness are the critical mediating 
factors between resource abundance and vulnerability to armed [and 
ethnopolitical] conflict; the first engenders popular grievances, the second 
makes separatist and non-separatist insurgencies politically and militarily 
feasible. (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003) 
At the analytical level, three similar approaches are found in literature 
regarding causality of ethnopolitical conflict. The first is the relative 
deprivation approach. Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as a 
perceived discrepancy between men‘s value expectations and their value 
capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to 
which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the 
goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining, given the social means available to them.39 Gurr (1993) 
identified four patterns of grievances of ethnopolitical movements  
which contribute to ethnopolitical conflict. These are 1) Political rights 
2) Political rights other than autonomy 3) Economic rights and 4) Social 
and cultural rights. 40  
 The concept which goes a step beyond the relative deprivation 
approach is that of ‗Social Exclusion‘. The processes which prevent a 
person from participating in the social, economic and political life lead to 
social exclusion (Beall and Piron 2005). Such social exclusion then leads 
to deprivations and grievances of the sort discussed above. 
Another theory which has a different locus but ends at the same focal 
point of ‗grievances‘ is that which takes stock of horizontal inequalities. 
Any dissatisfaction, regarding any of the above described rights, 
harbored by any ethnic group, is a result of two types of inequalities vis-
à-vis that group; Socio-Economic Inequalities and Political Inequalities. 
Since these inequalities are across unranked groups therefore it would be 
wise to use the term Horizontal Inequalities.41  
‗[T]heories of conflict that explain group mobilization for rebellion in 
terms of inter-group or ―horizontal‖ socio-economic or political 
42 CHAPTER 2 
 
inequalities … have significant explanatory power.‘ (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke 2003)42 
Theories that stress the relationship between ethnic conflict and 
modernization are quick to call attention to the role of the differential 
modernization of ethnic conflict: the role of elite ambitions and the role 
of differential modernization of ethnic groups in fostering conflict 
(Horowitz 1985).43 
Further differentiation between the two types of Horizontal 
Inequalities, therefore, also helps explain why some ethnopolitical 
movements develop and why some do not. The motivations inside an 
unranked group are different for the elite and the masses. To the 
question ‗What else is needed besides the ethnic identity, for the 
politicization of ethnicity?‘, Rothschild (1981) has two answers; 1) elites 
with a capacity and an interest (religious, economic, or political) in 
mobilizing those who share the objective markers into such a self-
conscious group and 2) competition over relatively scarce and valued 
resources and goals within the larger society.44 Disadvantaged people do 
not necessarily think that inequalities are unjust, nor does their 
perception of injustice, once awakened, lead inexorably to political 
movements demanding redress of grievances (Gurr 1993).45 Mobilization 
is catalyzed only when the elite are aggrieved and their motivation is 
Political Horizontal Inequality. Hence we come across one of Dahl‘s 
rules promulgated to keep conflict low enough for a ‗polyarchy‘;  
[N]o group should indefinitely be denied the opportunity to participate in 
government. (Dahl 1971)46  
The proposed analytical framework will need empirical handles to 
verify the link of grievances to conflict. The explanation will be 
attempted in chapter 6 in terms of horizontal inequalities. 
To provide an empirical core to this study, this horizontal inequality 
will have to be measured. Langer (2005) suggests an approach which 
takes into account some criteria for measuring Socio-Economic 
Horizontal Inequality. In this thesis, appropriate indicators have been 
chosen in chapter 6, keeping in view the limitations of data availability. 
The Political Horizontal Inequality at the elite level can be measured in 
terms of the proportional share of the elite in the governance structures. 
Suitable indicators have been constructed and used in chapter 5 and 6 
for this purpose. However it will not be enough to just look for these 
inequalities through time. Effort will be made to link it back with the 
 Through the Kaleidoscope 43 
 
historical processes, and the controversies in which dominant groups‘ 
ideals of nation building and assimilation contend with subordinate 
groups‘ (the use of ‗subordination‘ here is not in the sense of that used in 
section 2.3.3) advocacy of autonomy and multiculturalism, as suggested 
by Gurr (1993).47 The contemporary conditions, contributing to 
maintaining inequalities, will also be explored.  
2.4.4 The Greed versus Grievances debate 
The discourse couched by Tedd Gurr in terms of Grievances of 
ethnopolitical movements has lately been turned into ‗Greed versus 
Grievances‘ debate. ―Rebel-centric‖ approaches seek to explain why, 
how, and when people rebel. The elite leadership may not only be acting 
under political motivation but also financial motivation.‘ This possible 
greed factor has been analyzed in some cross country empirical studies.48  
The rational choice theorists have taken ‗greed‘ as one of the motives 
for the rebel leadership in analyzing conflict onset, duration and 
prevalence. In almost all these studies, natural resource rents as ‗booty‘ 
or ‗greed‘ has a central role. This ‗greed‘ factor has been proxied for with 
primary commodity exports ratio to that of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and found to be increasing the likelihood of separatist conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2002), and onset (Hegre 2002). This is in contrast 
to the weak or no effect found by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) for war 
prevalence, using a larger dataset. Others have used mineral exports as a 
ratio of total exports, oil production, oil reserves, natural resource stocks 
per capita, contrabands and mineral resources in conflict zones – as the 
proxies for this ‗greed‘ factor. Ross (2004) has reviewed 14 such studies 
on the subject and concludes;  
[O]il increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; 
second, ‗lootable‘ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make 
conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; 
third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and 
civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities – a 
broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods – and the 
onset of civil war is not robust. (Ross 2004) 
Murshed (2010) points to opportunities for rebel groups in terms of 
financing, recruitment and geography but concludes that any empirical 
validity for greed in the above discussed econometric models is 
atheoretical and emphasised that there is greater need to specify the 
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conditions under which violence and predation is a more viable option 
than peaceful resolution of conflict. He posits that ‗greed‘ and ‗grievance‘ 
may exist simultaneously and one can mutate to the other. Both these 
may be necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict onset. While 
greed may be important in cross country studies, grievance comes up as 
the chief causal mechanism for conflict in country case studies, the latter 
better explaining the onset and former its persistence. There are 
mechanisms in the middle, the institutions which come to represent the 
social contract (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005). 
Since the ‗greed‘ explanation is touted to have explanatory potential 
therefore it will partly be explored in chapter 5 and 6 where the issues of 
elite motivation are separated from those which motivate the masses. 
This will not be an exhaustive exercise though as ‗resource reductionist‘ 
models generally do not account for the myriad relationships between 
economic and political factors. The mere association of presence of 
lootable resources, which is mostly all that is available to test the greed 
explanation of conflict, is often at the cost of more deep rooted 
explanations of conflict.  
In my analytical framework, there is little scope for using the natural 
resource abundance or dependence as proxy for ‗greed‘. The only 
significant case of such a natural resource figuring in ethnopolitical 
conflict is that of Balochistan which provides about one third of the 
natural gas of the whole country. This natural resource is essentially 
unlootable but has some effect on generating grievances. It is also alleged 
that the tribal leaders getting appreciable surface rent for use of their area 
have often incited violence to get a better deal from the gas extraction 
companies and the federal government. Only this specific conflict will 
therefore be taken up in section 4.5.2 in a greed versus grievance 
framework. 
2.4.5 Weakness of State and Geopolitics 
Some studies of civil wars suggest that geopolitics have been at work in 
the ethno territorial conflicts like in Sri Lanka (Fuglerud 2001) and 
(Rotberg 1999)49, Nepal 50, Indonesia(Regan 1996), Rwanda and Burundi 
(Solomon 2004), and Nigeria.51  
 Contemporary intra-state conflicts have strong regional and even global 
linkages. By increasing the number of potential war profiteers and peace 
spoilers and multiplying the points of conflict, these broader dimensions 
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… affect the character and duration of hostilities, [Conflict] analysis … 
need[s] to address these regional dimensions. (Ballentine et al. 2003)52 
 It is natural for Realpolitik to take advantage of ethnopolitical 
conflicts inside any state.53 Ignoring its effects would be foolish. Pakistan 
is no luckier than most other states and the ethnopolitical conflicts are 
widely known to have geopolitical dimensions. In fact most of the 
conflict against Taliban militants today has a considerable geostrategic 
component and the war in Afghanistan has been and continues to be an 
explanatory factor. This will be discussed in chapter 7. The events of 
1971 also have their links to regional and international players (K.K. Aziz 
2003). As Figure 2.2 shows, each of the chief ethnic groups constituting 
today‘s Pakistan have presence across international borders. This has 
drawn her into unavoidable conflicts with some of her neighbours and 
has influenced her ethnopolitical conflicts. 
Figure 2.2: Major Pakistani Ethnic Groups and Their Presence Across 
International Borders 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg54 
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Although the presence of this international geopolitical influence is 
admitted, it will be beyond the scope of the inward looking explanatory 
framework of this thesis to investigate this link in the conflict related to 
ethnopolitics. However it will be discussed in chapter 7, while looking at 
the structural factors affecting taliban recruitment. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In Pakistan, conflicts involving issues of ethnicity, nationalism and 
politics need a theoretical framework which can adequately explain its 
multifaceted and often perplexing causal intricacies. The term 
‗Ethnopolitics‘ fits most of these conflicts well. It is contented that these 
conflicts have their seeds in the breakup of social contract, greed and 
external intervention. This thesis is an attempt to explore the first of 
these mentioned causes. This shall also contribute to our understanding 
of today‘s radical militant‘s conflict between the state and the taliban. 
An analytical framework is required to evaluate the above theoretical 
one. Social contract in Pakistan has to be defined and put to test in light 
of historical data on ethnopolitical conflict. The social contract requires 
some institutions for its implementation. These institutions are essential 
to reduce and resolve conflicts. Such institutions have to be identified 
and their course in history has to be charted. A break up of any contract 
generates perceptions of injustice and inequality, especially when the 
institutions created under the contract fail to correct for these 
perceptions and their underlying causes. This failure or weakness, of the 
institutions, and by implication, that of the social contract; then leads to 
grievances. The analytical framework, in addition to measuring the 
ethnopolitical conflict over the period of study, also needs to empirically 
verify inequalities (and grievances by implication). 
The analytical framework is shown in Figure 2.3. Only the 
‗grievances‘ link will be explored in this thesis, with the ‗greed‘ link 
providing depth to the analysis in chapter 5 and chapter 6.  
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Figure 2.3: The Analytical Framework for Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan 
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1 1971, Ethnic conflict leading to dismemberment of the country, the first post World War II 
country to breakup, and creation of Bangladesh. 
2 pp. 88-89  
3 P.13  
4 Horowitz (1985), P. 13 
5 Horowitz (1985), pp. 8-12 
6 P. 7  
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7 Muhajir, literally meaning a refugee, a term used for and by the Urdu speaking refugees of 1947, 
who mostly settled in urban areas of Sindh province. 
8 P. 52  
9 Horowitz (1985), P. 53 
10 Wimmer (2002), P. 1 
11 P. 1   
12 Horowitz (1985), P. 14 
13 Smith (1965) among others. 
14 For a simple distinction between ranked and unranked groups, Horowitz (1985) considers the 
coincidence or non-coincidence of social class within ethnic groups; where the two coincide, it is 
possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups; where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of 
unranked ethnic groups.  
15 In the Netherlands such systems are called ‗zuillen‘ or pillars, In Austria they are called ‗stamme‘ 
or tribes. Cited in Horowitz (1985), P. 23 
16 P. 25 
17 pp. 80-82  
18 P. 47  
19 P. 48 
20 Iqbal championed the cause of Indian identity in the early part of his political life but was a 
vociferous opponent of ethnic nationalism during the latter part. Similarly Maududi is criticized for 
his opposition to the Pakistan scheme on the basis of ‗two nation theory‘ but he essentially stood for 
pan Islamism as against ethnic nationalism. 
21 P. 50  
22 P. 18 
23 ‗Salariat‘ i.e. the salary owning class largely serving in the military, bureaucracy and judiciary. For 
details see Alvi (1983) 
24 For details see Alonso (1994) 
25 Wimmer (2002), P. 52 
26 P.2  
27 Cohen (2004), P. 163 
28 The famous ‗Objectives Resolution‘ stating as the preamble of the constitution that sovereignty in 
the universe belongs to God and that no law shall be enacted which is against the injunctions of the 
state religion i.e. Islam 
29 The particular details are discussed in chapter 3. 
30 P. 173, Quote translated from Urdu. 
31 State of Natural or ‗War of all against all‘. 
32 P. 11 
33 pp. 55-56 
34 See for example Pakistan‘s most widely read and respected columnist Irshad Ahmad Haqqani‘s 
address to the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (Haqqani 2006). More discussion is in chapter 
3. 
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Locke‘s Two Treatises of Government (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract (1762). For a 
more comparative study of competing theories of ‗popular sovereignty‘ against ‗individualist 
sovereignty‘ read Pierre-Joseph Prodhon‘s Individualist social contract (1851) and Ronald Dworkin‘s 
Law’s Empire (1986). 
36 This discussion about social contract owes its origins to  Tony Addison and Murshed (2001) 
37 i.e. the partition of India in 1947 and the birth of the independent states of India and Pakistan. 
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47 P. 37 
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Hoeffler (2004) 
49 For Indian connection http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0706/p06s01-woap.html , the 
Norwegian intervention is now well recognized 
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51 U.S Deptt of State Report on Nigeria http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61586.htm 
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53 For a wider study of the issue read Ryan (1990) and  Moynihan (1993) 
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3  Identity, History and Ethno-politics 
 
 
The caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence; at 
last the caterpillar took the hookah out of his mouth, and addressed her in 
languid, sleepy voice. Who are you? Said the Caterpillar. 
3.1 Introduction 
As the process of constitution making unfolded in post 1971 Pakistan, it 
was all too evident that the framers had a difficult task ahead of them. 
Questions of history, identity, law and economy made them agree to 
compromises which drew from the experiences of the past and would 
shape the conflicts of the future.  
Writing the formal social contract anew ought to be a time of hope 
for any people and yet the historical experiences of pre and post 
independence Pakistan engendered fears.  These were fears of being 
dominated on part of the smaller provinces and the fear of losing the 
shape of the rest of the state after the secession of East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh).  
There also were struggles of identity. While the conservative right 
insisted on giving a distinct religious identity to the state in the shape of a 
state religion and associated markers, the ethnopoliticians were keen to 
make the social contract reflect the primordialism of the contracting 
parties; and some consolation for the absence of congruency between 
the ethnic and political unit. There was a third group which wanted the 
contract to reflect the distinct and unique ‗Pakistani‘, nation-state 
identity. As compromises multiplied so did the potential for future 
conflicts. 
                                                 
 From ―Alice's Adventures in Wonderland‖ by Lewis Carroll 
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The legal scheme of distribution of powers among the contracting 
parties was also a contested issue and compromises had to be reached 
among the parties. Connected to both fear and identity strands above, 
the debate drew on the shape of past constitutions (1935, 1956), the pre 
contract proclamations of 1940 and 1949 and the institutional scheme 
required to ensure management of potential conflicts. 
And then there were the safeguards sought over a level playing field 
for all the parties to the contract. Guarantees had to be given that the 
state will look after all these parties with fairness when it comes to 
distribution of the costs and benefits of participating in a state. In short 
this was the discourse over the more mundane issues of development. 
The tools to bring this about with fairness were the same as were used in 
the pre partition independence struggle, namely quotas in legislatures, 
executive and all the other levels of administration. 
The formal social contract which was put into the constitution of 
1973 was thus largely a result of the interplay of fear, identity, legal 
history, bread and butter and the compromises over the same.  
This chapter will introduce the country and history of pre and post 
independence Pakistan with a particular focus on how the social contract 
of the country evolved into its present shape.  The history of political 
events, especially the constitution making process, the nature of 
federating units and their peculiarities and the nature of Pakistani 
federalism will be discussed. Of particular interest are the events of post 
1971 secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), when the 
constitution of 1973 was put together by political leadership, and which 
is the period under study in the latter chapters of this thesis.  In this 
context, this chapter is more about the evolution of social contract in 
Pakistan with a view to introducing the country and its political system 
to the reader. The attempt will be to show that both the struggle for 
Pakistan and its constitution making (and breaking) history has a strong 
relationship with the conflicts that later ensued. The chapter should be 
seen as a stepping stone to the rest of this thesis which attempts to 
explain the ethnopolitical and the current radical militant conflicts, not as 
a result of the domination-repression set up but that of a weakening of 
the social contact. 
This chapter is therefore structured as follows. A brief pre-partition 
history will give account of the events which later became the rallying 
points for stakeholders (Actors) in 1973 and thereafter. The post-
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partition history (1947-1971) will focus on the process of state formation 
and the behaviour of actors during this period vis-à-vis the four strands 
of interest identified above. The interplay of actors and a discussion of 
the compromises during the constitution making process will be 
followed by a discussion of how it all shaped the ethnopolitical conflict 
of the latter period (1972-2005). 
3.2 Search for identity in the constitutional framework of 
Pre-Partition India  
Pre-partition India was a mosaic of administrative divisions which came 
about as a result of conquests, experiments, reforms and political 
expediencies. At the turn of the twentieth century she had more than 675 
princely states, eight major provinces and a few minor (William Wilson 
Hunter et al. 1907).1 This made India, more like a bag of goodies which 
the English child had collected in haste; than a unified country. The 
ethnic make up of the country was even more diverse. In the following 
sub sections, the history of identity struggles of Muslims of India will be 
described. The purpose is to show the elements which transcended the 
time barrier of 1947 and were influential in shaping the conflicts of post 
independence Pakistan. 
Nature of Identity struggles 
The issue of identity in pre-colonial India isn‘t settled among historians. 
People like Beni Prasad called on the geographical unity of India to argue 
for their case of an Indian nation state (Prasad 1946).2 A second school 
of thought argued that India had never been a single nation state; like 
Francis Robinson who start his book with ‗The British united the 
peoples of India under one government, but left them under two‘ 
(Robinson 1974)3. A third school, mostly among Muslim writers of India 
argued that nations were formed by a common political consciousness 
and in India this consciousness could only be witnessed on the basis of 
religious identity.4 An appreciation of this background of competing 
theories of identity is necessary to understand the constitutional 
framework of pre-colonial India. The colonial power had it in its interest 
to keep India united for as long as it could and saw itself as the 
paramount power in India which had brought the country together with 
its civil-military bureaucratic machine. The champions of Indian nation 
state saw eventual Indian independence as their ultimate goal and 
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therefore resisted any idea of a separate identity on the basis of religion. 
The protagonists of a separate Muslim-nation identity feared the 
dominance of a Hindu majority in an independent and democratic 
India.5 They therefore fought all along for constitutional safeguards and 
a scheme of quotas in the executive and legislatures.  
It is not that Muslims pounced on the idea of a separate 
communitarian identity when they were suddenly confronted with the 
idea of Westminster type of democracy in early 20th century. Jalal (2000)6 
stresses the difference of ‗identity as culture‘ and ‗identity as politics‘ in 
pre-partition India. The former had always been present in press, poetry 
and art, the latter, equally present since the second half of eighteenth 
century.  
A prominent thread woven into this fear based identity discourse was 
the distinct economic conditions of Muslims of India. Muslims had a 
history of providing India its ruling socio-economic elite as recently as 
the Mughal Empire (1526-1857). With the empire, this economic pre-
eminence as a community was lost. The result was economic 
backwardness and the realization of a separate ‗Economic Identity‘. 
Talha (2000) has painstakingly traced the development of this identity 
among Muslims, to as far back as the times of Shah Waliulah (1703-81). 
Through the writings of the likes of Hunter (1876), the colonialists had a 
fair idea, very early, that Muslim alienation in India and especially in 
Bengal was mainly due to economic reasons. Muslim Bengal had a 
tradition of peasant revolts in which the leaders used religious identity to 
mobilize support against the British. Among them, Haji Shariatullah 
(1781-1840), Dudu Mian (1819-1862) and Titu Mir (d. 1831) led the 
Faraizi movement which, in the guise of religious Puritanism, was also a 
revolt against the Hindu landlords by the peasantry and an affirmation of 
Bengali Muslim separatism (Khan 1985). There was the added frustration 
of economic backwardness especially against the backdrop of a 
prosperous pre-colonial Bengali economy. Successive Muslim thinkers, 
leaders and reformers of the latter period, like Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan 
(1817-1898), Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
(1876-1948) were acutely aware of the disadvantaged economic situation 
of Muslims of India. As they articulated, they were afraid that Muslims 
will ultimately be reduced to ‗hewers of wood and drawers of water‘7 if 
the situation remained unchecked. 
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This theory of economic backwardness contributing to the evolution 
of a separate identity has its proponents and critics but the fact remains 
that it was either backwardness itself or the fear of it which helped shape 
this separate identity.8 
 All these three struggles of identity; United Indian identity, a divided 
and fragmented identity on the basis of different languages and races; 
and the two nation theory of Hindus and Muslims; would latter define 
the nature of socio-political dialogue when it came to putting together 
the social contract in Pakistan.  
 
Identity and Legal Framework 
The period from 1857 to 1906 was a difficult one for Muslims of India 
as the British largely held them responsible for the war of independence 
of the year 1857. Persian, the official language was replaced with English, 
a new fiscal measure ‗resumption‘ was introduced which called for 
showing title deeds of estates, deprived many Muslim land-holders of 
their lands (and many Hindus too). They were kept away from military 
service (a profession that was their traditional forte). During this period 
of official hostility, Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan, led, by trying to educate 
and organize the Muslims. It would eventually be his All India 
Mohammaden Association and the college at Aligarh that will provide a 
basis for the first Muslim political party of All India Muslim League and 
most of its leadership cadres. The change of heart on the part of the 
colonialists towards their Muslim subjects came during the mid seventies 
and eighties of nineteenth century (Sayeed 1968).9  By 1906, the situation 
had changed to the extent that Muslim demands for separate 
representation in all levels of government and legislative councils were 
accepted by the colonial power. To counter the influence of All India 
Congress, (which was herself created with British support in 1885) the 
British now encouraged the Muslims to form their own political party 
(Sayeed 1968).10 
With the avowed resolve to reform Indian polity and more out of the 
necessity of securing Indian support during world wars, the British 
wanted to bring about constitutional reforms in India. The process had 
started before World War I with the Minto Morley reforms of 1909 
wherein Muslim demand for a separate electorate was granted. The 
process gained impetus with the introduction of Montague-Chelmsford 
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reforms of 1919 when Sikhs, Anglo Indians and Europeans were also 
granted separate electorate status.  
All along this reform process the need to keep a united India under 
an effective and efficient colonial set up was important for the British. 
Therefore, while devolving limited powers of self rule to parts of 
administration in the provinces, the central authority of the colonial state 
was never left in doubt.  
It is safe to assume that except for this narrow band of separate 
representation in legislatures and administration, Muslim politicians of 
India had no focus till 1930. Their aims and objectives changed with 
whatever the times dictated. In 1919 they had demanded the 
preservation of Ottoman Caliphate failing which they called for mass 
migration to Afghanistan. The campaign failed and the resulting 
disappointment kept Muslims from launching a similar pan Islamic 
movement for at least another decade and a half. They also felt ill at ease 
with Mr. Gandhi‘s politics, yet couldn‘t decide on the extent of their 
cooperation with All India Congress.11 In 1928 the Congress committee 
on constitutional reforms, led by Moti Lal Nehru, recommended the 
abolition of the system of separate electorates. This was too much for 
some Muslim leaders and resulted in a parting of ways of Congress and 
Muslim league. The latter‘s only visible efforts now were to achieve 
economic security, mainly in seats in the legislature, judiciary and 
executive. This approach made the Muslim leaders oppose open 
competition in all these spheres.  
It was the Government of India Act 1935, which would prove the 
most influential in determining the state of relations among different 
federating units of Pakistan after 1947. This act also became the basic 
framework for all the future constitutions of Pakistan. The system of 
separate electorates was reaffirmed in this act. Sindh became a separate 
province. Reforms were introduced in North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and limited provincial autonomy was given to provinces. 
The Government of India Act 1935, constituted the state as a 
federation and, 
[T]he provincial governments derived their powers by devolution from the 
central government and discharged their functions under the 
superintendence, direction, and control of the Governor-General and 
ultimately the Secretary of State of India. (H. Khan 2005)  
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Although a semblance of autonomy and responsible government was 
granted to provinces, the overriding scheme of constitution called for the 
paramountcy of British imperial power in all matters of final arbitration.  
Some Muslim thinkers like Iqbal had already hinted, in 1930, at the 
establishment of separate autonomous regions for Muslims of north-
west and eastern India. After 1935, a process of introspection among the 
Muslim league leaders led to the crystallization of demands which gained 
formal shape in the 1940 Lahore resolution. In 1939 the British needed 
Indian support in their war effort. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of 
Muslim league, called a general session of his party in Lahore on March 
22, 1940. The much detested (by Muslim league) Congress led provincial 
governments had already resigned. The two and a half year experience 
had been very bitter for the Muslim league. She thought that the 
Muslims of India were in search of a viable cause. As their avowed 
representatives, the Muslim league came up with the scheme of a 
separate state for them. The raison d‘ etre of this state was to be the 
separate identity of Muslims of India; an identity based on religion. 
Mussalmans12 are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and 
they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state. We wish to 
live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent 
people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest of our spiritual, 
cultural, economic, social, and political life, in a way that we think best and 
in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our 
people. (Jinnah)13 
The resolution, moved by a Bengali A.K Fazl ul Haq and adopted at 
the occasion, called for groups of independent states of Muslim majority 
areas in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India,  in which the 
constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign (Sayeed 1968). 
Although the word ‗Pakistan‘ wasn‘t mentioned anywhere in the 
resolution, political adversaries of the Muslim League quickly dubbed it 
‗The Pakistan Resolution‘. The Muslim League had no hesitation to 
adopt the name. As Jalal (1994) points out, the resolution was a 
masterpiece of Jinnah‘s gamesmanship. With little say in the Muslim 
majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, he wanted the authority to 
speak on their behalf in the center, at the same time, preserving the 
rights of Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces. These seemingly 
mutually exclusive goals could not be accommodated in a single 
constitutional formula. The inherent inconsistencies of the Lahore 
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resolution will later come to the fore after 1947 when the religious right 
insisted on an Islamic character of the state based on the demands which 
were essentially made on the basis of a Muslim identity. On the other 
hand the ethnopoliticians would ask for rights of smaller provinces 
which were demanded of the British, in the same resolution.  
At the start of the Second World War, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to 
India with an offer which largely recognized the Muslim League‘s 
demand of strong provincial groupings. Such an arrangement would 
have given the Muslim League something approaching its demands 
contained in the Lahore Resolution but the latter sensed that it would be 
at the expense of minority Muslims elsewhere in India. The thrust of 
Cripps‘s offer on provincial rather than communal lines was now 
unacceptable to the Muslim League who had come to align itself with an 
identity based on religion. As H.V Hodson, the Reforms Commissioner 
would observe after speaking with many Muslims; 
Pakistan…was in essence a ‗revolt‘ against the notion of minority status 
with safeguards. At best, such a status relegated Muslims to being a 
Cinderella with trade-union rights and a radio in the kitchen but still 
below-stairs.14  
For Indian National Congress, the offer was unacceptable as it 
favoured the idea of strong provinces at the expense of a strong central 
government.  
The arrangement of Cripps‘s offer replied to a communal question 
with a provincial answer. It will be seen in latter pages how the 1973 
constitution of Pakistan dispensed the same legal framework when it 
came to address the ethnic question.  
At the end of the war, the British Empire did not have the 
wherewithal to resist Indian demands for independence. The 1945 
elections under the 1935 Act gave all the Muslim reserved seats to the 
Muslim league and resultantly the authority to speak on their behalf. As 
the three member mission of the British cabinet failed to convince 
Jawahar Lal Nehru and Indian National Congress, to lend unqualified 
support to their plan15 to grant India independence and keep it in a lose 
dominion, the Muslim League changed its stance from one of 
unqualified support to an uncompromising demand for Pakistan. The 
British had to acquiesce and announced the independence and partition 
of India into two separate countries in June 1947. 
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Colonial state, Identity and the fear of becoming a disadvantaged 
minority16 therefore were foremost in shaping the constitutional setup of 
British India. The 1935 Act had created a strong central government 
which provided checks against the centrifugal tendencies of the 
provinces. The Act institutionalized the system of separate electorate on 
the basis of religious identity, to assuage fears of becoming a powerless 
minority. It was also an attempt to give a semblance of devolution of 
power to the Indian subjects by the colonial state. The institutions 
created by this constitutional dispensation therefore catered to all the 
three needs of the stakeholders and would define the shape of latter day 
Pakistan, its own constitutional set up and its conflicts. 
3.3 The struggle over identity in the ‘Bonapartist’ State 
(1948-1971)17 
The cataclysmic events of 1947 gave birth to, in the words of Jinnah ‗a 
mutilated, truncated, moth-eaten‘ Pakistan. Disregarding the fact that the 
movement for Pakistan had used separate Muslim identity as a 
justification for its demand, now Jinnah wanted the Pakistanis to shun 
their religious differences for running the state. 
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do 
with the business of the State.18 
This may have been a hint of the future of things to come in Pakistan 
but Jinnah‘s death a year later and the problems of Kashmir, refugees 
and division of assets with India, kept the government occupied. Later, 
when the famous objectives resolution19 was adopted by the same 
legislature, it gave a distinct religious identity to the ‗business of the 
state‘. 
A. Khan (2005) goes to the extent of making the accusation of 
‗ideological engineering‘ by the state elite; 
The Pakistan movement was the Muslim elite‘s project to capture state 
power and replace colonial control and coercion with their nationalist 
version. Therefore, instead of doing away with the coercive methods of 
the colonial state apparatus and its racist and discriminatory ideology, the 
postcolonial leadership indigenised them to build a nation-state. (A. Khan 
2005)20 
This exercise in ‗ideological engineering‘ addressed itself mainly to 
state-building and economic development at the cost of – what Jahan 
 Identity, History and Ethno-Politics 59 
 
(1972) calls, ‗nation-building‘; and as a result, the Punjabis and the 
migrants from northern and western India became a national elite of 
Pakistan from the outset, at the expense of the majority 54% Bengalis 
(Jahan 1972).21 
The ‗politics of identity‘ soon took root with the language 
controversies of 1948 and 1952, when the Bengali movement for 
recognition of Bengali as a second national language, was brutally 
suppressed and their proponents branded as ‗traitors to Islam and the 
enemies of our nation‘ (Rahman 1998).22  
In 1954, the Fazlul Haq‘s United Front had won the elections in the 
province of East Pakistan. He had demanded satisfaction on the issues 
of language, constitution and provincial autonomy (H. Khan 2005).23 His 
dismissal soon thereafter on the pretense of law and order situation had 
already alienated the majority of political leadership of East Pakistan.  To 
the further chagrin and alienation of Bengalis (and indeed the Pukhtuns, 
Balochis and Sindhis), all the western provinces were combined into the 
single administrative unit of West Pakistan and parity was declared 
between the Eastern and Western provinces. This robbed the Bengalis of 
their legitimate expectation of due consideration in legislative rights and 
development funding.24  
The constitution of 1956 saw four short lived governments and the 
military coup of 1958 sealed its fate. The government of the military 
dictator Ayub introduced a new constitution in 1962. This constitution 
changed the state structure from parliamentary to presidential. By all 
accounts, the social contract provided in the new constitution was an 
authoritarian one. The common man (and by implication the majority 
Bengalis) were deprived of their right to elect a leader through ‗one man, 
one vote‘ and a complex system of ‗basic democracy‘ ensured that only a 
handpicked lot of some eighty thousand ‗basic democrats‘ were allowed 
to vote for a presidential candidate.25 The constitution of 1962 
concentrated such powers in the hands of the President that the position 
was commonly known as the ‗clock-tower of Faisalabad where all the 
bazaars converged‘ (H. Khan 2005).26 
The ‗failure in national integration‘ was all the more evident in the 
enterprise of institutions building pursued by the Ayub dictatorship 
(1958-1969). These institutions failed to bring about structural and 
functional integration of Bengalis into the national body politic in the 
sense that these neither gave proportional (and due) representation to 
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Bengalis on the basis of their share in population, nor succeeded in 
giving them a sense of identity with the national political system. This 
failure in structural and functional integration led to the de-legitimization 
of these institutions in the country as a whole (Jahan 1972).  
The ethno-politics and failure of institutions was compounded by the 
systematic gaps in development between East and West Pakistan. Such 
was the official bias that against Rs. 200 million development 
expenditure in West Pakistan only Rs. 70 million were spent in East 
Pakistan during 1948-1955 (Alqama 1997).27 Despite a formal official 
commitment to reduce disparity, the gap in per capita income widened at 
an increasing rate between 1949 and 1970 and ‗the commitment was only 
honoured in breach‘ (Alqama 1997).28 
Continued military dictatorship, lack of a formal social contract in the 
form of an agreed constitution, 29 institutional failure and socio-economic 
disparities between the East and West Pakistan were compounded by the 
refusal of West Pakistani politicians and generals to accept the electoral 
verdict of 1970 elections. Against 151 seats won by Awami League, all in 
East Pakistan; the Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) won 62, all in West 
Pakistan (Noman 1990), yet the generals and the PPP were reluctant to 
transfer power to Awami League leadership. The resulting agitation led 
to a brutal army action in East Pakistan which triggered a refugee crisis. 
India, citing this crisis, invaded East Pakistan and helped establish 
independent Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. Ethno-politics, on the 
basis of systematic failure in national integration, triumphed; with a little 
outside help. 
3.4 The New Social Contract: Constitution of 1973 
The army junta transferred power of the remaining country to the 
elected civilians. The first task before legislature was to write a new 
constitution. This had to be accomplished in the face of the ideal and the 
real. The identities of the past had to be adjusted with the hopes and 
fears for the future. The colonial constitutional legacy worked both as a 
working model to be followed and as an unwanted burden of history to 
be shed. This political and legal dilemma was to be solved with the 
language of British constitutional heritage and yet a conscious effort was 
required to set the new state apart from the trappings of the empire. The 
conflicting viewpoints of sovereignty, identity, nationality and state had 
to be adjusted in the scheme of a heavily bureaucratized state with a 
 Identity, History and Ethno-Politics 61 
 
definite ‗state ideology‘. Writing about constitution making in Pakistan, 
Newberg (1995) explains the difficulties; 
The process of constituting a new state - literally, writing its constitution - 
involves both political and juridical tasks. In the first instance, writing a 
constitution provides a legal frame for the state, a method of organizing 
authority and adjudicating conflicts about power. It also speaks to the 
political pasts and futures of those who comprise it – establishing the 
sources, character and conditions of collective identity and sovereignty. 
These activities are mutually reinforcing. (Newberg 1995)30 
As will be explained shortly, the history and issues, both pre and post 
partition - which are outlined above, had a powerful bearing on the 
exercise for writing a new constitution which had to be put together 
considering the not so distant past failures to have a workable 
constitution. The drafting committee noted: 
The committee was particularly conscious of the unfortunate 
constitutional history of Pakistan and past failures. It identified the causes 
which led, on more than one occasion, to the breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery. (Committee 1972) 
Contesting identities vied for prominence in the new social contract. 
The three notions of peoplehood namely people‘s sovereignty, 
citizenship and ethnicity, which underpin the project of political 
modernity,31 had to contend with that of religious identity. There was a 
sizeable presence of proponents of each of these contesting notions of 
peoplehood, in the legislature.  
The extreme right32 of Pakistani politics hoped to use this opportunity 
to get an ‗Islamic State‘. While it is easy to charge the state and the 
Punjabi dominated elite for the ‗ideological engineering‘ in the context of 
a power struggle in a domination-repression setting, the fact is that there 
were powerful ideological forces at the negotiating table who wanted to 
draft the contract to their own wishes. These forces had a more suave 
and sophisticated approach to the nature of their demands than they are 
generally given credit for.33 This sophistication aside, it was their chance 
to argue also that other identities and specially the ethnic – had 
contributed to the break up of the country.34 In addition to certain other 
Islamic provisions, the objectives resolution was thus included as the 
preamble to the constitution. 
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Despite putting together coalition governments in the two smaller 
provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, the ethno-politicians were 
outnumbered in the national assembly.35 They had a historical argument 
for modelling the state which guarantees the rights of its constituent 
ethnic communities (or nationalities as they preferred to call these) 
participating in a federal compact. This historic argument was largely 
Marxian and followed the domination-repression setting of looking at 
political chess board. 
[A]mong the political leaders, cadres, and intelligentsia of the Bengali, 
Sindhi, Pushtuns and Baloch nationalists as well as among Punjabi and 
Urdu-speaking leftists it became axiomatic that Punjabi and Urdu-speaking 
groups dominated the state while Bengalis, Sindhis, Pushtuns, and Balochs 
were oppressed nationalities.‘ (F. Ahmed 1997) 
The majority PPP, which could frame the constitution on the strength 
of its comfortable majority, was not prepared to grant this demand of 
constituting the state on ethnic lines. A less than insistent ethnopolitical 
leadership led to a compromise. What emerged was the pattern 
envisaged in the 1940 Lahore resolution where instead of mentioning 
communities (religious or ethnic) the regional (provincial) framework 
was adopted for modelling the state as a federation and federating units.  
The difference between the pre and post 1973 federations is apparent 
in the processes that led up to their specific configuration. Stepan (1999) 
has identified two broad processes of constituting federations. In 1947, 
the process of constituting a federation was the ‗coming together‘ type 
like e.g. Argentina, Switzerland, USA or Australia, in which federating 
units come together by pooling their sovereignty. All the five provinces 
at that time had explicitly consented to be part of the federation. NWFP 
through its plebiscite, Sindh through its provincial legislature, 
Balochistan through it‘s vote of the municipality of Quetta and Shahi 
Jirga36 Punjab and Bengal by agreeing to the sacrifice of as much as half 
their population and territory.37 Such federations are configured to 
restrain the dominant power from over running the weaker sub-units. 
Instead the process in 1973 was that of, ‗holding together‘ federation, as 
is the case in India, Spain, Belgium and Canada, where the states are 
configured to prevent the sub-units from secession; in Pakistan‘s case – 
further secession.   
On another score, the 1940 resolution was one-upped by the 1935 
Act. What little provincial autonomy was given in the constitution; was 
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taken away with a strong and meddlesome central government. There 
was no mention of ethnic identities in the constitution. As for 
‗nationhood‘ official decrees mandated that only the correct version 
should gain currency and any dissent on this score was a culpable 
offence, earning the offender seven years in prison.38 The constitution 
had already declared it a principle of policy to discourage parochial, 
racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices.39 
Since the demographics of most of the ethnicities broadly followed 
the provincial setup therefore it wasn‘t difficult to satisfy the aspirations 
of ethnopolitical leadership. There was the added fact that the 
participating regions/provinces of the federation neither had a 
particularly strong tradition of self rule on the basis of ethnic identity nor 
the common belief that the groups once governed their own affairs. 
Such a belief is the common denominator for almost all autonomy 
struggles (Gurr et al. 1993).40 The ethnopolitical leadership would later 
claim to have acted in good faith and having pulled the country out of its 
worst crisis by acceding to the 1973 constitution when ‗it was so faulty in 
their opinion‘ (Qazi 2003). 
The result of this arrangement is the composition of the social 
contract in such a way that ethnicities are not party to the contract 
directly. The contract is among 'federating units' or regions. This spatial 
configuration was broadly acceptable to the ethnopolitical leadership in 
1971. With time, this spatial arrangement started creating a melting pot 
of ethnicities. Pukhtuns in Karachi, Punjabis in Quetta and Balochistan 
at large; are the two major examples. This was unforeseen by the 
ethnopolitical leadership. The quid pro quo for accepting the regional set 
up was the promise that most of the powers, then retained by the federal 
government, will be gradually transferred to the provinces. Nazeer Naji 
links the failure to honour this commitment with the conflicts of the 
latter day; 
The constitution of Pakistan was actually a ten year contract among the 
federating units of Pakistan. In these ten years, a blueprint of powers, 
between the federation and provinces, was to be completed; after which 
the major portion of concurrent list was to be transferred to the provinces 
and the saga of constitutional abrogation, martial law and sham 
democracies would have stopped automatically. (Naji 2007) 
The instrument devised for this purpose was the two types of 
legislative subjects, the federal legislative list and the concurrent 
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legislative list. It was provided that after ten years the concurrent 
legislative list will be abolished and all the subjects will stand transferred 
to the provinces.41 
The institutions of conflict management in the constitution also 
followed this spatial arrangement. These are there to resolve conflicts 
arising between and among the federating units and not between the 
ethnicities. A regional quota scheme to ensure fair, population based 
share to each region, number of seats in the legislature and public sector 
jobs, was enshrined in the constitution for a ten years period initially. 
The share in revenue was to be allocated to these federating units and 
not otherwise. The fears of becoming a minority in one‘s own home 
were therefore allayed to some extent. 
Such a spatial arrangement of institutions was bound to come under 
stress from a direction for which no provision was available in the 
scheme of things, hence the insistence of constitutionalists to pose the 
questions of ethnopolitical conflict in terms of a provincial framework. 
The ‗National Question‘, as scholars like Feroz Ahmed, Aijaz Ahmed 
and Akbar Zaidi would like to posit; therefore finds little sympathy with 
the formal social contract. Ahmed (1992) objects to this scheme of 
things arguing that while it is helpful in resolving some conflicts, it will 
always fail without recognizing that ‗there are distinct nationalities which 
should have full freedom to develop their culture and national 
personality‘.42  
Having done with the demands of both the religious and 
ethnopolitical leadership it comes up as a singular failure of the writers of 
the constitution to identify a unique national, Pakistani, identity. The 
two-nation theory of pre-partition era only served to keep the new social 
contract tied up with agenda of the past, to the point that some argued 
that ‗Pakistan‘s conceived nation-ness should be judged by its hatred of 
others, especially India‘ (A. Khan 2005).43 This is somewhat similar to 
Cohen‘s (2004) assertion. However there were voices within the ruling 
PPP, like Aitizaz Ahsan who argued for a distinct Pakistani identity 
based on the geographical substrata provided by the river Indus. The 
‗Indus citizen‘, as Ahsan (1996) argues, has always had a separate political 
identity which was only interrupted by the three ‗Universal States‘ of the 
Mauryas (321-185 BC), the Mughals (1526-1857) and the British (1857-
1947). This view, however, was largely confined to a few academic circles 
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of Islamabad and Lahore and could neither gain popular acceptability 
nor political currency. 
The downside of this continued failure and identity based on past 
fears was the obsession with a security paradigm which the country 
could ill afford and turned it into a ‗security state‘. This security state and 
the ‗defence of ideological frontiers‘,44 were later used to justify the army 
coups and alienate the ethnopolitical leadership. Newberg (1995) points 
out that the casualty in this situation was often the social contract itself; 
Administering the state became an endeavour separate from resolving 
problems of identity to the edges of the political agenda. Ideological issues 
were either set aside or manipulated - always present and contentious, 
frequently used to represent or disguise the pursuit of power, but rarely at 
the critical centre of state authority. The end of stability has been used 
consistently to justify the means of manoeuvring constitutions to suit the 
executive-oriented - and too often, praetorian - state. (Newberg 1995)45 
The ‗end of stability‘, so forcefully argued by the ruling army juntas, 
was always used in tandem with, the means of ‗fear‘. It was always argued 
that a failure to act (i.e. mount a coup) would have resulted in a failure of 
the state itself.46 The courts shamefully agreed.47 
In addition to the political compact between the federating units, an 
economic compact was also made part of the formal contract. This setup 
made it a responsibility of the state to ensure the freedom of inter-
provincial trade, the promotion of social and economic well-being of the 
people by raising their standard of living and providing basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief, 
irrespective of caste or race and to reduce disparity in the income and 
earnings of individuals. A scheme of mutually coordinating economic 
institutions was built into the constitution to carry out the contract.48  
Both the political and economic compacts of the constitution dealt 
only with the upper two layers of federal and provincial governments. 
No local government scheme is part of the constitution itself. This may 
not have been a conscious choice however later attempts at giving this 
third tier a constitutional cover were met with resistance from almost all 
the political forces.49 Such staunch and almost universal resistance 
indicates that the original omission of such a constitutional cover was by 
design. 
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Ethnopolitical Conflict after 1973 
The security state and the authoritarian pedigree flowing from the 1935 
Act combined to eliminate any semblance of provincial autonomy that 
was enshrined in the original constitutional draft. Civilian martial law, 
suspension of fundamental rights and the patently unjust removal of the 
opposition led provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan, led to 
the uprising in Balochistan and heart burn in NWFP. Minority 
governments were foisted upon these provinces in all disregard of 
constitution and political ethics. A violent suppression led to armed 
insurgency in Balochistan, and the arrest and self exile of Pukhtun 
leaders of NWFP to Afghanistan. A state of emergency prevailed from 
1973 to 1977 i.e. throughout the civilian led government of PPP. The 
ruling party cited reasons of national security, distrust of ethnopoliticians 
and the semi tribal-ness of the people for the authoritarian rule. Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto (ZAB) thus justified his strong arm; 
The Muslims or the people from the North West have historically been 
more individualistic and have had greater sense of separateness. So 
although India is a bigger country, Pakistan contains four of the most 
difficult provinces of the subcontinent. To keep all these tribal people 
together- to keep people who just like to pull out their guns- under the 
umbrella of the rule of law is not an easy task. (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)50 
Amid this state of civilian emergency rule, the opposition cried foul 
over the results of elections of 1977. A country wide agitation led to 
another army coup and the PPP leadership was thrown in jail. The new 
army government promptly mended ways with the ethnopolitical 
leadership from NWFP and Balochistan, declared an end to the 
Balochistan army operation and took back the litigation pending against 
the ethnopoliticians of National Awami Party (NAP). This largely 
pacified the insurgency in Balochistan.  
While the two smaller provinces of NWFP and Balochistan were 
quieting down, the Sindhi ethnopolitical passions were incited when the 
four Punjabi judges of the Supreme Court found Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the 
leader of the PPP and the former prime minister, guilty of murder and 
the army junta (mostly led by Punjabi generals51) hastened to send him to 
gallows. Zia ul Haq, the army chief of staff, imposed his version of a 
‗military theocracy‘ on the country.52 The opposition launched the 
Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which, although could 
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not do well in the other three provinces, assumed violent contours in 
rural Sindh. Army‘s counter measures turned this largely political 
enterprise into a battle cry for the Sindhi ethnopoliticians. It is indeed 
remarkable that the PPP stood its federalist ground amid the temptation 
to use ethnopolitics in Sindh. 
Violence in Sindh gained impetus from the unlikely source of the 
terrorist organization of Al-Zulfiqar, which the two younger sons of Z. 
A. Bhutto had created to avenge the death of their father. This 
organization assumed responsibility for many bomb explosions, train 
derailments and a plane hijacking. This campaign was more violent in 
Sindh and had more ethnopolitical undertones than would have been 
expected of a movement created by the sons of ZAB. However the roots 
of ethnopolitical discontent in rural Sindh ran deeper. As Siddiqui (1986) 
points out, the continuous trek of people from up country threatened to 
imbalance the demographics. Also after the construction of Ghulam 
Muhammad barrage on Indus in 1955, newly irrigated lands were allotted 
to ex-servicemen which created resentment among the local peasantry. 
The ethnopolitical conflict in Sindh in mid 1980s was thus a result of 
more deep seated grievances and the MRD merely provided the political 
strata for it. 
When the Soviet tanks rolled across the Amu River into Afghanistan 
in 1979, Pukhtun ethnopoliticians found a sympathetic regime in Kabul. 
Pakistani alignment with the US set the left leaning leadership of NAP 
on a collision course with the state. Both violent and non-violent conflict 
flared up and continued right till the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and the over throw of Najibullah led government there. The 
alliance between the military junta and Islamic extremists was bank rolled 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Story 2007). 
General Zia‘s rule (1977-1988) is marked by the ascendancy of 
religious right in Pakistani polity. Religious parties were enthusiastic in 
supporting his mission to ‗Islamize‘ the state and society. They also 
participated with men and material in the Western supported war against 
the ‗infidel‘ Soviets in Afghanistan. All this helped to undercut support 
for the ethnopoliticians who were regularly accused of being hand in 
glove with the ‗red menace‘. With state patronage, the ‗ideological 
engineering‘ reached its peak. The counter to this came from a very 
unlikely source.  
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Islam and Urdu were the main arguments in the case for a religion 
based identity. Throughout Pakistan‘s history this case had found its 
staunchest supporters in the Urdu speaking migrant community from the 
Muslim minority provinces of undivided India. This community had also 
dutifully voted the religious parties to legislatures and city mayor ships. 
However, in late 1970s, the second generation of this community 
organized itself into Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) 53  under the 
leadership of Altaf Hussain. The party largely remained confined to 
Karachi and Hyderabad and a few other urban pockets of Sindh but 
within these, the hold of the party was complete and unchallengeable. At 
the same time the first ethnopolitical conflicts between Pukhtuns and 
Muhajirs, Sindhis and Muhajirs and Punjabis and Muhajirs converted 
urban Sindh into a multi-cratered volcano.54 The roots of Muhajir 
grievances have been traced to unemployment, lack of control over local 
resources, absence of effective participation in provincial and national 
decision making (K. Bengali 1996) and a lack of articulation for 
perceived deprivation (Jaffar 1992).55 Although these explanations for 
conflicts will be taken up later in this thesis, the purpose here is to 
remind the reader that all these explanations form part of a historical 
continuum in which new identities have been constructed on the basis of 
fears and grievances. 
The institutional ethnopolitical conflict over resources was mitigated 
to an extent during Zia dictatorship (1977-1988). It had mostly to do 
with the fact that a single institution (army) was calling the shots and the 
others had to tow whatever line was thrown at them. Demands for 
provincial autonomy were loud but relegated to the fringes of political 
debate in the absence of freely functioning institutions of conflict 
management. The same institutional ethnopolitical conflict registered a 
marked increase in intensity with the onset of democracy in 1988. Issues 
like the distribution of resources, regional quotas and provincial 
autonomy were for the first time debated inside the institutions that were 
actually created by the contract for exactly this purpose.56 
3.5 Revolving Doors, Democracy-Autocracy 
 Return to democracy in 1988 saw the return of Baloch and Pukhtun 
ethnopoliticians to the mainstream national politics. The institutional 
framework envisaged in the constitution was for first time put to test 
with strong opposition governments in the provinces. Although 
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institutions dealing with conflicts over development and funding issues 
among federating units57 operated with a degree of success, the 
legislature, executive and judiciary could not shake the stranglehold of 
army. Successive civilian governments in the 1990s also faced 
ethnopolitical conflict in urban Sindh, particularly Karachi. The division 
and disappointments of the 1990s, sometimes called the lost decade for 
Pakistan, stemmed from the role of religion in society, democracy in 
polity and the ‗transformative capacities ‗ of the state institutions‘ in 
economic management (Newberg 1995).58 
Perhaps the biggest achievement of the era from 1988 to 1999 was 
the spluttering start of institutions of conflict management among the 
federating units, as given in the constitution. Although this start was 
marked by a rise in institutional conflict, this must be seen as inevitable 
given the long artificial suppression of issues during the Zia dictatorship. 
The issue of sharing of financial and natural resources was for the first 
time brought to the fore and discussed inside the institutions that were 
meant for it. Accords over these issues were arrived at, albeit after much 
acrimony; the sort that was perhaps desired.  
There were times during this infant democracy when a need was felt 
to modify or improve the social contract. Moeen Qureshi, one of the 
many caretaker Prime Ministers during the 1990s thus opined; 
Pakistan needs to establish an understanding between the centre and the 
provinces, between the provinces and local bodies[.]… The armed forces 
too should be part of the social contract. A revenue sharing scheme could 
even out disparities between the provincial revenue base and needs, and 
ensure that all the country's citizens have the capacity to receive broadly 
similar services[.]…The social contract must involve the devolution of 
responsibility with power. Responsibility without the power to execute has 
been the problem of eunuchs throughout ages. (M. Qureshi 1993) 
Instead of a new social contract or an improvement in it, which, it 
was hoped, would reduce conflict; the country had to face yet another 
dictatorship. The army coup of October 1999 witnessed renewed 
conflict in Balochistan. This time the apparent issue of contention was 
the income from gas produced in the province. The three tribal leaders 
of Marri, Bugti and Mengal led this uprising. Initial demands of the 
insurgents related to enhanced income from gas and stoppage of 
migration to Balochistan from other provinces. The Balochis feared that 
whoever comes to Balochistan from outside, the political rights and 
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leadership of Baloch people will be taken over by them. This, they 
feared, will lead to usurpation of jobs and an ultimate ‗red Indian‘ status 
for the Balochis (Rehman 2006). While two parliamentary committees 
deliberated these demands, the initial low level conflict became decidedly 
secessionist with the death of its apparent leader, Nawab Akbar Khan 
Bugti, in an encounter with army in 2006. The attacks on gas 
installations, bombings, and kidnappings increased. The conflict is now, 
for the Baloch ethnopoliticians, the fight for the rights of Baloch nation.  
The ethnopolitical conflicts in Karachi went dormant during 
Musharraf years (2000-2008). Most of this can be ascribed to the capture 
of political power in the city by the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).59 
They also had a sizeable (some would argue, a controlling - 40%) share 
in the provincial government. The political power structures in the 
country had an overwhelming representation of their sympathizers as 
both the President and the Prime Minister belonged to the MQM power 
base of Karachi.60 
As detailed in chapter 5 and 6, this period from 1988 to 2006 was one 
of widening economic disparities among the federating units. While 
Punjab and urban Sindh consistently scored average or above average for 
socio-economic indicators; the rest of the country, on average, lagged 
behind.61 Failures to meet budgetary expenses by the two smaller 
provinces was a recurring annual disappointment. This was contrasted 
with the relatively comfortable financial position of Punjab. Heartburn 
followed in other provincial capitals which saw the distribution of 
resources on the basis of population as an unjust formula. The 
constitutional framework to resolve this situation frequently failed, 
particularly during the Musharraf dictatorship. The same pattern was 
followed when it came to other institutions of conflict management 
specially those of interprovincial trade, natural resources and autonomy. 
This era is also marked by efforts to undo the changes made to the 
constitutional scheme during Zia‘s time. The parliamentary character of 
the constitution, in which the powers rested with the Prime Minister, was 
changed in 1985 by the dictator. He concentrated all the powers in the 
unelected presidency and got the constitutional amendment rubber 
stamped by the legislature. After 1988 two governments were dismissed 
by Zia‘s successor, Ghulam Ishaq under the same powers. The fourth 
civilian government which came in 1997, with the support of opposition, 
undid these amendments and restored the powers to the elected 
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legislatures and its leaders. The next dictator, Musharraf, again amended 
the constitution in Zia‘s style and his handpicked legislature again 
approved the changes. It is the single most agitated issue on the list of 
unresolved agenda of the political forces today. In this conflict over the 
form of polity, the ethnopoliticians essentially were in league with the 
mainstream political parties.  
At the height of General Musharraf‘s power in 2006, dissatisfaction 
with the viability of the social contract was such that demands were 
raised for a new one. Failure to let the concurrent list of the constitution 
die its natural death after 10 years had now become a sore point with the 
ethnopoliticians. Demands started from smaller provinces, particularly 
from Balochistan, for a new social contract to ‗protect and ensure equal 
rights‘ (Mengal 2004). Their leaders specially cited the unequal 
relationship between the Punjabi dominated ruling army and the helpless 
ethnopolitical leadership which found themselves shut out from the 
corridors of power. Army thus came to be associated with Punjab and 
vice versa and the might of a meddlesome and powerful federal 
government has become a symbol of Punjabi hegemony for them.  
The need for a new constitution was also felt in the intelligentsia but 
they were afraid that the political leadership lacked the capacity to come 
up with one. Irshad Haqqani answers his own question; Do we need a 
new social contract? 
The present social contract i.e. the constitutional compact has become 
bereft of general agreement and therefore a new constitution should be 
enacted. This is to say that we definitely need a new social contract but 
remember that need of something isn‘t the same as its achievement and I 
think that in the given circumstances we, as a nation, are not capable to 
put together a new social contract.(Haqqani 2006)62 
Since September 2001, a new and more violent conflict has beset the 
region. This involves the radical militants pitted against the state and 
society. This conflict also draws its recruits from those motivated by a 
religious identity and using their ethnic identity as a tactic. The issues of 
bread and butter may not figure prominently in the debate but remain 
important. Similarly the issues of history, geostrategic and external 
influence and the institutional structure and its weakness have its effect 
on that conflict too and will be discussed in chapter 7. 
These years (1988-2006) can be seen as the harshest for the political 
economy of Pakistan. During this period, the social contract was put to 
72 CHAPTER 3 
 
its first real test and just when its viability was about to be revealed, the 
ethnopolitical conflicts were reignited to begin the circumnavigation 
again. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In order to understand the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts of Pakistan, 
it is necessary to first learn of the key milestones of its pre and post 
independence history. The history of pre-independence search for 
identity is inextricably linked with its post independence ethnopolitical 
conflicts. What began as a search for a separate identity on the basis of 
religion and comparatively backward economic conditions was 
essentially an exercise in fear of becoming a minority; a minority which 
could lose its individuality in a democratic, Hindu dominated and 
independent India. Most leaders of Muslim community could only 
foresee a future of perpetual minority status with little political and 
economic leverage. An identity based on religion was therefore found 
convenient to bring the community onto a common political platform 
for a cause which soon metamorphosed into a call for a separate, 
independent country.  
The British acquiesced to the demands for separate quota in 
legislatures and other forums on the basis of a religious identity but it 
was the authoritarian legacy of their legal enactments which would 
determine the lack of autonomy for provinces; an autonomy which was 
demanded by the Muslims of pre-partition India themselves in 1940. 
The religious identity was not enough to keep the country together 
for long. Soon the failure of political elite to evolve a social contract was 
compounded by the military dictatorships which alienated the Bengali 
ethnic majority and exacerbated the conflict over resources. In the 
absence of more robust institutions of conflict management, these 
conflicts were soon amplified and a refusal of the West Pakistani ruling 
elite to respect the democratic verdict of the people of Eastern wing 
resulted in the war of 1971. Outside intervention also helped the cause 
of Bengali separatism.  
The new constitution of 1973 was in effect a new social contract 
which again provided a stage for the identity dramas and fears of the 
past. The result was a compromise over the role of religion which ‗tried 
to describe a state primarily of Muslims but not necessarily or fully 
defined by Islam‘ (Newberg 1995).63 The compromise over the 
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configuration of the state led to a federal setup with the regions or 
provinces as the federating units, participating in a federal compact over 
institutions of conflict management.  
The two cycles of democracy-autocracy of post 1973 Pakistan is a tale 
of the breakdowns of institutions of conflict management among the 
federating units; in essence, a weakening of the social contract provided 
in its constitution. As the single institution of army sought to establish its 
paramountcy over the rest, the ethnopolitical leadership found more 
issues with the federation and the benefits of participating in the 
contract.  
The story therefore is that of a social contract which was entered into 
with hopes, fears, expectations and compromises. For various reasons 
these hopes and expectations were not fully met for all the parties to the 
contract. The resulting conflict had ethnopolitical vibes. The later 
chapters of this thesis are attempts to describe this conflict, measure its 
crests and troughs and come up with explanations for the same.  
 
 
 Notes  
                                                 
 
2 ―there is no country marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as 
India‖ Prasad (1946), P. 79 
3 Conveniently disregarding the fact, as A. Khan (2005) points out, that the British colonized 
Indians and not united them. 
4 See for example Durrani (1983).The history of this school in India goes back to, among others, Sir 
Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898).  
5 To quote Sherbaz Khan Mazari ―There is no question that the desire for a separate Muslim entity 
arose from a great fear among the Muslims that they would be swamped by the Hindus‖ (Mazari 
1999) p. 38 
6 p. 43 
7 Cited in Talha (2000) 
8 For a fuller treatment of the subject please see Talha (2000), W. W. Hunter (1974) and Robinson 
(2007).  
9 P. 20 
10 pp. 28-29 
11 An example is that of Jinnah‘s dual membership of the Congress and the Muslim league from 
1913 to 1920.  
12 Mussalaman is another word used for Muslim in South Asia 
74 CHAPTER 3 
 
                                                                                                                   
13 Muhammad Ali Jinnah‘s address to the Lahore session of All India Muslim League, 23rd March 
1940, cited from Grahi (2004). 
14 Cited in Jalal (1994) P. 70 
15 Azad (1988), pp. 164-6 
16 For a first hand account of these fears please read the excerpts from the speech of Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah‘s address to the 1940 Lahore meeting (Annexe 3-B) 
17 Although Sayeed (1968) gives the term to the period starting from 1958, the characteristics of 
‗Bonapartist state‘ are visible right after the death of Jinnah in 1948. 
18 Jinnah‘s first address to the first constituent assembly (legislature) of Pakistan, on August 11, 
1947, Jinnah (1948), P. 10. Cited in A.S. Ahmed (1997), P. 175 
19 Annex 3-A, It is now a part of the constitution itself. 
20 P. 60 
21 P. 6 
22 P. 93 
23 P. 129 
24 Almost all the other leaders of note from the smaller provinces also declared their opposition to 
the One-Unit Scheme. 
25 The actual scheme was introduced via ‗The Basic Democracies Order‘ of 1959. The same was 
given constitutional protection in 1962. 
26 P. 257 
27 P. 182 
28 P. 203 
29 Two successive constitutions of 1956 and 1962 were abrogated by the military juntas in 1958 and 
1969.  
30 P. 1 
31 As mentioned by Wimmer (2002) and discussed in chapter 2. 
32 Represented mostly by the Islamist parties of Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam and Jamiat-e-
Ulama-e-Pakistan had 18 members out of a total of 138. 
33 For a fuller exposition of the subject, please see Ahmed 1991, Rosenthal (1965) and A. Syed 
(1984) among others. 
34 A fascinating debate between Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, A.K Brohi and Feroz Ahmed on the 
editorial pages of daily Dawn (October 1978) captures the essence of arguments from both sides. 
35 Mostly the 6 National Awami Party (NAP) members and a handful of independents. 
36 Royal representative assembly 
37 For a detail of the number of votes in all these legislatures and plebiscites please see Jalal (1994) P. 
290 
38 On 18-3-1972 Instructions were issued to TV and Radio to ensure that no programme went on 
the air which even remotely contained a reference to the idea of four nationalities (Dawn: 19-3-
1972). Then on 22-11-1973 the prevention of anti-national activities ordinance was promulgated 
which defined as ‗Anti national activity‘ to ‗…create regional fronts on the basis of race and 
language; to incite sectarian and parochial feelings and to propagate the idea that the citizens of 
Pakistan comprise more than one nationality.‘ (Dawn: 23-11-1973) 
39 Article 33 of the constitution. 
 Identity, History and Ethno-Politics 75 
 
                                                                                                                   
40 P. 76 
41 For more about these legislative lists and their content, please read chapter 5. 
42 Ahmed (1992), P. 175 
43 pp. 18-19 
44 A favourite mantra of every army junta in Pakistan, which is given as a justification at the eve of 
every military takeover. 
45 p. 4 
46 The first speeches of Generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf are remarkably similar on this 
score. 
47 Most notably in Moulvi Tamizuddin Vs Federation of Pakistan (1954), Begum Nusrat Bhutto Vs 
The Chief of the Army Staff and another (1977), and Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others Vs General 
Pervez Musharraf and others (2000). The judgment condemning the coup of General Yahya Khan 
was only announced after his resignation. 
48 For more about these institutions, please refer to chapter 5. 
49 Particularly attempts by General Pervez Musharraf in year 2000. 
50 Interview to A. M. Rosenthal; Dawn 2-5-1974. 
51 Noman (1990), P. 194 gives a list of eight senior most generals who were all Punjabis, including 
Zia ul Haq himself and the martial law administrators of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan and 
the air and naval chiefs.  
52 The term used by Noman (1990), P. 144 
53 Migrants National Movement 
54 Details of these conflicts are given in chapter 4 and 5. 
55 Our own attempt at explaining this conflict is undertaken in chapter 6. 
56 A fuller treatment of institutional ethnopolitical conflict is undertaken in chapter 4. 
57 Details in chapter 5 
58 P.3 
59 The party is now known as Muttahida Qaumi Movement 
60 The short stint of the Baluchi Mir Zafaraullah Jamali (Nov 2002-Jun 2004) was more of an 
aberration in the politics of the country.  
61 Please see chapter 5 for these widening gaps and their effect on ethnopolitical conflict. 
62 Translated from Urdu by the author. 
63 pp. 3-4 
  
 
4  A Look at Ethnopolitical Conflict Data 
 
No I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has 
data. Insensibly one begins to twist to suit theories, instead of theories to 
suit facts  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the history of ethnopolitical conflicts in Pakistan. A 
conflict score is calculated from the primary database. This tool is then 
used to observe the trend over the years since 1972, collectively as well 
as for individual conflicts. 
 Ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has a history of ups and downs. 
Periods of relative calm are interspersed with intense violent conflict. 
During these calm periods, a low intensity conflict simmers below, ready 
to explode. In the ensuing melee it is difficult to chart the different and 
unstable coalitions of adversaries. The issues at stake are also myriad and 
one side may find itself in league with its adversary in connection with 
another cause. 
 We therefore need an empirical handle to chart these conflicts. This, I 
will attempt with a conflict score which is to be calculated with the help 
of my primary conflict database. The identification of various dyads in 
this conflict is needed. These dyads will serve as units of analysis in a 
cross dyadic comparison. We also need to identify issues which generate 
conflict. As Gupta and Gupta (1990) tell us, it is a classical problem of 
representing a multidimensional variable by a univariate one.1 
 It has to be kept in mind that this is not a historical narrative, but it is 
not possible to excise history out of it. Since the aim is to see the profile 
of ethnopolitical conflict as charted by the conflict score, derived from 
the coded primary data; history and context as explained in the last 
chapter are invariably called upon to help us explain the undulations in 
                                                 
 Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson in 'A Scandal in Bohemia' by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
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this conflict. Yet, this chapter is still about description and not 
explanation, per se.  
 It is also important to remind the reader again that the basic 
framework used in the present study is that of ethnopolitical conflict and 
that sets it apart from the works of scholars like Amin (1988), who uses a 
nationalist framework; or A. Khan (2005), who studied the politics based 
on identity.  
 The discussion below is arranged into six main areas: The problem of 
representing a multidimensional conflict, both violent and non-violent, 
will be defined, the methodology of collection of primary conflict data 
will be discussed and the conflict indicators will be grouped into a coding 
scheme which will yield the ‗conflict score‘ for the dyads. Then these 
conflict scores will be charted out for the main conflict dyads. Lastly, the 
concluding section will discuss results of this conflict score as applied to 
different dyadic datasets. The potential and limitations of the analysis will 
be discussed briefly at the end. 
4.2 The Problem 
Several databases of conflict events are available for research. A good 
review of these databases is presented by Rodik et al (2003). These 
databases did not cater to the needs of this thesis as far as primary 
conflict data was concerned owing to the choice of studying 
ethnopolitical conflict dyads. However these databases provided 
guidance when I searched for my own conflict data and then at the stage 
of coding.  
 Conflict events are easier to log, code and analyze when their inherent 
nature is empirical. The death of a person is usually taken as a unit, in 
most conflict literature, as a verifiable measure of conflict. Even in a 
biased reporting environment it is less likely to be misreported.2 It has 
therefore been found convenient by most researchers to use different 
combinations of this measure for analyzing conflicts and wars.3 But using 
this measure alone will not help us capture the political side of 
ethnopolitical conflict.  It was therefore necessary to use indicators 
which tell us more about the ‗latent‘4 conflict, a conflict which is 
reflected in the day to day statements of the adversaries, the protest 
meetings, sit-ins, arrests, administrative actions, parliamentary 
proceedings, and bomb explosions which do not kill. Such events are 
significant contributories to overall conflict. As Horowitz (1985) rightly 
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puts it, these are the many less dramatic manifestations of ethnopolitical 
conflict. 
 Two types of conceptual problems are to be explained before 
attempting to describe the data. The first is the definitional problem of 
relationship of observed variables to ethnopolitical conflict. This will be 
analogous to questioning the relationship of level of literacy to Gini 
coefficient. A direct one to one relationship needs to be established 
between the observed variables and the explained variable. This will be 
the subjective test of the validity of conflict indicators that I chose and 
the phenomenon called ethnopolitical conflict. 
 The other conceptual problem linked to the determination of a score 
of ethnopolitical conflict is the qualitative difference among the observed 
variables themselves. Broadly these parameters can be categorized into 
violent and non violent incidents. In the category of violent conflict, 
although general agreement exists on classifying these into anomic 
violence and internal war;5 This study shall not make such a 
classification. Instead the fault line of classification bisects all the conflict 
events between two general categories of violent and non violent conflict 
events. The term latent encompasses all my indicators of non-violent 
conflict. These non violent events include, from belligerent statements 
and speeches, to protest demonstrations and arrests. Violent conflict 
events include violence causing injuries to violence resulting in death. 
Further, an event which results in the death of a person is higher in 
intensity when either militia or army (as opposed to e.g. police) is 
involved. This is done for the manifest reason that armed forces are only 
called out when the conflict is more intense. More on this will follow in 
the next section. 
 There is another classification of these conflict parameters, based on 
the type of stakeholders involved. e.g. an event may be initiated by a 
state actor, say, an administrative step like declaration of a local language 
as the official one, the other side may initiate a response event like 
holding protest demonstrations. In this same classification, there is 
another category wherein both stakeholders operate to contribute to the 
overall conflict; For example, the arrest of an activist.   
4.3 The Data 
For the present analysis eight measures of violent and non-violent 
conflict are included (See Table 4.4). I also had to make a decision 
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regarding the cut-off point of this study. As discussed in chapter 2 and 3, 
it was the scope of the study which defined the cut off point for us. The 
fact that Pakistan functioned as one federal state, under a unanimously 
approved constitution, after 1972, made the task of choosing a cut-off 
date, easier. Using data before that date would not have been consistent 
because of the simple fact that data from the former East Pakistan (Now 
Bangladesh) would not have fitted in the analytical framework.6 
 Since this analysis uses a primary dataset therefore it would not be out 
of place to describe the sources of data as well as the data itself. Events 
of ethnopolitical conflict since 1972 were logged from different 
newspapers. The resulting database contains information on 4456 events. 
The events capture this conflict in both its violent as well as non violent 
forms. The absence of projection in media is a well known issue while 
working with newspaper data. In this regard I recognize the concern of 
Danzger (1975) that a lack of conflict reports may not mean that conflict 
has not occurred. I compensated for it by looking up other sources, 
especially for the two periods of 1974-1977 and 1979-1984, when state 
censorship of news media was rampant under emergency laws (Niazi 
1986).  Despite this, I fear that state censorship of media was too much 
to help us paint an entirely accurate picture of conflict during these two 
periods. 
 Though not entirely accurate this study still maintains that 
newspapers should provide a reliable source of events of ethnopolitical 
significance. This is for the reason that the over all media sensitivity 
towards events is unbiased. This is demonstrated by Snyder and Kelly 
(1977) whose model specifies validity of newspaper data as a function of 
event intensity and media sensitivity. The fact that the media may 
overlook minor events e.g. small protests or big but mild 
demonstrations, may even be advantageous (Koopmans and Rucht 
(2002). In selecting the sources for data, I followed Filliule and Jiménez‘s 
(2003) advice of objectivity of quality and quantity. A list of these 
sources is given in Table 4.1. 
 The major source for this data had to be uniform over the years with 
characteristics such as a good reputation and editorial independence. 
With its general reputation for fair reporting and non-biased editorial 
board, I chose the oldest and most established English daily of Pakistan, 
namely ‗Dawn‘. This is also the only English language daily that 
continuously published throughout the period of study and as such 
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perhaps the only candidate. For important periods and known events 
other newspapers and internet sources were also consulted and used.  
Table 4.1: Names of News sources 
No. Name of the Source 
1 Dawn 
2 Muslim, The  
3 News, The  
4 Nation, The  
5 Frontier Post, The  
6 Philadelphia Inquirer 
7 New York times, The 
8 Associated Press 
9 Newsbank from newslibrary.com 
10 Jang, the daily 
11 Nawai Waqt, The daily 
12 Asia Times 
 
 
Data was aggregated on an annual basis for most of the analysis in 
this chapter. Coding was done for dyads of stakeholders in a conflict. 
For selecting the dyads, attention was paid to the event data itself. While 
making a press statement against a foe, the identity of that foe indicated 
the conflict dyad. There were events which indicated several dyads at 
work, e.g. a press conference in which one stakeholder has issued 
statements against a number of foes over a variety of issues. Such events 
were accordingly broken down to take into account all the possible dyads 
and issues raised. Efforts were made to capture all possible dyads which 
employ ethnic markers in their politics. Fifteen possible dyads are now a 
part of this data set in Table 4.2. The two sides in the dyad are separated 
by a small dash. The stroke signifies ‗and/or‘. The particular 
combination of Center/Punjab/Army figures prominently in these dyads 
and the reasons are discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, particularly 
section 3.5. All the other combinations have their origins in the historical 
narrative of conflict, sometimes addressed in this thesis, but mainly to be 
found in the details of the event data itself. 
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It is emphasized here that a conflict dyad represents the conflict that 
arises, or perceived by the media to have arisen, with ethnic overtones. 
This is quite subjective at times but judgment was exercised while coding 
each conflict event. In addition the four conflict dyads (1,2,3,4) which 
are mainly the axes of provinces and the federal government, are also the 
main dyads for analyzing the relations of provinces with the federation in 
chapter 5. Dyad 7 is also treated as a regional dyad as the data for it 
represents Urban Sindh almost exclusively. This means that an event 
does not need to involve the ethnopolitical leadership of that province to 
be categorized as an ethnopolitical conflict event. The 'dyad' does not 
demonstrate that the whole population of a particular province is against 
that of another or against the federal govt. It merely shows the origins of 
conflict in a configuration and the existence of a dispute that may lead to 
conflict. 
  
Table 4.2: Conflict Dyads 
No. Dyad with Stakeholders 
1 NWFP/Pukhtun-Center/Punjab/Army 
2 Balochistan/Baloch/(Pukhtuns of Balochistan-Center/Punjab/Army 
3 Sindh/Sindhi-Center/Punjab/Punjabi/Army 
4 Punjab-Center 
5 
Pukhtun/Baloch and/or JUI/ UDF (To the extent of supporting NAP or 
their cause) –Center 
6 Muhajir- Sindhi in Sindh 
7 Muhajir-Center/Punjab/Army 
8 Muhajir/Sindhi in Sindh-Punjabi/Punjab 
9 Pukhtun-Muhajir in Sindh 
10 Seraiki-Punjabi in Punjab/Muhajirs/Sindhis in Sindh 
11 Pukhtun- Baloch in Balochistan 
12 All Provinces-Center/Other provinces 
13 Sindh-Balochistan 
14 Pukhtun/Baloch/Sindh-Punjab 
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 The data indicates two potential levels of analysis, the provincial level 
and the ethnic group level. This connects with the two different types of 
social contract demanded by the ethnopolitical leaders and supplied by 
the constitution, as discussed in chapter 3. These two levels are afforded 
by the dyadic nature of the data and also by the nature of issues. It can 
be seen that not all dyads are provincial in nature. Some transcend the 
boundaries of provinces and strictly deal with ethnic groupings e.g. dyads 
1, 2, 7 and 9. Others such as dyads 3, 12 and 13 are at the provincial 
level. Similarly the issues can be grouped broadly into primordial and 
provincial categories. e.g. IDLE, REST, SEPR and MIN are essentially 
primordialist. On the other hand, some issues are strictly provincial in 
nature HDR, MNR and WATKB (See Table 4.3). It is felt that this 
categorization is important as it is commonly perceived that issues are 
lumped together which are essentially of different character.7 
As discussed, a conscious effort was made to capture conflict in both 
its violent as well as latent forms, therefore those indices and scales 
which only used the number of deaths, were of little use for this study. 
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (Gurr 2002) uses a taxonomy of 
ethnic violence indicators which provided the primary motivation for my 
indicators.  
 Conflict type was coded for most of the issues which made the 
content of ethnopolitics since 1972. Issues were grouped into similar 
codes based on their affinity with each other. This process was updated 
during the course of data collection as well as data coding on the basis of 
grouping made by the conflict stakeholders themselves (Table 4.3). 
   
Table 4.3: Conflict Issues 
No. Code Conflict Issue 
1 
 
HDR Hydal power profits. 
2 MNR Mineral Resources/Royalty, Rent on gas/Oil. 
3 WATKB Kalabagh and water share issue. 
4 SEPR Re-demarcation of boundaries/ Separate province in Punjab, Sindh and 
Balochistan 
5 PART Participation in Governance structures/Trade bodies/Power organs 
6 TRD Free trade among provinces, especially in food products/Scarcity of 
wheat/Trade with Afghanistan 
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7 DEV Development/ Development spending by Federal Government/ Loans to 
Provinces. 
8 NFC Share of Provinces in federal revenues/National Finance Commission 
Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes. 
9 JOB Quota system of jobs in Government services/ Share of jobs, Joblessness 
10 POL Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy. 
11 REST Resettlement/Repatriation of Biharis in Sindh, South Punjab/Afghans in 
Balochistan 
12 PRT Provincial Rights, General, economic rights, social rights, Provincial 
autonomy/Nationalities rights. 
13 PAT Backing Central policies/ Assertion of patriotic credentials by stakeholder 
1, Condemnation of Nationalist/ anti state behavior by stakeholder 2. 
14 SUB Subversion/Terrorism/Secession. 
15 MIN Governance / General legislation/ Budget/ Foreign policy 
16 INF Infighting in a single ethnic group 
18 IDLE Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity 
19 RITS Rights to life, honour, freedom and property, Conflict with state agencies. 
20 OTR Other 
  
 An overall picture of the classification of Ethnopolitical Conflict 
events can be seen in Table 4.4. After deciding on these indicators, the 
data had to be reduced into a composite ‗Conflict Score‘ so that it could 
be used in econometric analysis (to be presented in subsequent chapters). 
In the political science literature, various methods have been tried for 
construction of an index that can capture the essence of socio-political 
instability. Such indices frequently contain indicators of violence and 
non-violence which have affinity to some of the indicators used in this 
present work. (e.g. Almost all the indicators of non-violent conflict are 
present in the work of Gupta and Gupta (1990)).  
The method of principal components is sometimes used to construct 
an index of mainly cross sectional data. Two leading examples stand out. 
Hibbs (1973) used the method of principal components to work out an 
index of mass political violence. More recently Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
used this method to construct an index of political instability on the basis 
of indicators of social unrest and political violence.  However these 
techniques cannot always be adapted to every situation due to the nature 
of available data. The method of principal components is better suited to 
cross-sectional data which has more than at least 50 cases. There are 
many thumb rules for the least number of cases and this is the least 
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number available in all the thumb rules in practice. One obvious choice 
in my case could have been to treat dyads as separate cases but that 
would have still fallen far short of this number (which in itself is 
arbitrary). An alternative could have been to take the four or five yearly 
average scores of indicators while allowing for sufficient gap (five years) 
in between these periods. The assumption would have been that data is 
sufficiently spaced to make the yearly average scores independent of one 
another. This would have increased the number of available cases to 
more than 70 (In fact Gupta et al employ this technique to increase the 
number of cases for the purpose of cluster analysis) but it is far from 
convincing to assume that it would have removed the co-variation 
among individual cases in my work.  
Another method used to construct such an index is the one adopted 
by Gupta and Gupta (1990). They first used cluster analysis to assign 
countries to groups with roughly similar levels of violence. In the second 
step, the same grouping was used as the dependent variable in 
discriminant analysis to work out an index of political instability. In the 
third step they calculated a logit model again using the cluster analysis 
results as the dependent variable. In their findings, both the discriminant 
analysis and the logit model yield similar results. This attempt to explain 
a dependent variable which is itself created with the help of independent 
variables is a hazardous approach (which Gupta et al also observe).  The 
need for exogeneity, even weaker one in estimation and testing model, is 
not met in this case. The primary data in my case will later be used as the 
dependent variable in almost all analyses and therefore this method is 
not suited to my needs. 
Vanhanen (1999) uses a scale of institutionalized ethnic conflict which 
assigns a conflict score according to a set scale, from 0 to 100. This scale 
bears some resemblance to my scale except that I don‘t put an upper cap 
on the scale and the method of my calculation of this score is quite 
different (explained below). 
The good thing about all the above three techniques is that they take 
into account the non-violent indicators as well as the number of deaths 
and provide guidance on how these seemingly diverse indicators can be 
grouped into a single variable. 
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4.4 The Conflict Score 
For my own conflict score I assigned weights to events of ethnopolitical 
conflict. The events were first divided into two broad categories of 
‗Violent‘ and ‗Non Violent‘ conflict. The non violent conflict was then 
further decomposed into four categories with weights assigned from 1 to 
4. The violent events were given weights from 5 to 8 (Table 4.4). The 
weight is assigned following a logical scheme as followed by Feierabend 
et al. (1969). The apparent arbitrariness of the weights, as Gupta and 
Gupta (1990) point out, could be worth the risk as will be shown by the 
logical ranking of the dyads from non violent to violent. The results are 
also intuitive and conform to the underlying theory. Further, I feel that 
subjecting my data to the limitations of principal component analysis or 
discriminant analysis would have entailed pitfalls as explained above. In 
essence my method is akin to using an ordinal variable as a scalar one. 
The use of an alternative method will add little to our understanding of 
these conflicts because of the inherent weaknesses of these methods. 
The purpose of classifying injuries and deaths into two further 
categories was that conflict is definitely more serious when the army or 
militia is called upon to restore order. An injury or death in such a 
situation will therefore score higher on our scale as compared to one 
when only the police is involved. Using the above weights, the data is 
summed up on annual basis and then standardized to make the various 
indicators comparable. The resulting standardized data was linearly 
transformed (scaled) to remove negative signs. Now this data for the 
above eight indicators was multiplied with the corresponding weights to 
arrive at the annual conflict scores.  
The main dyadic charts are part of the chapter (Figure 4.3 to Figure 
4.8). The rest are presented in the appendix 4-A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 CHAPTER 4 
 
Table 4.4: Conflict Categories, Codes, Types and Weightage. 
Category Code Type of Event Conflict 
Weight 
age 
N
o
n
 V
io
le
n
t 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t Stm Statements, Press Conferences, Interviews. 1 
Mtn Public Meetings, Public Rallies. 2 
Adm Court proceedings, Verdicts, Appeals, 
legislation/legislative process, Major 
administrative steps, Resignations. 
3 
Ars Strikes, Curfew, Protest day, Kidnappings, 
Arrests, Eviction, Exodus, Arson without 
deaths or injuries. 
4 
V
io
le
n
t 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
Inj_1 Violence with injuries 
Bomb blasts, Arson, and Action leading to 
injuries not involving armed forces or 
militias but may involve police. 
5 
Dth_1 Violence with deaths, Bomb blasts, and 
Action leading to death not involving armed 
forces or militias but may involve police. 
6 
Inj_2 Violence, Bomb Blasts and Action leading to 
injuries involving armed forces or militias. 
7 
Dth_2 Violence, Bomb Blast and Action leading to 
deaths involving armed forces or militias. 
8 
 
4.5 The Total Ethnopolitical conflict score 
Plotted over time, ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has largely been 
a mixed bag of violent and non-violent incidents, although summing 
up the total conflict scores over the years reveals an overwhelming 
tilt towards non-violence, See Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: The share of violence and non violence in Ethnopolitical conflict 
in Pakistan 
 
 
 The total conflict (Figure 4.2) increased dramatically in the early 
1970s when army was sent in to Balochistan to rein in a secessionist 
movement (elaborated upon in section 4.5.2). The Mid 1980s saw a 
sharp climb in conflict due to the situation in Sindh. The upturn near 
the end of the study period is largely due to the events in 
Balochistan. 
  The apparent decline immediately after the spike in early 1970s can 
be ascribed more to the media censorship of ZAB‘s government 
than to a genuine lull.  
 In subsequent sections the main dyads of ethnopolitical conflict in 
Pakistan will be discussed individually. These include dyads 1, 2, 3 
and 7. Dyad 6, 8 and 9 are studied as corollaries to dyad 7. It is 
therefore necessary to point out that readers who are already familiar 
with Pakistani ethnopolitics will feel that some parts of it have been 
left out in the first three dyads. These left out issues mostly fall into 
dyad 7 and will be discussed there. To get a visual feel for the overall 
trend of conflict in each dyad, polynomial trend lines have been 
added to the charts where appropriate. This is chosen to get a better 
fit between the trend line and the bar charts. Since the goodness of 
fit (R2) value for the first, second and third order polynomials show 
Non Violent
71%
Violent
29%
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that the last one is consistently higher therefore these trend lines are 
of the third order in every case. Trend lines of higher order didn‘t 
contribute further to the R2 value and therefore were not chosen. 
 The rest of the dyads are minor in their contribution to the overall 
ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and are given a cursory treatment 
for reasons to be explained.  
Figure 4.2:Profile of Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan 
 
 
4.5.1 Pukhtun Ethnopolitics 
Over all, Pukhtun ethnopolitics is cited as a confirmation of the thesis 
that Pakistan can also successfully dissipate separatist and centrifugal 
tendencies, like India; although it lacks the democratic culture (Jaffrelot 
2002). This is in contrast to the recent views presented by scholars like 
Cohen (2004) who thinks that the ethnic group that poses the largest 
threat to Pakistan is the Pukhtuns.8 Another example of such a view is 
that of Kohli (1997) who argues that in contrast to India, since Pakistan 
does not have a working federal structure and democracy therefore she 
cannot assuage the centrifugal tendencies in Provinces. In light of my 
data (the main dyad 1, for Pukhtuns, Figure 4.3) we are forced to 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
Non Violent
Violent
Total
 A Look at Ethnopolitical Conflict Data 89 
 
disagree with this latter set of views. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
recent Taliban movement in Pakistan is overwhelmingly made up of 
Pukhtuns, it would be premature to link that with ethnopolitics.9 The 
data shows that Pukhtuns have gradually toned down their ethnopolitics 
on the basis of regionalism and secession and are now mostly concerned 
with matters of rights, within the framework of Pakistani state. (See for 
example Figure 9 to Figure 18 in Appendix 4-A). Pukhtun Ethnopolitics 
subsided after the events of 1971, partly because the leading 
ethnonationalist party, NAP was a partner in the coalition in NWFP. 
Their style was largely non-violent. The extent of NAP‘s apparent 
change of heart was revealed by its leader Wali Khan when he declared 
that the long cherished goal of Pukhtunistan was ‗no longer an issue‘ for 
NAP.10  
Figure 4.3: Pukhtun Ethnopolitical Conflict (The main dyad NWFP/Pukhtun-
Centre/Punjab/Army) 
 
 
 
In 1973, immediately after the introduction of the new constitution, 
the provincial government of Balochistan was removed by ZAB. The 
NWFP government resigned in protest. Mr. Hayat Sherpao, the 
governor of NWFP was assassinated and NAP was blamed for this 
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murder. As a result, NAP was outlawed and its leaders jailed. Some of its 
leaders fled to Afghanistan from where they organized resistance.11 The 
militant elements in NAP, numbering 700-1000 were led by Ajmal 
Khattak in Kabul (Amin 1988).12 The political scene became rife with 
violence and continued to be so throughout the 1970s. The initial change 
of heart on part of NAP to embrace mainstream politics and her 
subsequent reversal to agitation and confrontation makes Jefferlot 
remark: 
After the victory of his party (the NAP) in the 1972 election and the 
formation of a government coalition over which he exerted a strong 
influence, Wali Khan tried to acquire a national stature. He put his 
Pakhtun nationalism on the backburner, to the point of forgetting his 
promises about the renaming of the province— the only one in Pakistan 
with a name that did not reflect any ethnic identity—and to elevate Urdu 
to the rank of the official language of the NWFP, a decision which was 
also taken to avoid confrontation with the local Hindko speakers. The 
Pakhtuns embraced a more radical form of nationalism as a reaction to the 
authoritarian methods of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (Jaffrelot 2002)13 
A tribunal14 was set up for the trial of NAP leaders. NAP was banned 
on February 10, 1975 and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, on 30th 
October, held that the party was conspiring for secession of NWFP and 
Balochistan. Later, this tribunal was unilaterally wound up by General 
Zia. 
After 1977, Zia-ul-Haq released NAP leaders and allowed them to 
organize again. We can see the effects of this policy on the style of 
ethnopolitcs of Pukhtuns. In early 1980s it became markedly non-
violent. The apparent upward surge in violence during mid eighties 
should be read with caution. Most of this is due to attributing the bomb 
explosions, especially those in NWFP, to Pukhtun ethnopolitics (Figure 
15, Appendix 4-A). No blame should be assigned here to NAP for these 
bomb explosions. This is merely due to incorrect but necessary 
attribution of events to one of the dyads and mostly the influence of 
events in Afghanistan. Briefly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had 
forced the Pakistani state to support Afghan resistance, popularly known 
at the time as ‗jihad‘. The Afghan government had been hosting Pukhtun 
nationalist leaders since 1970s. As a tit for tat, the Soviet supported 
government in Kabul wanted to force Pakistan to stop its support for 
the ‗Mujahideen‘. The Pukhtun nationalist cause was used to achieve this 
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aim, with little success, as on the Pakistani side, most of Pukhtun 
nationalist leadership did not support this campaign. They however 
spoke openly against Islamabad‘s support of the American backed 
resistance.15 and hence the assessment that after 1990, the Pukhtun 
ethnopolitics were decidedly non-violent. The occasional spikes in 
violence are attributable to mild and occasional violence during street 
protests and/or demonstrations. 
With the return of democracy in 1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan, more bread and butter issues came to the fore 
of ethnopolitics. The conflict over these issues was largely non violent. It 
can be seen that the issue of hydal power profits and Kalabagh dam 
(KBD) have assumed greater importance for the mostly Pukhtun 
province of NWFP (Figure 9 and Figure 10, Appendix 4-A). While the 
rise and fall of conflict over KBD has followed the announcements of 
federal government on her intent of building (or otherwise) of the dam; 
the issue of hydal power profits has gained strength once it became clear 
that the federal government has no intention (nor the money) to pay to 
the province.16 
There is an interesting trend to be seen regarding the conflict over 
provincial autonomy, the Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership‘s struggle 
over nationalist rights, and the conflict over the type of polity (Figure 13 
and Figure 12, Appendix 4-A). Both charts show a remarkable 
amelioration of conflict over these issues, which was overwhelmingly 
non-violent to begin with. There is also a tendency of less conflict over 
the years when it comes to questioning the patriotic credentials of 
Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership (Figure 14, Appendix 4-A). Since 
1972, I have counted at least 28 occasions in the data set when the 
Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership asserted their patriotic credentials and 
claimed to put the country before everything else, in their rhetoric. In 
contrast there are at least 43 events in which aspersions have been cast 
on the loyalty of the same leadership towards their country. A declining 
tendency is also witnessed in conflict with state agencies (Figure 18, 
Appendix 4-A).  
The increasing assimilation of Pukhtuns into the wider Pakistani state 
structure is also borne out by the fact that since the early nineties, their 
ethnopolitical leadership has tried to focus more and more on issues 
related to governance, foreign policy and the economy (Figure 16, 
Appendix 4-A). This trend was reversed during the years since 1999, (the 
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year of General Musharraf‘s coup) but we can see an upward shift in the 
data related to latter years of this study.  
The one conflict which seems to have grown in intensity is over 
issues such as Identity, Culture and language (Figure 17, Appendix 4-A). 
Most of it can be traced back to the mid eighties when ethnopolitical 
conflict in Karachi turned violent. This is discussed separately in the 
section on Muhajir ethnopolitics (Section 4.5.4). In tandem, the demand 
for renaming NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa also became central to the politics 
of Pukhtun ethno politicians. After Nawaz Sharif refused to cooperate to 
amend the constitution for the change of name of the province to 
Pukhtunkhwa in 1997, the Awami National Party (ANP) found that it 
had a new issue on its hands. As A. Khan (2005) remarks; 
Since then it has appeared that at last a nationalism that had virtually 
become nationalism only in name had finally become a nationalism for 
name alone. (A. Khan 2005)17 
Jaffrelot (2002) asserts that Pukhtun nationalism has followed an 
inverted U. Although the framework of ethnopolitical conflict in this 
study is different to his ‗nationalist‘ framework, our empirical findings 
generally agree with this statement. This ethnopolitical conflict has in 
fact followed an inverted U curve, at least since 1980, both in terms of 
violence and in terms of demands for autonomy.  
4.5.2 Baloch Ethnopolitical Conflict 
Balochistan is the province with the largest area (42.9%) and the least 
population (5%) out of the four provinces of Pakistan. It has two main 
ethnic groups of Balochis and Pukhtuns but it would be very difficult to 
decide on an accurate percentage of both due to numerous problems 
with census which could not be held regularly in the province. The 
general agreement seems to be a 50:50 ration for both with each side 
claiming to be in majority,  that is if Brahvis, a significant ethnic 
minority, is grouped together with Balochis. Our second dyad is mostly 
concerned with the ethnopolitical conflict between Balochis and centrist 
forces, be they the central government, the army or the province of 
Punjab or its politicians. Figure 4.4 gives the profile of this total conflict 
over the years. The chart should be read with caution. The apparent dip 
in both violent and non-violent conflict in mid 1970s should not be 
interpreted as a decrease in conflict. The press is simply unable, due to 
massive censorship, during ZAB‘s years, to carry news of the armed 
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conflict in Balochistan. There had been a history of Baloch nationalism 
in the province leading to armed conflict in 1948, 1958 and 1973 (Grare 
2006). The latest phase before 1972 was between 1958 and 1969, that 
Breseeg (2004)18 calls the second uprising. With the establishment of a 
Baloch nationalist government in the province in 1971, most of those 
previously in conflict with the federal government were ushered into the 
power corridors. The three main tribal leaders Ataullah Mengal (who 
became the Chief Minister of the province from May 1972 to Feb 1973) 
Khair Bakhsh Marri and Akbar Bugti; were mostly reconciled with the 
overall scheme of the constitution. All this came crashing down when, 
the Federal Government of ZAB decided to sack the provincial 
government. To suppress the voices of dissent and to form his own 
party‘s government in the province (while the opposition was still in 
majority in legislature) he clamped governor‘s rule and sent in the army. 
All this gave a new lease of life to Baloch nationalism. Except for Bugti, 
who became the new governor, the other major opposition tribal leaders 
were jailed or fled to the mountains. What followed was a protracted 
civil war19 which saw Balochistan descend into chaos. The media was 
largely kept under the thumb by ZAB. Most of the data from that period 
had to be gleaned from other sources. 
The conflict was largely defused when General Zia ul Haq released all 
the political prisoners from Balochistan. There is a visible lull in the 
violent conflict through out the 1980s. This trend changes with the 
advent of 1990s. A steady rise in violence is witnessed since then. In fact 
the present state of violence which is largely thought to have started with 
the confrontation between General Pervez Musharraf and Akbar Bugti 20 
can be traced back to the early 1990s. The cause here may not be Baloch 
ethnopolitics per se as was the case in Pukhtun ethnopolitics when we 
discussed the impact of the situation of Afghanistan in section 4.5.1. 
Again we may caution the reader that it is not assigning blame but merely 
an effort to discover the underlying factors of conflict. The fact that the 
declining trend in conflict over secession can also be attributed to the 
change in tone of the Baloch ethnopolitical leadership is also suggested 
by Tahir Amin‘s remarks;  
As the civil war was prolonged, the movement leaders became ambivalent 
with regard to the issue of secession. They chose to put the struggle as a 
first step towards the liberation of nationalities in Pakistan. (Amin 1988)21 
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In the start of 1990, the leaders from Balochistan gave a series of 
statements to underline the need for provincial autonomy22 and rights of 
nationalities.23 This set the tone for an increasing non-violent conflict in 
the next fifteen years. After 2002, the conflict with state agencies became 
overtly violent and during 2006 and later (which is beyond the scope of 
this study for ethnopolitical conflict) the conflict assumed proportions of 
a civil war of the same or greater intensity as that of 1970s. It can be 
safely suggested that the trend lines of both violent and non violent 
conflict at the end of this study‘s period, point towards increasing 
conflict in later years. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that 
this happened indeed. I would also dare to suggest that the roots of the 
most recent, and current Baloch ethnopolitical conflict should not be 
expediently located in the type of polity (the dictatorship of General 
Musharraf), only.  
Figure 4.4:Total Ethnopolitical Conflict over the years for 
Baloch/Balochistan 
 
 
Further analyzing this dyad for the type of issues that made the 
content of this conflict we first see that the income from Gas produced 
in Balochistan could be a real source of conflict in the province (Figure 
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prevalence of conflict have been variously attributed to ‗greed‘. This 
greed factor has been proxied for by the presence of natural resources, 
which offers opportunities to the rebel group. In Balochistan‘s case, 
there is a history of payments of large sums of money, made to the tribal 
leaders in lieu of the use of land for extraction of gas. Akbar Bugti and 
his tribe are known to have received the major portion of these payouts 
under agreements with state owned companies.24 A chunk of the lower 
level jobs were also given to his appointees, under the agreement. This is 
also coupled with the fact that 12.5% of the royalty of gas is also 
required to be paid to the provincial government by the federal 
government. The latest conflict in Balochistan which started in 2004 is 
known to have its roots in the disagreements over the amount of these 
payments. 
It may be tempting to readily believe this greed-conflict hypothesis in 
Balochistan‘s case, however there is powerful evidence to suggest that 
long standing grievances were a key factor in this conflict. As Murshed 
(2010) suggests, a proper greed-based theory of civil war must relate to 
the trade-off between production and predation in making a living. He 
also points to the fact that armed conflict implies the absence of 
contractual or consensual interaction. This is not the case in Balochistan 
where proper contractual arrangements existed for transfer of resources 
from the government to the ethno politicians. It is also important to 
note that if greed is ever a factor in a conflict, it will seldom surface in 
the pages of a newspaper. No ethnopolitical leader will be foolish 
enough to mention the money factor even in passing. The mere presence 
of lootable resources in the province only helps us to take advantage of 
the theory developed in this regard through the cross country studies and 
discussed in section 2.4.4. 
This should prompt us to look towards other issues which made up 
the content of this conflict. We observe that some of the Baloch people 
have been in a conflict which can be described as subversive or 
secessionist (Figure 20, Appendix 4-A). We also see that there has been a 
conflict with state agencies over the rights to life, freedom and property 
(Figure 21, Appendix 4-A). Although both these are two sides of the 
same coin, yet it was necessary to separate the two for the simple fact 
that - ‗one person‘s terrorist may be the other‘s hero‘. There is an 
amazing tendency in both these conflict issues to move in tandem. 
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Almost the same is true for the conflict over general rights for the 
province (Figure 22, Annex 4-A). 
The rest of the conflict issues in this ethnopolitical dyad are all 
overwhelmingly non violent. An increasing conflict over participation in 
governance structures and power organs of the state is witnessed in the 
shape of statements from the politicians. There has been a historic sense 
of frustration in Balochis about their non representation in power 
organs. This is also reinforced by the fact that Balochistan has often 
failed to secure its quota of jobs in the federal services (See Figure 26, 
Annex 4-A).  Due to the fact that Balochistan was only granted the 
status of a province in 1970, the majority of civil servants in that 
province hailed from outside (A. Khan 2005). There is a sense that these 
factors have contributed to the over all underdevelopment of 
Balochistan (Quota system discussed in detail in Chapter 5). The conflict 
over federal help for Balochistan has therefore picked up steam (Figure 
25, Annex 4-A), with the province demanding more from the resource 
pool on the basis of it‘s under development.  
One would expect that those accused of indulging in narrow 
parochialism, the ethno-politicians, to be more belligerent on the issues 
of identity, culture and ethnicity. The absence of any violent conflict on 
this score in the Baloch case should be an eye opener (Figure 29, Annex 
4-A). The rest of the conflict that is there, is non violent and of a 
periodic nature. I will examine the impact of such a finding on the 
institutional set up in chapter 5.  
The Baloch case also follows the general trend in Pakistani politics 
when it comes to conflict with the state over the type of polity (Figure 
27, Annex 4-A). The fact that this type of conflict has largely been non 
violent and has ebbed and flowed with the alternate dictatorial and 
democratic cycles in the country, should be a testament that on this 
score these ethno-politicians have not been against the entity of the state 
but against the way it has been run. To the extent of Baloch 
ethnopoliticians, this is no longer true as some of them now openly 
demand secession. This includes Hairbiyar Marri, Bramdagh Bugti and 
Akhtar Mengal i.e the second generation of tribal leadership. The 
significance of polity (democracy, autocracy) in determining the contours 
of ethnopolitical conflict will be discussed in chapter 5.  
In a nutshell, we find ourselves in agreement with A. Khan (2005) 
who argues that the highly centralised state of Pakistan and its 
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unwillingness to allow regional and ethnic autonomy forced the 
nationalist forces to launch a guerrilla war against the state. 
4.5.3 Sindhi Ethnopolitical Conflict  
Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict has been largely non violent over the years, 
especially after 1988-89, See Figure 4.5. Like the Pukhtun case, Jaffrelot 
(2002) postulates that Sindh's political trajectory shows that, Pakistan 
could experience an inverted U curve, a trajectory ending with the 
defusing of ethnic tensions. Assuming for a moment that nationalism 
here is the same as the ethnopolitical conflict, we find from our data that 
it has indeed followed an inverted U curve (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5: Profile of Sindh/Sindhi Ethnopolitical Conflict 
 
 
Ethnopolitics in Sindh have a rather short history as compared to 
Pukhtun and Baloch cases. GM Syed founded the Sindh Progressive 
party in 1947 which, in his own words, laid the foundations of Sindhi 
nationalism.25 In 1953 he formed the Sindh Awami Mahaz.26 In early 
1960s it metamorphosed into the Jiye Sindh Movement.27 Till 1970s the 
movement remained confined to articulating the grievances of the 
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people of Sindh, emanating from in-migration of large number of non 
Sindhis, and mainly in the realm of culture and identity (Wright Jr 1991). 
The emergence of PPP under ZAB (Who was himself a Sindhi), 
undercut the support for the ethno politicians. 
 The conflict in Sindh has largely been non violent in the 1970s 
except for a few sporadic incidents. 1980s saw an outburst of 
ethnopolitical conflict when the Sindhi nationalists became a part of the 
PPP led MRD. The effect of this movement is seen in the form of 
violent conflict in mid 1980s. It would be unjust to the politics of PPP to 
confine it to the narrow realm of Sindhi ethnopolitics but it is also a fact 
that Sindhis felt alienated and wronged when one of theirs (ZAB) was 
sentenced to death by a Punjabi majority Supreme Court under a Punjabi 
dictator, Zia ul Haq. When the PPP launched the struggle, the effect was 
mostly felt in Sindh. There was the added fact that Sindhis have a very 
small presence in Army. This makes A. Khan (2005) remark that ‗For 
Sindhis military rule means rule by an occupying army‘.28 Jaffrelot (2002) 
notes that the anti Zia campaign in Sindh in 1980s was amply 
nationalistic. The subversive effect in the conflict is shown by Figure 33, 
Annex 4-A.  
The conflict data shows that after 1988, ethnopolitical conflict in 
Sindh has largely been non-violent, with a declining trend. Most of this 
conflict during these years has been around the issues of Kalabagh dam 
and the water share from Indus river (Figure 30, Annex 4-A), the issues 
of rights of the province (Figure 31, Annex 4-A), issues related to general 
governance e.g. budget and foreign policy (Figure 34, Annex 4-A) and 
conflict with state agencies over the rights to life, freedom and property 
(Figure 35, Annex 4-A). All these conflicts were overwhelmingly non 
violent. 
Apart from the ethnopolitical conflict over Sindhi language which 
started with the language riots of early 1970s (which we will discuss in 
the next section) this dyad has been remarkably mute during the period 
under study (Figure 36, Annex 4-A). Activity is only seen from mid 
eighties to the year 1999. After that it can be reported that there has not 
been any conflict over this issue.  
4.5.4 The Muhajir Dyads 
The advantages of studying ethnopolitical conflict in dyads are evident 
when it comes to analyzing dyads numbering 6 to 9. In all these dyads, 
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the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajir community from urban Sindh, 
form one end of these conflict axes. Dyad 8 is a minor dyad with very 
little conflict (that too is non violent) in 1973 and 1987. There is 
therefore no need to discuss it to any length.  
The Muhajir case also comes as a confirmation of the adoption of 
multiple identities by individuals and groups.29 We see these multiple 
identities at play on several levels of ethnopolitical conflict when it 
involves Muhajir ethnopolitical leadership. They are Muhajirs, the sons 
of the people who made Pakistan possible and then migrated to it, they 
are Sindhis when it comes to demanding rights for the province and they 
are from the proletariat when it comes to demanding rights for the 
people against the elites. Yet there is more; namely the fact that Muhajirs 
have also seen most conflict on the basis of identity markers. There is 
very little over rights and grievances. Karachi and Hyderabad have seen 
the most urban violence during 1980s and 1990s. These conflicts have 
had more ethnic overtones than political, something borne by the data. 
As an example scholars are curious by the intensity of conflict between 
Muhajirs and Pukhtuns in mid 1980s (Figure 4.8) and the absence of any 
real conflict of interest (A. Khan 2005).30  
The data shows that dyad 7 has exhibited the most violent 
ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1972 (Figure 4.7). Seen in 
conjunction with dyads 6 and 9 (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8), this violence 
is even more magnified. The infighting between the two factions of 
Muhajir ethnopolitical party, the MQM, has also been included in 
conflict dyad 7 because for most of this conflict, one side was supported 
by state forces or at least was perceived to be supported by it. 
The Muhajir and Sindhi ethnopolitical conflict has its roots in the 
earliest post partition period in 1947, when the Sindhi expectations of 
getting land from Ghulam Muhammad Barrage31 were not fulfilled. 
Instead most of the land went to Punjabi and Muhajir settlers and 
former and serving military officers (Waseem 1996).32 Sindhis were also 
not happy with the small credit given to them in the struggle for 
Pakistan, in the school textbooks (Kazi 1988). The language bill of 1972, 
introduced by the provincial PPP government, became the starter for a 
short lived conflict which was mainly based on identity markers. The 
data shows that Muhajir ethnopolitics were born amid violent, almost 
simultaneous, conflicts in Karachi with Pukhtuns (Figure 4.8) Sindhis 
(Figure 4.6) and the Central Government/Punjab (Figure 4.7) 33 
100 CHAPTER 4 
 
The issues which pushed Muhajirs and Sindhis towards conflict were 
mainly related to language in the 1970s and the return of Bihari34 refugees 
from Bangladesh.35 The Sindhis saw this as a further threat to the 
demographic balance of the province. The flashpoint for conflict with 
Pukhtuns was the death of a Bihari girl in Karachi in a bus accident. Since 
most of the public transport is owned and operated by Pukhtuns, the 
incident soon became a rallying point for ethnopolitical conflict.  
MQM leadership has been in intensely violent conflicts with state 
agencies the rhetoric for which was secessionist and subversive (Figure 
39, Annex 4-A). The three army/militia led actions were all started by 
federal governments, which initially counted MQM as its coalition 
partner. These operations lost their momentum gradually with each cycle 
to the extent that General Musharraf‘s operation fizzled out in the end 
by appointing an MQM activist as the governor of the province. Since 
then there has been no violent conflict in any of the Muhajir dyads till 
the end of this study period.  
Figure 4.6: Total Conflict between the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs 
and Sindhis. 
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Figure 4.7: Total conflict between the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs 
and the State, Army, Punjab 
 
Figure 4.8: Total Conflict between the Ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs 
and Pukhtuns 
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4.5.5 Other Dyads 
The eight dyads discussed above contribute the maximum to overall 
conflict. However, the rest of the dyads had to be studied in order to see 
a complete picture. Individually, all these dyads are mostly non violent 
(except for dyad 5 in early 1970s and dyad 11).  
Dyad 4 (Figure 41, Annex 4-A) for Punjab is the most non violent 
and milder one among major dyads. There is a tendency that it shows 
activity only on the few issues of share of resources among provinces.  
Dyad 5 has been active only during the early 1970s. (Figure 42, Annex 
4-A).  
Except for dyad 10, most of these dyads are linked to those already 
explained above in the sense that the parties in conflict (mostly ethno 
politicians) are the same. The difference is in the alliances they make and 
the multiple identities they acquire in different dyads. This gives rise to 
different configurations of stakeholders which are interesting in their 
own right to study. A broad picture is given by the charts of conflict in 
these dyads (See appendix 4-A). 
4.6 Limitations and Potential of the Approach 
The process of data collection can never be rigorous enough in a country 
with a history of media censorship and use of additional sources has its 
limits.  
Another limitation of the data is its use of weights assigned to 
different orders of conflict, as discussed in section 4.4. An ordinal 
variable can be used as a scalar one only on the basis of good underlying 
theory, which is itself a subjective criterion. However the use of another 
method for assigning weights as discussed in section 4.4 would have 
entailed much the same problems, without any apparent addition to the 
understanding of the issue under study. The framework has given us 
graphical accounts of the different ethnopolitical conflicts – accounts 
which conform to the narratives of this conflict. 
The framework of our present dataset can be used to add more 
events to the present dyads as well as the addition of more dyads and 
issues. This will allow us not only to see a more complete picture of the 
conflicts under study but also analyze the present conflict between the 
radicals (Taliban and their allies) and state agencies. It will also afford us 
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to see the cross linkages of these conflicts with others e.g. sectarian 
conflict and that over the emerging issues of environment. 
4.7 Conclusion 
To see the profile of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan I collected a 
dataset of events from 1972 to 2005. To get an empirical handle on the 
data a conflict score was calculated according to a weightage scheme. 
This scheme was applied to the annually aggregated data for the period 
of study. A dyadic scheme was followed to study the different 
combinations of stakeholders in these conflicts and on the basis of a 
given set of issues.  
From the above, we get a sense that the ethnopolitical conflict in 
Pakistan took a definite turning point after 1971. Till 1970, the one unit 
scheme36 was largely responsible for most rhetoric from the 
ethnopolitical leadership. The dissolution of one unit was welcomed by 
all. This took out the sting from most of the ethnopolitical agenda. The 
1971 elections gave this leadership a share of the pie in governments in 
NWFP and Balochistan. The issues that remained were largely side issues 
of day to day governance. 
The current phase (1971 till now) of ethnopolitical conflict, excluding 
dyads containing Muhajirs, has a watershed starting point in the events 
of 1973 in Balochistan. Those events started a chain which led to Baloch 
uprising, a renewed Pukhtunistan movement and the interference from 
Afghanistan in 70s and 80s. This led to the banning of NAP and that in 
turn sped up the fragmentation of Sindhi ethnopolitical leadership who 
separated from the party.  
1980s also saw the birth of Muhajir ethnopolitics, which were 
instrumental in some of the most intense violence in the period under 
study. This trend has been declining since 2003.  
This description of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1972 was 
necessary to get the overall picture. The next chapter will now attempt at 
an explanation of this conflict in the context of the health of federal 
institutions. 
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 Notes 
                                                 
1. Gupta and Gupta (1990), P. 191 
2  The number of deaths can always be updated from biographical material and 
triangulation of sources.  
3. The UPPSALA conflict data program is one such example which defines 
armed conflict as ‗a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one 
is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths‘ (Strand et 
al. 2003)  
4  Term taken from the Conflict Barometer by Heidelberg Institute of 
International Conflict Research.(HIIK 2008) 
5 Among others by Hibbs (1973) and Rummel (1971) 
6 Please read chapter 2. 
7  Among others by Shahzad (2007), A. Khan (2005) and Amin (1988). 
8  P. 217 
9  This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
10  Dawn, 30-03-1972 
11  Interview with Mr. Juma Khan Safi, Dated 01-05-2007, Peshawar. 
12 P. 139 
13  pp. 25-26 
14 Which later became known as the Hyderabad tribunal (1975-79) 
15  Jeffrelot asserts otherwise. ‗The ANP also diluted its nationalist programme 
because its top priority was to support the war effort of Islamabad against the 
Soviets‘ (Jaffrelot 2002). This is pure conjecture and not based on facts.  
16 More on this aspect in our discussion of Fiscal Federalism in Chapter 5. 
17 P. 105 
18 P. 286 
19 Using the UPPSALA definition of civil war, a thousand or more deaths per 
year in a conflict. 
20 Akbar Bugti was killed in an encounter with the security forces on August 26, 
2006.  
21 P. 151 
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22 See for example Dawn: 26-3-1990, 02-04-1990, 28-05-1990, 07-07-1990, 09-10-
1990, 22-10-1990. These are among the many statements wherein he demanded 
more provincial autonomy and due rights.  
23 See for example Dawn: 11-02-1991, when Ataullah Mengal demands rights for 
nationalities. 
24 The companies include Pakistan Petroleum limited (PPL), Oil and Gas 
Development company Limited (OGDCL), Sui Southern Gas Company Limited 
(SSGC) and Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL). The companies 
claimed that in 2005 they were paying Rs. 10,000 per acre for use of 1,100 acres. 
The tribe insisted on being paid Rs. 17,600 per acre for the use of 7000 acres. See 
Dawn 29-1-2005. 
25 Cited by Amin (1988), P. 92 
26 Translated as Sindh People‘s Front 
27 Translated as ‗Long live Sindh Movement‘. 
28 P. 149 
29 For multiple identities please read A. Sen (2008) 
30 P. 175 
31 Became operative in 1958. 
32 P. 623 
33 For an account of Muhajir grievances in one place, see Haq (1995) 
34 Mostly with ancestral ties to the province of Bihar in India, speaking Urdu and 
are ethnically related to Muhajirs. In fact the MQM leadership takes umbrage if 
the term is used. 
35 ‗Biharis‘ is the term used for the descendents of people from the Indian 
province of Bihar who migrated to the former East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). 
Most of these people have been left stranded in slums in Bangladesh after 1971.  
36 One Unit scheme details in chapter 2. For more on this scheme please refer to 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Unit 
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The Health of Federal Institutions and 
Impact on Ethnopolitical Conflict 
 
 
When I depart from the scene, I would like to see constitutional 
government entrenched and democratic institutions strengthened. I would 
like to see provincial autonomy functioning properly because in an 
underdeveloped country it is far more difficult to maintain a balance 
between the federal and the provincial governments than in the developed 
countries.  
5.1 Introduction 
The connection between institutions and conflict is well theorized. This 
chapter discusses the formal and informal institutions created under the 
social contract in Pakistan. Important institutions in these categories, 
their health and the impact on the overall ethnopolitical conflict will be 
analyzed.  
I will briefly discuss the institutions established by the social contract 
in Pakistan, mainly through its structured fiscal federalist scheme, the 
requirements of checks and balances, and the unstructured and informal 
understanding among the federating units on the share in power pie. The 
effects of these two types of institutions on the overall ethnic conflict 
will be analyzed by studying the quality of leading institutions in each 
category.  
A system of fiscal federalism had to be devised in Pakistan to allocate 
and redistribute resources among the federating units. Among the 
institutions created for this purpose, The NFC, the Concurrent list of the 
constitution and the quota system of jobs in the federal government, 
stand out for their importance and will be studied for their impact on 
ethnopolitical conflict.  
                                                 
 Prime Ministers Z.A Bhutto in an interview with A.M Rosenthal. Dawn,  May 
2nd 1974. 
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The checks and balances scheme of the constitution provides judicial 
review and a bicameral legislature. Their independence and democratic 
credentials respectively, indicate their quality. It would be difficult to 
study both in a single undertaking. As a practical solution I intend to 
study the latter as the changes in polity directly affected changes in the 
independence of judiciary. The chapter will attempt to see the effect of 
changes in polity on the ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan.   
Among the unstructured and informal rules of the game, a tacit 
understanding among the power stakeholders in the country about the 
share of each federating unit in the power cake is observed. A few power 
positions of note are considered part of this cake. We will see how the 
division of these positions impacted the overall conflict.  
The relevant elements of social contract which will be part of the 
discussion in this chapter have been fleshed out in chapter 3. Here we 
are interested to see how those elements were practically implemented 
and answer the question; what was their effect on unfolding 
ethnopolitical conflict? 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, the 
theoretical debate linking institutions, their types and quality to the 
conflict inside a country will be presented. In section 5.3, the federal 
scheme of the Pakistani constitution and the institutions it creates will be 
linked to the emerging ethnopolitical conflict via the three tiers of NFC, 
the concurrent list of the constitution and the quota system of jobs in 
federal services. In section 5.4 the checks on executive and their link 
with conflict will be explored via the health of the two institutions of 
polity (the legislative check) and the share in power of each 
ethnic/provincial group. Section 5.5 discusses other institutions which 
were specifically created for conflict management among the federating 
units. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Institutions and Conflict-The Theoretical Debate 
Institutions have been variously defined as scripts (Ridley 1975), games 
(Iversen 1999), the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction (North 1990)1 and simply the equilibrium ways of doing 
things (Shepsle 2006).2  
Shepsle further differentiates between structured and unstructured 
institutions. Simply put, institutions that are robust over time and lend 
themselves to comparisons across settings are structured (Shepsle 2006) 
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e.g. legislature, judiciary or a regulatory agency like the NFC in our case. 
For Shepsle, Other institutions which may be ―described as practices and 
recognized as patterns they induce‖ should be classified as unstructured 
institutions.3 In our case, examples of these may include the tacit 
understanding among ruling elites, to give representation to every ethnic 
group, in power (more on this in section 5.4.1).  
The structured and unstructured institutions of Shepsle can be 
compared to the formal and informal institutions of North (1990). It 
may be easier to think of the formal constraints or institutions, but 
where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially 
transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture 
(North 1990)4. 
Like politics and economics, political and economic institutions are 
inseparable.5 This gives the study, the motivation to study both as a 
single set of factors affecting conflict. Both types of institutions need to 
be differentiated as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005), however my differentiation will be restricted to 
more formal institutions than theirs.6 I will also refrain from an 
exhaustive analysis of these institutions and will take one or two 
examples from each category (See Table 5.1). 
Why is it necessary to study institutions? Is there a theoretical basis 
for linking conflict with the quality of institutions? The literature 
suggests that this link is established through at least three channels.  
First, the quality of institutions is linked to growth. This growth link is 
established in such cross country works as, inter alia, Acemoglu et al. 
(2005), Murshed (2010) and Easterly and Levine (2003).  The underlying 
theory states that conflict over resources or rents will decrease if the over 
all size of available resources is increased. In other words, the bigger the 
cake, the bigger the share and the less will be the heart burn. 
The second effect of good quality institutions is their leveling impact 
in terms of horizontal inequality among the contending groups.7 Its 
biggest impact is felt on the elites and the share of power and wealth 
they enjoy in the informal political institutions (S.M. Murshed 2010). On 
a more general level these reduce horizontal inequality, relative 
deprivation and social exclusion, topics which will be covered in next 
chapter. 
The third significant role of institutions is direct. Easterly (2001) finds 
that good institutions may mitigate ethnically based social conflict that 
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lowers growth. Most institutions are in one sense, attempts to manage 
conflicts. The presence of good working institutions is itself a sign of less 
conflict. 
It will be the endeavor in this chapter to discuss Pakistani institutions 
in the light of the above mentioned links. To do this we first need to 
identify those institutions in this study, the composition and working of 
which had a relationship with unfolding ethnopolitical conflict. Since 
Nordlinger (1972)8 and Snyder (2000),9argue for a case that federalism 
and its associated arrangements are not a suitable solution to ethnic 
conflict and that a federal dispensation will contribute to exacerbation of 
conflict and ultimately the failure of federation, therefore; a nuanced 
study of contextual factors that lead to particular make up of the 
federation and its resulting institutions in our case will be required. Such 
an analysis will therefore need to identify its place in the narrower 
theoretical discourse about the nature of federal structures, the fiscal 
federalism schemes; and their impact on conflict. This debate will also be 
a bridge for us to the study of our case. 
5.2.1 Consociational Federalism, Fiscal Federalism and 
Institutions 
When does a formal social contract or the constitution become federal. 
William Riker‘s classic answer remains valid today; 
A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land 
and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is 
autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a 
statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its 
own sphere. (Riker 1964)10 
Federalism then is about the division of power between federal and 
regional governments (Wachendorfer-Schmidt and Wachendorfer 
2000)11 therefore there cannot be a single method for this division. 
Federalism thus comes in more than one flavour. This gives rise to a 
variety of institutions depending upon the context and need. Jennings 
(2007) asks the question that given that good institutional arrangements 
result in low conflict, then why we don‘t see more constitutional 
conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. Linking it with reducing 
conflict, McGarry and O'Leary (2009) point out that in order to be 
successful, federations not only need to evolve institutions of ‗self rule‘ 
but also those of ‗shared rule‘, or consociational rule. It should also have 
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an agreed regime for managing resources.12 Many Scholars thus arguing 
have led to the consociational school, maintaining that ―proportionality 
in…the allocation of public funds‖ is an essential element of successful 
power-sharing arrangements between ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977).13.  
In other words, it isn‘t sufficient to grant a semblance of self rule to 
the federating units but also to take these units along in governing the 
federation as a whole. This takes us to the debate whether a democratic 
federal setup will be more amenable to reducing conflict.  
As discussed in section 3.4, the nature of federation in Pakistan 
changed from that of ‗coming together‘ federation in 1947 to ‗holding 
together‘ federation in 1973. Such holding needed bonds which could 
only be supplied through the consociational means. Analyzing the case 
of Pakistan, Adeney (2009) argues that better representation of groups in 
the core institutions of state through consociational mechanisms would 
have alleviated many of the tensions and conflicts within Pakistani 
federation, whether or not it was a democracy. She does not agree with 
Talbot (1998) and A. Khan (2005) who argue that since the absence of 
democracy necessarily meant the centralization of power therefore in 
these periods of dictatorships ethnic tensions increase. Adeney‘s analysis 
questions this assumption, recognizing the argument that many of the 
conflicts took place after prolonged periods of autocratic rule. She then 
posits that the relationship between the nature of polity and ethnic 
conflict is more complicated than it is generally portrayed. Analyzing the 
two institutions of army and bureaucracy, she concludes that the 
proportionality (inclusiveness) element of consociational-ism has a direct 
relationship with the ethnic conflict in Pakistan.  
There is also a case for decentralization of public expenditures in 
federations, leading to a reduction of conflict. Tranchant (2007) presents 
evidence that fiscal federalism reduces violence if different ethnicities are 
concentrated in the different geographic entities of the federation. As 
Murshed (2010) points out, fiscal federalism or the decentralized 
expenditure decision making is less of a factor, in reducing violence, than 
fiscal appeasement. The point is underscored by Alemán and Treisman 
(2005) who studied the cases of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Yugoslavia 
and found that fiscal appeasement rather than fiscal decentralization has 
been more effective in reducing conflict. This finding in case of Pakistan 
will be the focus in section 5.3.1.  
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In a roundabout way the successful practice of a particular brand of 
federalism again comes back to the nature of institutions in a country. 
This is what Tranchant (2008) finds in a cross country study.  
Drawing on the above discussion I propose to study Pakistani 
institutions and their impact on the ethnopolitical conflict. Two cases 
each of the unstructured/informal and structured/formal institutions 
will be discussed. Each case will be either a political or economic 
institution. Please refer to Table 5.1 for typology of these institution and 
our studied examples. 
Table 5.1: Typology of institutions and studied examples for Pakistan 
Type of Institutions Political  Economic 
Unstructured/Informal 
Institutions. 
Share of Power for the elite Appeasement 
through NFC 
Structured/Formal 
Institutions. 
 Legislatures. 
 The concurrent list of 
Constitution. 
 Council of Common Interests 
 
 Allocation and 
Redistribution 
through NFC. 
 Quota system of 
jobs in Federal 
Government. 
 
   
5.3 Federal Institutions and their impact on ethnopolitical 
conflict14 
Wallace E. Oates, in his classic study on fiscal federalism presented the 
decentralization theorem.  
For a public good- the consumption of which is defined over geographical 
subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each 
level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central 
or the respective local government-it will always be more efficient (or at 
least as efficient) for local governments to provide the pareto-efficient 
levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central 
government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all 
jurisdictions.(Oates 1972)15 
However, costs vary in the real world, and the central governments 
need to decide on their level of provisioning. In such a situation the 
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question of continued devolution to the regional governments is bound 
to become skewed in favour of some and will generate controversies and 
grievances in a federation. Resource starved regions will find themselves 
unable to provide even the most basic of public goods efficiently, 
without ‗someone‘ picking the extra tab. Additionally, tastes and 
preferences differ from region to region (province). In such a situation a 
market type solution may not exist for public goods when it comes to 
determine the level of expenditure (Samuelson 1954). Tiebout (1956) 
argued that if the consumption of public goods and choice of region is 
bundled then we can obtain an approximate market type solution where 
people can ‗vote with their feet‘ i.e. move to an area of low taxes and 
high public good availability. Bewley (1981) argued that for such a 
situation to hold and be efficient, the number of regions should match 
the number of consumer types, governments should be profit-
maximizing and anticipatory, they should make zero profits in 
equilibrium, there is free trade among regions and that public services 
rather than public goods are the focus of government intervention. This 
is a tall order to meet and it will be seen in latter discussion that most of 
these conditions were not met in the Pakistani fiscal scheme and its 
implementation. The result was sometimes ‗voting with the feet‘ as in the 
case of large scale migration to Karachi and northern Punjab, but mostly 
such inefficiencies led to generation of grievances.  
The institution of NFC was proposed and set up under article 160 of 
the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, to apportion resources vertically 
between the center and provinces and horizontally among the federating 
units.16 With its work cut out for it by the constitutional contract, the 
NFC should not have had much problem in arriving at agreed and 
acceptable formulae. Over the years this proved an elusive goal. The 
fiscal flavour of the scheme (with supposedly pareto-efficient output) 
was frequently overshadowed by the consociational one. The basis for 
this was provided by the same article of constitution (Sub article 2(b), 
See Annex 5-A). In section 5.3.1, this thesis will study how this came 
about and what was its impact on ethnopolitical conflict. 
The federalism theorem also has its application in the political 
institutions. Pakistani constitution provides for legislative domains 
(called ‗lists‘). Article 142 provides a federal legislative list and a 
concurrent legislative list (Annex 5-B). The former is the exclusive 
domain of the national parliament while matters in the concurrent list are 
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open to the provincial and federal legislatures.17 An analysis will be 
undertaken in section 5.3.2 for studying the impact of this arrangement, 
on conflict. 
The concept of power sharing by being inclusive has long been a 
favourite with consociationalist. It is supposed to dampen the appetite 
for conflict. However Murshed (2010) and Roeder (2005) consider these 
power sharing formulae bad for long term democratization because all 
issues risk becoming ethnicized. For long term solution they contend 
that power division structures should be built in the system with checks 
and balances, ‗multiple majorities‘ and no veto power for any single 
majority. This may mean ‗more layers of political and economic decision 
making than there are ethnicities‘ (S.M. Murshed 2010).  
In addition to the layers of multiple majorities and separation of 
powers, an informal political contract among the federating units in 
Pakistan has typically been recognized. This informal/unstructured 
institution is the proportionate representation of units in the power 
circle. This is mainly a power sharing institution as opposed to the more 
formal institutions of power division. This institution is the implicit part 
of the elite level contract and the ethnopolitical conflict over it will be 
analyzed in section 5.4.1. 
5.3.1 The National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Redistribution 
In accordance with the constitutional provision, the NFC award has 
been announced in 1974, 1979, 1990, 1996 and 2006.18 In light of Oates‘s 
theorem we can see that the purpose was to redistribute the resources 
optimally and after every five years. This obviously could not happen 
regularly as intended, at least when it came to the ‗regular‘ part. 
Vertical Distribution and Fiscal Autonomy 
The constitution does not provide any formula for vertical distribution 
of resources between provinces and the center. The issue of vertical 
imbalance between the two has dogged most of the discussion over the 
years since Pakistan‘s vertical imbalances are high by international 
standards (Asian Dev Bank 2004), see Figure 5.5 and Table 5.2.   
Most of the revenue is directly collected by the central government. 
This may provide for efficient collection but it absolves the provincial 
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governments of the responsibility to the taxpayer; it leaves few incentives 
for the provinces to utilize the resources efficiently. Also, another 
potential drawback of the system is that the formula determining a 
province‘s revenue allocation bears little relation to the province‘s 
expenditure (Asian Dev Bank 2004). This creates inefficiencies in the 
over all system and is one crucial deficiency for the requirements of 
optimality.  
In addition to inducing the above mentioned inefficiencies, the 
system also engenders the feelings of financial dependence. Whatever 
formula is agreed upon, it is bound to be seen as unsatisfactory to the 
individual stakeholders. With such vertical fiscal imbalance, the financial 
soundness of provinces remains dependent on the handouts from the 
center and all the undesired consequences are put at the doorstep of 
federal government.  
Table 5.2: Vertical distribution under various NFC awards 
Year Federal 
/Provincial  
Divisible pool19 
1974 20:80 Income tax, Sales tax and corporation 
Tax+ Export duties on Cotton 
1979 20:80 Same as above 
1985 Interim Award Same as above 
1990 20:80 Same as above+ Excise duty on sugar and 
tobacco 
1996 62.5:37.5 All taxes 
2000 (Not 
Awarded) 
Interim Award Same as above 
2006 
(Estimated) 
45:5520 Same as above 
Source: Adapted from (I. Ahmad et al. 2007) and (Sabir 2001) 
 
As Qureshi (1991) points out, there is no single measure that can give 
an unambiguous idea about the financial soundness of sub-national 
governments and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by them. The one 
indicator that can give us some idea about the financial autonomy of 
these federating units is the degree of fiscal decentralization.21 More 
precisely, the degree of fiscal decentralization can be measured as the 
proportion of aggregate subnational government expenditures that is 
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financed from non-central sources (Alemán and Treisman 2005). In 
theory, more fiscal decentralization should offer more potential for 
improved macroeconomic governance (A. Shah 1999). Translating this 
into practice has been particularly difficult in Pakistan.  
From Figure 5.1, it can be seen that the provincial share of the federal 
taxes and excises, distributed according to the NFC awards from time to 
time, steadily decreased for all the provinces but especially so for NWFP 
and Balochistan. While Punjab‘s and Sindh‘s share dropped from mid 40 
percentage points to 30s, NWFP‘s and Balochistan‘s share dropped from 
50s to 20s and below. This drop is compensated to a large extent by a 
rise in revenue deficit grants from the federal government, see Figure 
5.3. Similarly the share of provincial own revenues have steadily dropped 
for all provinces but more so for NWFP and Balochistan, See Figure 5.3. 
The trend continues to this day, See e.g. Figure 5.4. However since 1996 
award, there is a tendency to shift from grants to getting more revenue 
share from the divisible pool (Jaffery and Sadaqat 2006). This was done 
largely in the name of stabilization but had its own negative 
consequences (Q.M. Ahmed et al. 2004).  This also, in essence, does not 
change the autonomy equation. And we can surmise that financial 
autonomy over the years has steadily eroded and with it the notion of 
fiscal decentralization. Therefore, the case that fiscal decentralization is 
not effective enough in reducing violent conflict (S.M. Murshed 2010), 
cannot be investigated thoroughly because, to begin with, there has not 
been enough decentralization in Pakistan. This does not stop us from 
observing that while there has been a trend of decreasing fiscal 
decentralization, the ethnopolitical conflict over it has shown an 
increasing trend, see Figure 5.12.  
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Figure 5.1: Share of Federal Taxes and Excises as a percentage of total 
provincial current revenues  
 
Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994) 
 
Figure 5.2: Share of provincial tax revenues as a percentage of total 
provincial current revenues  
 
Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994) 
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Figure 5.3: Share of Revenue Deficit Grants as a percentage of total 
provincial current revenues  
 
Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994) 
Figure 5.4: Provisional Percentage Share of different sources in Total 
Provincial Revenue for July-Dec 2008  
 
Source: Govt of Pakistan, Ministry of finance22 
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Figure 5.5:International Vertical Fiscal Gaps  
Source: (Asian Dev Bank 2004) 
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Horizontal Distribution and Redistribution 
Going along the path of Oates‘s theorem, the second requirement for 
the optimality of fiscal federalism is its efficiency in redistribution of 
resources among federating units. In addition to the vertical distribution, 
the horizontal distribution among provinces has also been a squabbling 
point. The basic formula for this apportionment has evolved over the 
course of successive awards. Notwithstanding the grants and 
subventions for the provinces, the formula has come to depend largely 
on population as the basic criterion; while changing the composition of 
the resource cake. All the four provinces have historically proposed 
different and, at times, mutually exclusive formulae as basis for resource 
distribution, see Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Provinces and their demands for NFC Formula basis 
Province Formula Basis Demand 
Punjab Population 
Sindh Revenue Generation 
NWFP Backwardness + Population 
Balochistan Inverse Population Density 
Source: (G. Ahmed 2007) 
 
Population has been the only criterion on the basis of which all the 
past awards have been decided. This however has a catch. In the absence 
of any compromise formula, the recurring subterfuge has been to let the 
previous population based formula to continue, with some extra grants 
for the smaller provinces. This has caused heart burn and a sense of 
helplessness among the three smaller provinces. It is perhaps the biggest 
contributory factor to the overall ethnopolitical conflict over NFC and 
allied matters, see Figure 5.12. The population basis for this formula, in 
combination with grants, has the benefits of simplicity, objectivity and 
the transfer of resources in a predictable manner but lacks a specific 
equalization standard and therefore falls short of the professed goal of 
reducing regional inequalities (A. Shah 1991).  
Sindh‘s case for consideration of revenue generation will take into 
account the sincerity of effort for resource generation. However the data 
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for this is not available (G. Ahmed 2007). The data that the finance 
department of the government of Sindh compiled23 only gives the 
collection origin and not the incidence point of the taxes. Nor does the 
tax collecting authority, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), compiles data 
on this basis. Further, as Anwar Shah points out, there seems neither to 
be equity nor efficiency argument for doing so.24 In essence, this 
argument crumbles at the touchstone of optimal redistribution in fiscal 
federalism. 
NWFP‘s case for taking ‗backwardness‘ as the formula basis has 
equity and efficiency on its side but it would be very difficult for the two 
bigger provinces of Punjab and Sindh to accede to it as it would directly 
impact their own share of divisible pool. NWFP also supports giving 
part consideration to population.  
Balochistan‘s case for Inverse Population Density will take care of the 
unique situation of that province as it is the largest and least populated of 
all four; however that will leave Punjab and Sindh, and to a certain extent 
NWFP, with too few resources.25 
The redistribution scheme of Pakistani federalism is therefore good 
on paper but lacking in practice. We will see in detail in chapter 6, 
whether this redistributive scheme had any appreciable effect at reducing 
interprovincial and inter regional disparities in development and in turn 
had any effect on the course of ethnopolitical conflict. 
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Figure 5.6: Percentage share of each province in divisible pool 
 
Source: (I. Ahmad et al. 2007) 
Figure 5.7: Year wise allocation of percentage share for each province 
 
Source: (I. Ahmad et al. 2007) 
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Fiscal Appeasement 
Having a rigid population based formula did not deter decision makers 
from evolving a complex scheme of transfers, grants and budgetary help 
for the smaller provinces. Thus, in addition to the above fiscal 
redistribution formula, the appeasement was mainly done via two 
principal fiscal channels, straight transfers and grants. 
Revenue collected from certain natural resources by the federal 
government was directly transferred to the provinces by the collecting 
agency, hence straight transfers. This gave the provinces a sense of 
entitlement and a modicum of control over their natural resources. 
Although the provision was there in the constitution, only excise duty 
and royalty on natural gas were included in the 1974 award. In 1990 the 
net profit from hydro electricity, gas development surcharge and royalty 
on crude oil were also included and hence the importance of these funds 
have steadily increased for provinces (Ghaus et al. 1996).  
There have been problems with these straight transfers. The 
computation and payment of profits from hydro electricity has been 
random and non-transparent. These payments are sometimes blamed for 
creating financial viability problems for the state authority responsible 
for generating electricity, the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA). Due to these problems the payments have sometimes been 
capped at a certain level leading to long drawn legal solicitation between 
the federal and provincial governments. The expectations after the NFC 
accord of 1990 were high and the provincial government of NWFP 
accordingly budgeted its resources. These expectations were not met in 
the subsequent years as the profit was capped at Rs. 6000 million, 
without assigning any reason, see Figure 5.8. This led to heart burn and 
the conflict over this issue can be seen following the trend of 
expectations, see Figure 5.9. A solicitation committee of all stakeholders 
recommended a compromise formula in 2006 but even that remains to 
be implemented as WAPDA has refused to agree to it. More recently 
however, the Prime Minister announced in November 2009, the 
implementation of the compromise formula but that too over a period 
of five years. 
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Figure 5.8: Expected (Budgeted) and Actual funds received for hydro profit to 
NWFP. (Rs in millions) 
 
 
Source: Provincial Budget statements and AGPR reports for various years. 
Figure 5.9: Conflict over Hydro power profits 
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In the case of Balochistan these straight transfers witnessed 
appreciable jumps in 1991 and 1999 and downturns in 1996 and 2001, 
See Figure 5.10.26 Yet curiously, a rising trend is witnessed in conflict 
over the same, in Figure 5.11. However conflict indicators over this issue 
are few and far between and therefore cannot help us explain the recent 
rise in overall ethnopolitical conflict in Balochistan. This, we shall 
attempt in section 5.3.2.  
Figure 5.10: Straight transfers to Balochistan 
 
Source: Statistics compiled by provincial finance department of Balochistan. 
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‗clear attempt by the federal government to appease‘ NWFP, Balochistan 
and to a certain extent, Sindh, is observed which suggests to have 
achieved the desired consequences for ethnopolitical conflict. 
Figure 5.11: Balochistan Conflict over Mineral Resources 
 
 
Table 5.4: Allocation of Central grants to provinces, (% of total) 
  1976
to 
1979 
1979 
to 
1981 
1981
to 
1983 
1983 
to 
1985 
1985 
to 
1987 
1987
to 
1989 
Revenue 
Deficit Grants 
Punjab 30 8.5 11.7 34.5 42.8 40.1 
Sindh 13.7 9.5 5.1 17.2 20 21.4 
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Development 
grants 
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Sindh  22.4 27.6 46.7 33.1 27.6 
NWFP  17.7 15.5 1.6 8.3 14 
Balochistan  9.4 20.2 42 13.1 12.1 
Source: Adapted from Sato (1994) 
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Whither Fiscal Federalism! 
While collecting conflict data from newspapers for this work, I got the 
distinct impression that the politicians and opinion leaders from the two 
bigger provinces do espouse the cause of consociational federalism and 
giving more resources to the two smaller provinces of Balochistan and 
NWFP.27 When it comes to implementing exactly this, after every five 
years, the finance ministers and the bureaucratic machine gets bogged 
down in the nitty gritty of a few basis points. Then, as should be 
expected of partisan stakeholders, all talk of consociation and optimal 
redistribution vanishes. This tendency is slightly modified when the 
federal government has interceded, on behalf of the smaller provinces, to 
alleviate some of their financial problems. Although the overall conflict 
over these issues has increased (Figure 5.12), fiscal appeasement seemed 
to have worked at least in late 1970s and 1980s. The optimality of 
resource distribution and allocation will be more fully investigated in 
chapter 6, where we will study the regional and inter provincial 
inequalities. 
Figure 5.12: Ethnopolitical conflict over NFC and allied matters 
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5.3.2 The Concurrent List of the Constitution 
I come back to Oates‘s theorem and the three functions of fiscal 
federalism namely, redistribution, stabilization and allocation of 
resources. These were analyzed there in a fiscal setting in the previous 
section. Now I will analyze the same in a legislative setting.  
The chief formal/structured institutions for the three functions have 
been the two legislative lists of the constitution (Annex 5-B, also see 
section 5.3). The lists have been an integral part of the constitutional 
social contract (Please refer to chapter 3). Here I will not attempt to 
analyze the lists themselves since that is a project in its own right. What I 
want to emphasize here is that it was the intent that the concurrent 
legislative list, the items of which are open for both the provincial and 
federal legislatures, will be abolished after ten years (c. 1983).28 This 
couldn‘t happen for various reasons, some of which have been alluded to 
by Nazeer Naji (Partly cited in Chapter 3); 
The constitution of Pakistan was actually a ten year contract among the 
federating units of Pakistan. In these ten years, a blueprint of powers, 
between the federation and provinces, was to be completed; after which 
the major portion of concurrent list was to be transferred to the provinces 
and the saga of constitutional abrogation, martial law and sham 
democracies would have stopped automatically. But after ten years, 
General Zia ul Haq didn‘t execute, the contract upon which the 1973 
constitution was accepted unanimously. The federation kept occupying the 
domains of the provinces and two martial laws were enforced to facilitate 
this. Constitution was abrogated, provisional constitutions were made and 
then the mutilated constitution, with disjointed amendments, was revived 
under the name of real constitution. The concerns and unrest in the 
federating units increased. Religious politicians were brought to the fore to 
sabotage those struggling for regional rights and sectarian tensions were 
encouraged. In short, non political forces were used catastrophically to 
undermine the movements for regional rights. (Naji 2007)29 
This refusal to execute a vital part of the contract had its influence on 
ethnopolitical conflict as suggested by our conflict data, where a constant 
level of intensity is maintained right after 1983 (See Figure 5.13). The 
constant refrain of provincial rights and demands to abolish the 
concurrent list, are always audible in all the cacophony of ethnopolitical 
conflict. It was high at the initial stages of constitution making and 
understandably so, as all the stakeholders were trying to bargain over 
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their respective positions. The gradual declining trend in 1970s was 
broken in 1984, exactly as Naji states. Another rising trend in this 
conflict can be seen after 2003, during the era of the sham democracy 
ushered in by General Musharraf.  
The concurrent list is still a part of the constitution and the demands 
for its abolition continue to come from Sindh and NWFP, however for 
the ethnopolitical leadership of Balochistan this issue has now become 
infractuous. To quote Irshad Haqqani interviewing one leading Baloch 
tribal leader Sardar Ataullah Mengal; 
Haqqani: …This has to be explained a little. Presently there is a federal list 
and a concurrent list. Do you want that the whole concurrent list should 
be transferred to the provinces? 
Mengal: Now we have no interest with the concurrent list. It wasn‘t done 
when there was time for it. Now it has become infractuous. Now we 
demand that all legislative powers should be with the provincial 
legislatures. And I am not saying this for only Balochistan…However the 
centre should only legislate for the (few) departments it retains (Haqqani 
2004).30 
Figure 5.13: Ethnopolitical Conflict Over Provincial Rights and Autonomy 
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peace deal is due to short time horizons and there is impatience to 
consume the more immediate fruits of reneging on a treaty. The future 
cost of reputation when the other side will update its beliefs, as 
suggested by Baye‘s law, is discounted. Exactly the same happened in 
Pakistan where we can see that an institution provided in the social 
contract was not allowed to function as designed. We can also see that 
ethnopolitical conflict over this issue has not abated. The ethno-
politicians, particularly from Balochistan, have moved on and have now 
demanded a new social contract which will incorporate the cost of 
reneging on the previous contract. In a way there was a high discount 
rate over the contract so that it was more profitable for those in power 
in center in 1980s and 1990s to renege.32 The future ethnopolitical 
leadership updated their beliefs33 and now there is a premium they 
demand in addition to the previously agreed terms. 
5.3.3 The quota system of jobs  
The fact that the state is the biggest employer in the country and because 
pubic sector employment is the principal avenue for personal 
advancement for many, has made the issue of jobs a public issue of 
significant proportions (Waseem 1997).  
Yusuf (2006) asserts that ethnic cleavages are configured differently in 
different societies. He finds that relative horizontal equality has been 
achieved in the public sectors of countries that are highly fragmented, 
but not in those with ethnicity-blind policies. He advocates 
consociational arrangements in ethnic settings with a couple of main 
groups or in settings with strong ethnic/regional clusters. Almost all his 
recommendations apply to the Pakistani case.  
Table 5.5: The Scheme of Quotas in 1973 constitution: 
Category Quota % 
Merit 10 
Punjab 50 
Sindh 19 (Rural 11.4, urban 7.6) 
NWFP 11.5 
Balochistan 3.5 
Northern Areas and FATA 4 
Azad Kashmir 2 
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We see that it was the express wish of writers of the constitution to 
incorporate some affirmative action to bring the representation of 
various regions in fairer correspondence with their population ratio. This 
was attempted with an eye on the need to reward ability and merit, See 
Table 5.5. 
Over the years the lopsided shares in jobs have been brought nearer 
to the over all share in population. This is suggested by the census data 
for the federal government‘s civilian employees, see Figure 5.14. The two 
smaller provinces of Balochistan and NWFP have gradually gained more 
representation in these jobs than was the case in 1973. The situation with 
senior level positions34 is no different (Figure 5.15). 
One criticism levelled against this system is that it takes the domicile 
of a district as the criterion and not the ethnicity. However when the 
data is viewed in ethnic categories, almost same conclusions were drawn 
e.g (Kennedy 1993). The critics point out that mere domicile does not 
guarantee that ‗a son of the soil‘ will get the job, because of 
interprovincial migration. Although in the case of Sindh, a further split 
of 60:40 between the rural and urban areas is supposed to cater to the 
Sindhis and Muhajirs, yet since the system was not designed to cater 
specifically to the demand for ensuring ethnic representation therefore it 
will be unjust to hold it to that standard. 
Keeping the above in view, it is no surprise to find that the 
ethnopolitical conflict over quota in jobs and joblessness has been non 
violent and mainly restricted to statements by ethnopoliticians. Not a 
single such statement could be found originating from Punjab, except in 
the case of the Seraiki speaking southern belt. Most of this conflict 
seems to have died down after 1999, except in the case of renewed 
activity in 2005 in the case of Balochistan. It suggests that the gradual 
convergence of representation figures, towards the percentage in total 
population, in the services had an effect on conflict. The formal 
institution of quota system seems to have worked in case of Pakistan 
towards mitigation of conflict. 
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Figure 5.14: Share of all federal Government Civilian employees for every 
province (On the basis of domicile) 
 
 
Source: Data from several federal government civil employees census reports 
Figure 5.15: Share of senior federal government civilian employees for 
every province on the basis of domicile 
 
Source: Data from several federal government civil employees’ census reports. 
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Figure 5.16: Conflict over Jobs and quotas 
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democratization (the process) is likely to facilitate both protest and 
communal rebellion. (Gurr et al. 1993)38 
Here I would like to bring the debate between Adeney and Talbot 
(Section 5.2.1) into the discussion and ask ourselves, Was democracy 
instrumental in reducing ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and what was 
the influence of the process of democratization on this conflict? To find 
the answer we first need to know the characteristics of different regimes 
in Pakistan for the duration of this study.  
For the above I take the help of the Polity IV dataset which examines 
concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority‘.39 On a 21 
point scale ranging from -10 (Hereditary Monarchy) to +10 
(Consolidated Democracy), the data captures the type of regime 
authority. On this data score we can see the almost perfectly cyclical 
history of Pakistan alternating between autocracy, democracy and 
anocracy or as we would prefer to call ‗Sham Democracy‘. By this term, 
we mean specifically a regime in which absolute powers rest with the 
army general who mounts the coup. Afterwards a referendum of sorts is 
organized in which he ‗gets‘ more than 95% of the vote and ushers in an 
‗elected‘ legislature which is empty of any effective opposition to his rule. 
The facade of democracy is maintained all the time.40 Such systems were 
brought in by Generals Ayub, Zia and Musharraf and lasted for a 
combined 14 years. 
The combined polity score of the Polity IV database is a measure of 
both the autocratic and democratic credentials of a state. In turn the 
democratic score is made up of the presence of institutions, the existence 
of institutionalized constraints on the executive (Competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment) and competitiveness of political 
participation. 
Instead of lumping together all ethnopolitical conflict, I tried to 
separated the conflict which remained inside the institutions provided 
under the social contract, from the conflict which was over issues 
outside any (formal/informal) institutional framework (See Table 5.6). I 
have also distinguished between violent and non violent conflict in this 
setting. The trend lines for the four types of ethnopolitical conflict over 
the years are shown in Figure 5.18. 
Comparing Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 we discover that the conflicts 
outside an institutional setting (both violent and non violent), although 
present in democratic setups (1972-1977 and 1989-1999), had declining 
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trends. The same had inclining trends during outright dictatorships 
(1978-1985 and 2000-2002) and sham democracies (1985-1988 and 2003-
2005).  
For the non violent conflict which took place over issues inside the 
institutional setup; it is either low-keyed or there is an inclining trend 
during democratic setups (1972-1977 and 1988-1999). The violent 
conflict for this institutional type has either been absent (1972-1977) or 
had an inverted U shape (1988-1999). Gurr et al (1993) propose that 
institutionalized democracy facilitates non violent communal conflict. He 
thinks that this tendency is specially a feature of strong states which have 
the resources to respond to pluralist interests. Non violent conflict inside 
institutional set up during democratic regimes in Pakistan may therefore 
be a desired type of conflict during this type of polity. 
An approach such as above enables us to see that conflict which is 
more benign (may even be desirable in some cases) has increased or 
levelled out during democratic regimes in Pakistan. During the same 
regime type both the violent and non violent conflicts which were 
outside the institutional setup, decreased. 
The two sham democracies of 1985-1988 and 2002-2005 witnessed 
almost universal upward trends for all types of conflict but especially so 
for the violent type. The autocracies fared no better except that the 
violent institutional conflict was absent. This may be because effectively 
only one institution (i.e. army) was calling all the shots. To quote Zamir 
Ghumro; 
…the conflict-resolution within the constitutional parameters has been 
anathema to the military-led governments in Pakistan. They believe in 
brute State power and executive methods to cow down people fighting for 
their legitimate rights. (Ghumro 2006) 
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Table 5.6: Institutional and Non Institutional Conflict 
Conflict 
Within the 
Institutional 
Framework 
 Hydal power profits. 
 Mineral Resources/Royalty, Rent on gas/Oil. 
 Kalabagh and water share issue. 
 Quota system of jobs in Government services/ Share of 
jobs, Joblessness 
 Development/ Development spending by Federal 
Government/ Loans to Provinces. 
 Share of Provinces in federal revenues/National Finance 
Commission Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes. 
 Free trade among provinces, especially in food 
products/Scarcity of wheat/Trade with Afghanistan 
Conflict 
Outside the 
Institutional 
Framework 
 Re-demarcation of boundaries/ Separate province in 
Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan 
 Participation in Governance structures/Trade bodies/Power 
organs 
 Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy. 
 Resettlement/Repatriation of Biharis in Sindh, South 
Punjab/Afghans in Balochistan 
 Provincial Rights, General, economic rights, social rights, 
Provincial autonomy/Nationalities rights. 
 Backing Central policies/ Assertion of patriotic credentials 
by ethnopolitical stakeholder (1), Condemnation of 
Nationalist/ anti state behavior by state sponsored or 
conservative stakeholder (2). 
 Subversion/Terrorism/Secession. 
 Infighting in a single ethnic group 
 Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity 
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Figure 5.17: Authority trends in Pakistan (1947-2007) 
 
Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) 
Figure 5.18: Trend lines for Ethnopolitical Conflict Inside and Outside the 
Institutional set up. 
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5.4.1 Executive Quota System-The power pie 
There has been an unwritten understanding among the political elites to 
give some representation, however token, to the regions and provinces 
in power corridors. This has been an unstructured/informal institution 
which has been the exclusive domain of elite politics and power 
struggles.  
In the world of Pakistani power politics the term ‗troika‘ has now 
come to occupy its own niche.41 It means the three persons occupying 
the positions of President, Prime Minister and the Chief of army staff 
(COAS). I have attempted to trifurcate the origins of this power, in the 
way it is derived, perceived and projected. 
Most of the power of each of these positions comes from their 
substance. By this I mean the constitutional powers entrusted in a 
position. A president does not enjoy these powers when he is a mere 
figurehead. Similarly a prime minister in a sham democracy (1985-1988 
and 2002-2007) does not enjoy these powers.  
A second type of power associated with troika comes from public 
perceptions. A prime minister with a heavy electoral mandate, a 
president who is also the figurehead of the ruling party and the COAS 
(all the time); have come to enjoy this power.  
The third type of power is that of protocol. I recognize the fact that 
human egos need pampering and protocol inspires awe in others. To put 
it lightly, politicians aren‘t immune to this. 
Based on these three types of powers associated with the troika, I 
have analyzed the total troika power enjoyed by the different 
provinces/ethnic groups in the country from 1972 to 2006. In a binary 
setting I assigned 1 to a group for the presence of a particular type of 
power and 0 for its absence. The total power in a year is the sum of all 
the three types. As a result we get the pictures shown in Figure 5.19 to 
Figure 5.21. It can be seen that while the shares of substantive power 
have roughly followed the population shares (Figure 5.20)42, those of 
perceived power have been highly skewed to the disadvantage of certain 
provinces/groups (Figure 5.21).  
I also did similar analysis for a sample of second tier of power 
positions. These include the speaker of the national assembly, the 
chairman of the senate, the finance minister and the foreign minister. 
Except the portfolio of defence minister which has been mostly held by 
the prime minister himself, these positions represent the immediate 
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second tier below the top tier positions, both in protocol and the power 
these positions wield. The first two carry mostly protocol power while 
the last two have mostly the substantive power. I have not assigned any 
perceived power to these positions. Once again the picture is highly 
skewed (Figure 5.22).  
Figure 5.23 is difficult to comprehend in light of the above 
discussion. The Muhajirs have had a larger overall share in the power pie 
but their (ethnopolitical leadership‘s) share in the overall conflict over 
this score has been overwhelming. To help us understand this we turn to 
Figure 5.24, Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26. We can see that this conflict 
was almost non existent from 1974 to 1986. Then from 1986 to 1999, 
there is no appreciable representation of Muhajirs in troika except the 
two years tenure of General Aslam Beg, See Figure 5.25. This period also 
saw three army operations in Karachi, mainly against the ethnopolitical 
leadership of Muhajirs (MQM). Therefore all the conflict over this score, 
involving Muhajir leadership, is concentrated during this period. 
In both Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26, it can be seen that Balochistan 
has almost no share in troika and second tier power positions. This 
partly explains the large share of Baloch ethnopolitical leadership in over 
all conflict over this score, Figure 5.23. 
The informal institution of sharing out power in the state organs 
exists. The institution has however failed to work in the manner it is 
conceived by the political elite and this suggests that conflict over 
participation in governance structures has a basis. With this conflict at its 
peak in 1989, Mushtaq Ahmed remarked; 
Today…behind the politics of confrontation is the clash of personalities, 
conflict of vested interests and a scramble for place and power. (M. 
Ahmed 1989) 
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Figure 5.19: Total Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006) 
 
Figure 5.20: Total Substantive Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006) 
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Figure 5.21: Total Perceived Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006) 
 
 
Figure 5.22: Total Second Tier Power Sample (1972-2006) 
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Figure 5.23: Total Conflict over participation in Governance Structures. 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Ethnopolitical conflict over participation in governance 
structures 
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Figure 5.25: Disposition of Available Troika Power Since 1972 
 
 
Figure 5.26: Disposition of Available Second Tier Power 
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5.5 Other Institutions 
In addition to the institutions discussed, the constitution provided for 
other institutions which were to cater for conflict management in various 
other spheres. There also were some institutions which were created by 
subordinate legislation through ordinary acts of parliament. These 
include, inter alia, the Council of Common Interest (CCI), the Inter 
Provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC), the Indus River System 
Authority (IRSA) and the free trade among provinces. In the following, 
only these four will be discussed, mainly because of their importance but 
also because the conflict over the rest has not been mapped in the 
primary conflict database.  
The CCI has been created under article 153 of the constitution. The 
chief ministers of the four provinces are members while the Prime 
Minister is to be the chairperson. This institution was supposed to work 
towards conflict management between the central government and the 
provinces and among provinces. The working of this institution has 
remained a mystery as it has seldom met in decades. One reason for not 
meeting of the council during democratic regimes is the provision of the 
constitution that if the council fails to reach a decision then the joint 
sitting of the parliament (The national assembly and the senate) will 
decide the matter at hand. This, at least was the logic behind calls by the 
opposition which governed in Punjab and Balochistan (1988-1990) and 
had a numerical superiority in any such joint sitting. The Federal 
Government at the time did not want any embarrassing situation and 
therefore avoided the meeting all together. Even after that, meetings 
have been few and far between. The CCI was reconstituted in July 2007 
to include four federal ministers from four provinces. The working 
procedure of the council and its mandate is still under a shroud. 
The IPCC works under its own federal minister. Its mandate includes 
general coordination between the Federal Government and the 
Provinces in economic, social and administrative fields, promoting 
uniformity of approach in formulation of policies and their 
implementation by the provinces and the federal government in all fields 
of common national concern.43 Such a wide mandate has never been 
translated into practice. In agreement with Anwar Syed (2004) I could 
not find anything that IPCC can do which the CCI cannot. The 
provinces may have more representation in the IPCC as compared to the 
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CCI but that is meaningless as the decisions of the former are non-
binding on the federal government.  
IRSA was set up as a result of the Water apportionment accord 
among the provinces in 1991. This conflict management institution has 
been effective in regulating the flow of water in the Indus river system 
and its tributaries. The conflict that there is on this score has been more 
due to a shortage of water in the system and the issue of Kalabagh dam. 
With two provinces (NWFP and Sindh) against this dam and Punjab in 
favour of it, the issue has been instrumental in periodically whipping up 
debate about water shares for the provinces, see Figure 5.27.  
Figure 5.27: Ethnopolitical Conflict over Water share and Kalabagh dam 
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biggest province of Punjab purchases the wheat stock from the farmer 
through a monopolized system and imposes a ban during the harvest 
period. If the other provinces (mostly NWFP and Balochistan) protest 
then they are provided with wheat flour on controlled basis. This 
measure is hardly acceptable to the other provinces as they see it against 
the provisions of the constitution. They also argue that these measures 
effectively take the flour milling industry in their province out of 
business. The ethnopolitical leadership of smaller provinces mostly keep 
this conflict non violent, Figure 5.28. 
Figure 5.28: Ethnopolitical conflict over free movement of goods especially 
food grains. 
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conflict over provincial autonomy and the regional inequalities are 
blamed over its absence.  
The conflict over the political question of legislative powers for the 
provinces has its roots in the non fulfilment of the contract provided in 
the constitution. The institution of concurrent list has not been 
abolished as promised and the stakeholders in the resultant conflict have 
now jacked up the original demands. 
The rise and fall of democratic institutions influenced the 
ethnopolitical conflict. Mainly the non-violent conflict inside an 
institutional setting increased during democracies while both the violent 
and non violent conflict which was outside an institutional setting 
increased during autocracies and sham democracies.  
The power distribution in Pakistan is institutionalized informally. The 
craving for power among the elite has frequently overshadowed the 
understanding to share power. Most of this comes back to the 
dominance of one institution (i.e. the army).  
Among the other institutions for conflict management, the council of 
common interests has largely remained dormant. The interprovincial 
coordination committee has too ambitious an agenda and too few 
powers to do anything.  
The water apportionment accord has worked well to contain the 
conflict in desperate times of drought but the issue of Kalabagh dam has 
kept the conflict alive.  
The free movement of goods, guaranteed under the constitution, has 
been frequently ignored, only to stoke anger and conflict in the affected 
provinces. Once again a formal rule of the game (an institution) has been 
sidelined resulting in ethnopolitical conflict. 
 
 
 Notes  
                                                 
1 P. 3 
2 pp. 24-25. 
3 P. 27 
4 P. 37 
5 The debate about the relative importance of politics and economics is well 
discussed by Dick Pels(Pels 1997). 
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6 Acemoglu et al. (2005) puts property rights and contract enforcement in the 
category of economic institutions which affect growth. 
7 For more on Horizontal Inequality, please read chapter 5. 
8 Cited in G.K. Brown (2009) 
9 Cited in McGarry and O'Leary (2009) 
10 P. 11 
11 P. XIII 
12 McGarry and O'Leary (2009) also lists other conditions such as the presence of 
a ‗statsvolk‘, democracy, and a sense of ‗coming together‘ rather that ‗holding 
together‘ and ceteris paribus the number of units to be sufficiently more than two. 
13 P. 120 
14 We limit our discussion only to the upper two tiers of government i.e federal 
and provincial. The local government devolution scheme introduced in 2000 
does not form part of this discussion as spelled out in chapter 2. 
15 P. 35 
16 Read Annex 5-A for the text of article 160 of the constitution. 
17 For more detail please read chapter 3. 
18 The latest award was announced in December 2009 but is not a part of the 
analysis. For detailed historical account of all NFC awards to date, please refer to 
I. Ahmad et al. (2007) and for an aggregate analysis of trends and patterns of 
federal-provincial fiscal flows please see S.K. Qureshi (1991) 
19 This divisible pool is in addition to Special transfers and revenue that belongs 
to the provincial government but collected by the federal government. 
20 These are initial ratios at the start of the 5 year period and in most cases 
gradually change with each financial year. 
21 Even that is difficult to measure as Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) point out. 
22Data-available-at 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/admin/images/phicalOperation/FT%20on%20We
b%20July%20to%20Dec%202008.pdf.  Last accessed on 16-04-2009. 
23 Officials in the finance department of Sindh kindly gave this author access to 
their compiled data. 
24 Unpublished article of Anwar Shah. ―Pakistan in the Millennium: Federalism 
Reform Imperatives, Restructuring Principles and Lessons‖, to be found at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206898/PakistanintheMillenium.
pdf. Last accessed on 16-4-2009 
25 For a good discussion on the provincial bickering over NFC, please read Omar 
(2005) 
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26 We cannot help notice the fact that both the big jumps were effected when a 
Punjabi, Mian Nawaz Sharif, was the prime minister. It was also during his tenure 
that NWFP started getting the share from hydro profits. 
27 A good example can be seen in S.A.A. Shah (2002). 
28 For more detail please see chapter 3. 
29 Translated from Urdu by this author. 
30 Translated from Urdu by this author. 
31 The ‗signalling‘ concept developed by Spence (1973) is used now in the analysis 
of conflict and peace. A few of the works are Mock (1992) and Murshed (2010). 
32 For more reading on cost of commitment and discount rates please refer to T. 
Addison and Murshed (2002) and S.M. Murshed (2010). 
33 Updating beliefs, a notion of Bayesian choice based upon the work of Rev. 
Thomas Bayes (1702-1761); means updating one‘s prior beliefs in light of new 
evidence. For more discussion of its applicability to conflicts and peacemaking 
please see Murshed (2010). 
34 Jobs which are in Basic Pay Scale 16 and above on a 1 to 22 scale. The 
equivalent senior jobs in the previous system (used for 1973 system) were class 1 
and class 2. 
35 It is hardly surprising when people recommend running Pakistan like the 
Austro-Hungarian empire e.g. Zakaria (2007). 
36 P. 31 
37 P. 265 
38 P. 138 
39 For more detail on Polity IV please refer to 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
40 The term was so well coined by none other than General Musharraf himself. 
He used it derogatively to describe the system that he toppled. 
41 See for example Jalalzai (2002) 
42 For population shares please refer to chapter 2. 
43 From the website of the cabinet division, Government of Pakistan. 
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/cabinet-test/aboutdivision/ipc.jsp 
Last accessed on 21-4-2009. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
6  
Regional Disparities in Development: 
The Roots of Grievances 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There has been a debate within conflict researchers on the primacy of 
factors that help explain conflict. The advocates of ‗motivational‘ factors 
hold that it is the gap between expectations and achievements that 
motivates parties to enter conflict. On the other hand, the proponents of 
the political process model of conflict stress the primacy of power 
resources in the explanation of conflict (Korpi 1974). In a way the 
Foucauldian schema used by A. Khan (2005) and discussed in Chapter 2 
is an extension of this same debate. The ‗motivational‘ factors model is 
therefore more akin to our chosen theoretical model as against that of 
the political process model. This chapter will discuss the role of 
motivational factors, the gaps in expectations and achievements and their 
impact on generating grievances which then lead to conflict. 
The link between grievances and conflict is now well researched and 
established. An example is that of Gurr‘s (1997) classification of group 
grievances into those related to political autonomy, those related to 
political rights other than autonomy, economic rights and social and 
cultural rights.1 These four dimensions of grievance were then correlated, 
by Gurr (1997), to indicators of cultural differences and political and 
economic disadvantages  
Grievances are a result of perceptions, perceptions of unjust 
treatment, of artificial barriers to better life conditions or a reneging on a 
contract which had created rights in favour of the aggrieved. Parties 
enter social contracts by assuming some responsibilities and giving away 
some rights. All this is done in the rational expectation that there would 
be a corresponding quid pro quo. A weakening or a failure of these 
contracts means the non-fulfillment of the promises made to some 
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parties. This gives rise to perceptions of unjust treatment and resultantly 
grievances.   
What is the mechanism of these perceptions? Three theoretical 
responses are found in the conflict studies literature. The Relative 
Deprivation (RD) approach, the Social Exclusion (SE) approach and the 
more recent Horizontal Inequalities (HI) approach. This chapter will 
briefly discuss the comparative merits of using one of these frameworks 
and then apply the same to the study of ethnopolitical conflict in 
Pakistan. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A brief discussion of 
the three concepts of RD, SE and HI will be followed by the application 
of the concept of Horizontal Inequality to ethnopolitical conflict in 
Pakistan and the reasons for choosing the HI approach. These regional 
disparities show different types of HIs in Pakistan. The grievances 
generated by these will be linked to the various issues in ethnopolitical 
conflict in Pakistan.  
6.2  Theoretical concepts of disparities and inequalities 
The concept of Horizontal Inequalities (HI) is used for this analysis of 
grievances and their impact on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan. 
However this will not be taken up in isolation as the concept draws on 
the theoretical base provided by the other two concepts of Relative 
Deprivation (RD) and Social Exclusion (SE). A discussion of these two 
concepts is necessary to delineate the way the concept of HI has 
borrowed and then built on them. It will also inform the empirical work 
in the latter sections in which the generation of grievances is discussed as 
a result of HIs.  
6.2.1 The Concept of Relative Deprivation (RD) 
The concept of Relative deprivation has its roots in post World War II 
research on American soldiers in the 1940s.2 It has been used, among 
others observational studies, to explain the Quebec nationalist 
movement (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983) and for the conflict in 
Northern Ireland (Birrell 1972).  
In a more empirical context, Yitzhaki (1979) showed that the concept 
of Relative deprivation is connected to the inequality coefficient Gini; 
Specifically, that a measure of aggregate relative deprivation could be 
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expressed as a product of the mean income and the Gini coefficient of 
the reference group (Hey and Lambert 1980). 
While the concept of relative deprivation seems adequate for probing 
the causes of domestic national unrests, the reasons for circumspection 
among the wider conflict research community are also understandable. 
As Gurr (1997) notes, the social origin of deprivation (Exposure to new 
modes of life, new ideologies, value gains of reference groups and value 
disequilibria) have made the intensity of RD a psycho-cultural variable 
where the basic unit of analysis is the individual. The measurement of 
this variable therefore requires extensive surveys and will be difficult to 
employ in a longitudinal study, except in a project of the depth, scope 
and resources of Gurr‘s. Another method would be to infer it from 
properties of the social system. This, however, should not keep us from 
gleaning valuable insights into the production of grievances at the group 
level.  
Our major point of reference for this concept would be the 
pioneering work of Gurr (1970) who defined RD as actors' perception of 
discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. 
Where value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which 
people believe they are rightfully entitled and value capabilities are the 
goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.3 
He cites the historical domestic comparisons of national aggregate 
measures, inter alia, poor economic conditions corresponding with overt 
protest in England between 1790 and 1850, bread prices and the extent 
of mob violence in revolutionary France, and the correlational evidence 
that the frequency of lynchings in the American South between 1882 and 
1930 varied inversely with the indices of economic well being. Gurr 
(1970) concluded from his gathered quantitative evidence that degrees of 
deprivation or discontent are associated with degrees of disorder.4 
Recent literature on relative deprivation has also alluded to the link 
between relative deprivation and civil war. Defining RD as the 
perception by one or more parties that they are being unjustly treated, 
Murshed (2010) shows that it is a major cause of civil war. 
The concept of RD is not confined to economic well being. In fact 
for the elite this RD is more important in the distribution and uses of 
power values in a political system. Higher sharing of opportunities to 
lead will satisfy some of these elite. As Gurr indicates, a non-sharing of 
these power values will lead to higher participatory RD. This 
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participation in power echelons will also be used to remedy the sources 
of discontent, to increase the output of and reallocation of economic 
goods, to create and maintain security; and to reinforce ideational 
coherence (Gurr 1970).5 
 The above discussion indicates that the concept of RD is valuable in 
explaining internal conflict among groups. The limitation on its use in 
our case is the particular suitability of the concept to socio-psychological 
studies of conflict. This does not limit us to borrow from the concept in 
our quest to look up the process of generation of grievances. This 
concept will help this study to develop its use of the concept of 
horizontal Inequality in the latter pages of this chapter. 
6.2.2  Social Exclusion 
In contrast to relative deprivation which describes a state, Social 
exclusion is a concept which describes both the condition and the 
dynamic process (Beall and Piron 2005). As a condition it describes 
groups or individuals who are unable to participate fully in society. As a 
process it is concerned with the interaction among groups. The concept 
of social exclusion is used to describe a group, or groups, of people who 
are excluded from the normal activities of their society, in multiple ways 
(Frances Stewart et al. 2005a). Exclusion from political, social and 
economic institutions is generally understood to make up the core of this 
concept A general working definition is; 
Social Exclusion is a process and a state that prevents individuals or 
groups from full participation in social, economic and political life and 
from asserting their rights. It derives from exclusionionary relationships 
based on power. (Beall and Piron 2005) 
Social exclusion may lead to multiple deprivations (Frances Stewart et 
al. 2005a) and as such is related to the thread of discussion in the above 
section. But it is important to relate this process of exclusion to 
generation of conflict. Gellner (1983) assumes an omnipresent unequal 
distribution of economic resources within states leading to 
discrimination and conflict based on group identity. Here, grievances are 
a product of unequal group interaction, which is a multipath process in 
itself.  
While drawing on the concept of Social Exclusion in ethnopolitical 
conflict analysis, one has to be cautious. As A.K. Sen (2000) warns, the 
concept is not for the abstemious researcher. Things like livelihood, 
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employment, earnings, property, credit, land, housing, consumption 
levels, education, skills, citizenship, democratic participation, public 
goods, respect, among others have been mentioned which the people or 
groups may be excluded from. In our study only a few of these will be 
considered for their impact on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and 
that too as part of the wider concept of grievances. 
Social Exclusion is a product of disadvantages being faced by people 
or groups. These disadvantages are readily observable in the shape of 
Horizontal Inequalities among them. This leads us to our next 
discussion. 
6.2.3  Horizontal Inequalities 
Although sometimes used synonymously with Relative Depravation, The 
concept of Horizontal Inequalities draws on both Relative Deprivation 
and Social Exclusion and is distinguishable by its application by analysts.6 
I prefer to apply it to my case for the ease with which it can be applied to 
readily available regional data. We also observe that theoretically, it 
contains the dimensions of RD and SE as all three are concerned with 
conditions in which groups get unequal treatment and lead them to 
conflict.  
To quote Kofi Annan: 
… simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent 
conflict. What is highly explosive is … ‗horizontal‘ inequality: when power 
and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also 
differentiated in other ways – for instance by race, religion or language. So-
called ‗ethnic‘ conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or 
more of these ways, when one of them feels it is being discriminated 
against, or another enjoys privileges which it fears to lose.7 
By definition Horizontal inequalities are inequalities among groups 
with shared identities – identities formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial 
affiliations, or other salient ways that bind groups of people together 
(Stewart et al. 2005b). These are different to Vertical Inequalities (VI) 
which are inequalities within a homogenous group, on the other hand 
HIs are a measure of inequalities between and among groups and not 
within groups. The notion of groups is important in this concept and has 
posed some problems8 but in our case it would be a straightforward 
application to the provincial data for reasons discussed in chapter 2 and 
latter also in section 6.3.  
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Murshed (2010) has categorized HIs into four broad areas: political 
participation, economic assets, incomes and employment, and social 
aspects. Their relevance in a particular socio-economic set-up vary and I 
will not apply all of these to my case in section 6.3. The reason is mostly 
poor availability of data, for the whole period under study. 
HIs have been instrumental in provoking conflict and the relationship 
has been suggested in both single country case studies and more recently 
in cross country studies. Based on the district wide data of Human 
Development indicators for Nepal, Murshed and Gates (2005) find that 
the intensity of conflict across these districts is most significantly 
explained by the degree of inequalities. Brown (2005) assessed the impact 
of Horizontal Inequalities on conflict in Aceh, Indonesia and the 
implications for economic policy. Langer (2005) assessed the role of 
political Horizontal Inequalities at the elite level and the socio-economic 
horizontal inequalities at the level of the masses to study its impact on 
ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast. In her cross country study Østby (2008) 
analysed data from 36 countries and suggested a positive relationship 
between horizontal social inequality and violent civil conflict.  
The still evolving literature on measuring HIs has come up with two 
indices; the group based co-efficient of variation weighted by group size 
(GCOV) and the population weighted group GINI coefficient 
(GGINI)9. These indices are important if one has to analyze HIs in a 
cross country context. For single country studies a gap measure of 
different socio-economic or political indicators will suffice (S.M. 
Murshed 2010). A good example is as a gap with national average in the 
case of Nepal (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005). In the Pakistani context I 
will follow this advice. 
Horizontal Inequalities are influential in provoking conflict if these 
are sustained, widening over time and consistent across dimensions. A 
one size fits all solution doesn‘t exist (Stewart et al. 2005b). This calls for 
separate investigations of the social, economic and political dimensions 
of horizontal inequalities. As discussed in section 6.3 this is what this 
study will look for in the Pakistani case.  
The reference point for these HIs can either be a national 
achievement (generally that of the capital city) or the national average of 
the particular metric. In the former case the difference to the reference 
point will be the difference to the ultimate level to which a group feels 
 Regional Disparities in Development: The Roots of Grievances 155 
 
entitled. In the latter it is the minimum standard attainable by the group 
in the given socio-economic conditions. 
Use of horizontal inequality also challenged some of the earlier 
theoretical conclusions about inequality and its relationship with conflict. 
Using the framework of vertical inequality among individuals, several 
studies failed to find a causal link between inequality (particularly income 
inequality) and conflict.10 Østby (2008) has criticized the approach on the 
basis that the explained variable in all these studies was ‗group conflict‘ 
therefore the explanatory variable should also have reflected group 
horizontal inequality. Another problem she points out with all these 
studies is that only economic inequality was chosen and the other 
concepts like welfare inequality and social polarization were ignored. 
Correcting for these conceptual anomalies, she finds in her cross country 
analysis that it is still premature to dismiss the inequality-conflict nexus. 
A. Sen (1995) has proposed at least three different categories of 
equality: income, welfare and rights and liberties. The political, economic 
and social aspects of inequality therefore come to the fore of the 
proposed analysis when this study explores the conflict-inequality nexus 
in our case in Pakistan in section 6.3.  
Why I take horizontal inequalities as the analytical framework 
A shared group based grievance is required to induce a group based 
conflict (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005). The identity based 
ethnopolitical conflicts are therefore ideal candidates for analyzing the 
link between horizontal inequalities and conflict. The concept of group 
also forces us to distinguish between group and its leadership. Such 
leadership may have different grievances than the masses. With the HI 
framework it is easier to follow the different trajectories of elite (group 
leadership) and mass level grievances. 
My preference for this framework over that of Relative Deprivation 
and Social Exclusion is also due to the fact that data is more easily 
available about group based horizontal inequalities than about group 
based psycho-cultural metrics and that too over the whole period of 
study. 
6.3 Horizontal Inequalities in Pakistan 
Based on the work cited later in this chapter, it can be said with 
confidence that the scholarly microscope has consistently found regional 
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disparities in Pakistan. The scope of these disparities was in the 
economic, social and political realms and these disparities have been 
both widening and sustained. I contend that these have been responsible 
for giving rise to grievances which influenced the ethnopolitical conflict 
over the period of study (1972-2005), see Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: The scope of horizontal inequalities and their impact mechanism 
on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan 
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6.3.1 Horizontal Economic Inequalities, the theoretical and 
applied work in Pakistani context. 
After 1971 secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) many scholars have 
investigated the regional disparities in Pakistan. These studies can be 
classified into three categories. 
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The first were studies on socio economy of particular provinces: 
These were mostly case studies of conditions inside individual provinces 
e.g. A.S. Ahmed (1980), and F. Ahmed‘s (1984b) study about NWFP, A. 
Ahmad (1973) about Balochistan and F. Ahmed (1984a) about Sindh. 
Most of these studies especially those by Feroz Ahmed only 
concentrated on the agrarian economy of these provinces.  
Then there were studies related to economic disparities among 
provinces/districts. The existence of significant regional variation in level 
of development in Pakistan is a widely recognized fact. The two 
provinces of Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province are 
generally seen as relatively backward while the two other provinces, Sind 
and Punjab, are considered as relatively developed (Pasha and Hasan 
1992). Pasha and Hasan (1992) recognized that simply taking per capita 
income will be inadequate for working out these disparities, because 75 
percent of the population (In 1992) is rural and is characterized by 
subsistence farming. They therefore used crop cash value per capita, 
industrial value added per capita, the number of commercial bank 
branches per 100000 population and the number of livestock units per 
capita as the income and wealth indicators. They included 46 districts in 
their analysis and ranked these on the basis of composite indicators. 
These rankings (which are for the year 1982) are very similar to the later 
rankings arrived at by Pakistan HDI report of 1998 (Hussain and Kemal 
2004). 
Bengali (2000) provided a genuine base for assessing the 
disaggregated accounts of provinces and for the first time provided a 
total picture for looking at provincial disparities in GDP and, per capita 
GDP on the basis of UN conventions and international practices and the 
particular Pakistan related constraints. It has been shown that over the 
period 1973-2000, Punjab alone has increased its share of national GDP 
by about 2 percentage points. NWFP has maintained its share, while 
Sindh and Balochistan have reduced their respective shares by about one 
percentage points each (Bengali 2000). In the conclusion given by 
Bengali, the results tend to confirm the emergence of a north-south 
economic divide in the country and a sustained and sometimes widening 
gap in per capita GDP among the provinces. (See Figure 6.2) 
158 CHAPTER 6 
 
Figure 6.2: Per capita GDP at constant factor cost of 1980-81 (Rs.) 
 
Source: Adapted from (K. Bengali 2000) 
 
The sustained nature of these gaps is also verified from the HDI 
report of the UNDP (Hussain and Kemal 2004). Figure 6.3 shows that 
while Punjab has no district in the bottom 30 districts in terms of 
Human Development Index, Balochistan makes almost half and NWFP 
almost one third of all these districts. A similar study by Jamal and Khan 
(2003) arrived at almost the same conclusions. Their analysis showed the 
situation further tilting against Balochistan and NWFP. 
Despite these consistent findings of regional disparities there is 
surprisingly little study on its impact on the unfolding ethnopolitical 
conflict. Zaidi (1992) made the first real attempt to link these regional 
disparities to the political economy of regional nationalism (or in his 
words, ‗the national question‘) in Pakistan. However since his empirical 
thrust has been concentrated only on one side of the issue, namely the 
economic one, the political economy of regionalism lacks the empirical 
punch. His conclusion mentions that: 
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‗Based on the evidence presented…, it is quite clear that economic factors 
have played an important role in affecting national and ethnic 
consciousness and there is indeed ‗national‘ economic exploitation which 
is manifested in varying forms and in varying degrees.‘ (Zaidi 1992)   
Figure 6.3: Percentage share in districts in terms of HDI 
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However these manifestations ‗in varying forms and in varying 
degrees‘ are not operationalized empirically when it comes to ‗national 
and ethnic consciousness‘; something that this chapter will attempt. 
The above narrative of the work on regional disparities in Pakistan is 
necessary to show that the scholarly microscope has not been focused 
on the impact of these regional disparities (in our case ‗horizontal 
inequalities) on the ethnopolitical conflict.  
Since this work uses the Horizontal Inequalities framework therefore 
it would be instructive to spell out some issues related to the data, before 
attempting to analyze it. 
This study follows the advice of Stewart (2008), Østby (2008) and 
others; and distinguish among economic inequality, political inequality 
and the inequality of welfare. The preferred variable for the first type is 
the gap in per capita GDP. The data for this variable is taken from 
Bengali (2000). For political inequality, the work in the previous chapter 
about regional shares in the top and second tiers (selected power 
positions) is expanded to work out gaps in the regional shares. For 
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welfare inequality, the preferred variable is the regional gap in literacy 
ratio to that of the national average, since this data is available for all the 
groups over the total period of study. It would have been worthwhile to 
include some measures of life expectancy and/or infant/child mortality 
ratios but the paucity of regional data over the whole of the period of 
study was a limiting factor in this case. 
The question of ascribing spatial data to a particular province/region 
or dyad in is straight forward in our case. The ethnopolitical leadership 
had itself been championing the cause of spatial quotas in jobs and in 
representation in governance structures. The provincial framework has 
been, by and large, adopted as a frame of reference for articulating their 
demands. The same method has been endorsed by Murshed (2006) who 
argues that we can impute group inequalities from spatial data also 
because certain groups chiefly reside in certain areas. This argument 
proved useful for this study in ascribing data related to urban and rural 
Sindh to the dyads 3 and 7 respectively.11 
As mentioned earlier recent propositions to use GCOV and GGINI 
as single measures for HIs are gaining popularity but horizontal 
inequality will essentially remain a gap measure (Murshed 2006).  This 
study constructed variables which capture the horizontal gaps to a 
benchmark. In addition the use of GCOV and GGINI would have 
required data at the district level, which in our case was non-existent for 
most of the period under study. 
6.4 The Regression Analysis 
What follows is an exploratory regression analysis of Pakistani conflict 
data and horizontal inequality measures. The data, methods and results 
will be presented in the following paragraphs. 
 Conflict data for the years from 1972 to 2005 was analyzed. Table 6.1 
gives the variables, their description and sources. The data for four 
principle dyads (please see Table 4.2 for these dyads) was utilized for 
regression analysis. These included dyads 1, 2, 4 and 7. All these dyads 
are province/region based as also explained in section 4.3. In case of 
dyad 7, which has data of conflict exclusively from urban Sindh, the 
matching data for horizontal inequalities was taken on this basis. The 
rest of the dyads were excluded for need of comparable data for all the 
variables or the fact that they did not represent ethnopolitical conflict in 
a regional/provincial framework.  
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Table 6.1: List of Variables and their description 
No. Variable 
Label 
Variable Description Source/Methods for 
calculation 
1 Year Year (From 1972 to 2005)  
2 Province Province/Region/dyad  
3 VC Violent Conflict score The conflict score arrived at 
with the help of procedure 
outlined in chapter 3. 
4 NVC Non-Violent Conflict score 
5 TC Total Conflict score  
6 OVC Ordinal Violent Conflict The highest level of conflict 
attained by a particular dyad 
in a particular year, on an 
ordinal scale as given in 
chapter 4. 
7 ONVC Ordinal Non-Violent Conflict 
8 OC Ordinal Total Conflict 
9 PGDPCG Percentage Gross Domestic 
Product per capita Gap to 
that of the national average 
Per capita GDP for provinces 
calculated from Bengali 
(2000). The values for Sindh 
have been assigned to those 
for Muhajir dyad. 
Extrapolation for missing 
years. 
10 LitGap Literacy Gap w.r.t national 
average 
From the census reports of 
1972, 1981, 1998. The 
(Household Integrated 
Economic Survey (HIES) 
reports, the Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey 
(PIHS) reports and the Pakistan 
Social and Living Standards 
Measurement (PSLM) reports. 
11 GapAll_P Population weighted Gap of 
all civil servants w.r.t the 
population share of the 
group, in total national 
population. 
From the triennial census and 
survey reports of federal 
government employees. 
Extrapolation for missing 
years. 
12 GapSen_P Population weighted Gap of 
senior civil servants w.r.t the 
population share of the 
group, in total national 
population. 
13 PI_1 Political inequality gap in 
troika power w.r.t the share 
of Punjab province  
The political inequality gap 
calculated for the years on the 
basis the scheme given in 
chapter 4. 
14 PI_2 Political inequality gap in 
second tier power w.r.t the 
share of Punjab province 
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Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 give the summary of means and standard 
deviations of these variables for two different time periods. 
Table 6.2: Summary statistics for variables (Data from 1972-2005) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Non Violent Conflict 26.28 28.26 0.00 123.72 
Violent Conflict 11.23 26.02 0.00 163.80 
Total Conflict 37.51 45.99 0.00 280.10 
Political inequality gap in 
troika power 
 
2.37 3.49 -7.00 8.00 
Political inequality gap in 
second tier positions 
 
0.61 1.178 -2.00 3.00 
Literacy gap 1.07 13.17 -29.50 16.00 
PGDPCG 3.05 22.77 -39.84 45.94 
Gap of all civil servants 
  
-10.48 78.11 -380.94 75.06 
Gap of senior civil servants  -5.66 87.03 -445.87 75.74 
Table 6.3: Summary of statistics for variables (Data from 1986-2005) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non Violent Conflict 34.03 28.38 0.00 123.72 
Violent Conflict 13.33 25.13 0.00 123.54 
Total Conflict 47.36 43.84 0.00 212.21 
Political inequality gap in 
troika power 
 
1.29 3.39 -7.00 8.00 
Political inequality gap in 
second tier positions 
 
1.00 1.20 -2.00 3.00 
Literacy gap 1.20 12.36 -24.00 16.00 
PGDPCG 5.55 22.77 -39.24 45.95 
Gap of all civil servants 
  
-2.03 42.34 -126.15 48.52 
Gap of senior civil 
servants  
6.93 34.85 -137.42 51.51 
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 Table 6.4 gives the impact of these horizontal inequalities on the total, 
non-violent and violent ethnopolitical conflicts. The independent 
variables are chosen from the three aspects of horizontal inequality as 
discussed above, namely political, social access and economic (Also see 
Figure 6.1). However these present horizontal inequalities may 
themselves be due to the conflict and therefore only the lagged values 
for all these variables are included in the models. 
 It is also recognized that past conflicts do have an impact on the 
present conflicts and that conflicts create their own cycles. Therefore 
lagged values of past conflicts are also included as independent variables.   
 The separate results for total, non violent and violent conflicts are 
given both for the full range of data and for a trimmed version which 
includes data only from 1986 onwards. Table 6.4 gives two sets of 
regression coefficients and their standard errors. For the full range of 
data that we have, the results suggest that the horizontal inequality of 
senior civil servants, political inequality of second tier positions, and 
violent conflict from previous years are statistically significant for 
explaining both total conflict and violent conflict. On the other hand, the 
gap in all civil service positions has negative statistical significance for all 
three types of conflict. The gap in per capita GDP and gap in all civil 
service positions are statistically significant but has negative signs. This 
does not support the theory explained in earlier sections of this chapter. 
In section 4.3 about the conflict data sources, it is recognized that 
some periods presented particular problems for data collection due to 
media censorship. Niazi (1986) has also discussed these media 
restrictions in detail. This means that some portion of conflict may be 
missing in our dataset despite our efforts and this limitation has been 
recognized previously. In regression analysis, to see the sensitivity of our 
results to this missing conflict, the period of analysis is trimmed. The 
data from 1972 to 1985 is dropped. The resulting regression coefficients 
and standard errors are reported in the second set of Table 6.4. It can be 
seen that income gap (per capita GDP), and political inequality at elite 
level are positively related to all types of conflict and the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Gap in senior civil service positions is statistically 
positively significant for total conflict and violent conflict. Literacy gap 
(social access) is also positively related and significant for total conflict.  
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Table 6.4: The impact of different horizontal inequalities on conflict with 
fixed regional effects 
 Data for full period 
Time Series length = 33 years 
Number of observations=132 
 Trimmed Data  
Time Series Length = 19 years 
Number of observations = 76 
Variables Total 
Conflict 
Non 
Violent 
Conflict 
Violent 
Conflict 
 Total 
Conflict 
Non 
Violent 
Conflict 
Violent 
Conflict 
Percentage GDP gap 
to the national 
average 
 
-0.71 
(0.45) 
-0.16 
(0.27) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
 2.48*** 
(0.86) 
1.29*** 
(0.28) 
1.12* 
(0.58) 
Literacy gap 
 
 
-0.05 
(1.68) 
-0.64 
(0.89) 
0.55 
(0.72) 
 5.24*** 
(1.29) 
4.39 
(2.65) 
1.44 
(1.70) 
Gap of all civil 
servants  
 
-1.27* 
(0.67) 
-0.41 
(0.33) 
-0.81** 
(0.01) 
 -1.30*** 
(0.29) 
 
-0.10 
(0.19) 
-1.13*** 
(0.16) 
Gap of senior civil 
servants  
 
1.09** 
(0.49) 
0.39 
(0.24) 
0.67** 
(0.29) 
 0.87*** 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
0.89*** 
(0.10) 
Political inequality 
gap in troika power  
 
0.54 
(1.13) 
0.173 
(0.54) 
0.26 
(0.65) 
 4.55*** 
(1.22) 
2.81*** 
(0.96) 
1.76*** 
(0.21) 
Political inequality 
gap in second tier 
power  
 
8.036** 
(3.17) 
3.17* 
(1.74) 
4.99** 
(1.99) 
 5.34 
(10.56) 
-0.06 
(5.85) 
4.92 
(4.74) 
Non Violent Conflict 
from previous year 
 
 0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
  -0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
Violent Conflict from 
previous year 
 
 0.27** 
(0.13) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
  0.12 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Total Conflict from 
previous year 
 
0.15 
(0.13) 
   -0.05 
(0.17) 
  
Constant 
 
17.96*** 
(2.18) 
15.06*** 
(2.32) 
5.51*** 
(0.84) 
 17.35 
(11.32) 
25.91*** 
(6.39) 
-3.89** 
(1.79) 
R-Squared 0.38 0.39 0.3  0.43 0.41 0.36 
Note: *** Significance at 0.01 level, ** Significance at 0.05 level, * Significance at 0.1 level. 
Values in parenthesis are standard errors for the given coefficients  
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6.5 Conclusion 
Conflicts do not arise in thin air. Rational choice theorists have long 
argued that opting for the path of conflict and confrontation involves 
more than primordial instincts and the primacy of power struggles. For 
the group based conflicts and especially those groups whose basis is a 
shared ethnic identity, the motivation to enter conflict is more often 
provided by perceptions of unjust treatment. They feel, as a group, 
entitled to minimum standard of political, economic and social 
benchmarks and the failure to attain those benchmarks often leads them 
to conclude that the benefits of entering a conflict would outweigh those 
of sitting silent over the perceived grievances.  
Looking for the sources of these grievances in the three main spheres, 
the theoretical frameworks of relative deprivation, social exclusion and 
horizontal inequality have been variously prescribed. All three concepts 
essentially draw on the same core of the mechanism of production of 
grievances. Perceived and actual gaps in the social, economic and 
political milieu are believed to have led many to conflict. 
There have been many case studies linking horizontal inequality to 
conflict as discussed in section 6.2.3. Recently some cross country 
studies have also shown the existence of this link. Examples of both 
these types of studies are discussed in section 6.2.3.Our endeavor in this 
chapter was to explore this link empirically in our case. 
While regional differences in development have been linked to ethno-
nationalism in the past, there has not been a study to link these 
differences in development, to any meaningful measure of conflict in 
Pakistan. In the particular Pakistani ethnopolitical context the data 
related to violent and non-violent conflict was regressed vis a vis the 
indicators for horizontal inequality. Most of our results suggest that the 
thesis that horizontal inequality is linked to conflict may indeed have 
some merit in our case. The statistical significance of positive influence 
on all forms of conflict has been detected for horizontal political 
inequality, income inequality and inequality of social access (for data 
from 1986-2005) among provinces and groups whose spatial 
configuration is largely representative of the demographics of our 
ethnopolitical groups.  
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 Notes   
                                                 
1 Gurr (1997), pp. 71-72. 
2 For a concise review of the construct of Relative Deprivation please read the 
Walker and Smith (2002). 
3 Gurr (1970), pp. 24-25. 
4 ibid, pp. 62-63. 
5 P. 143. 
6 See for example S.M. Murshed and Gates (2005). 
7 Address to the World Bank Staff, Washington DC, 19 October, 1999. Cited in 
Østby (2008). 
8 For a discussion of this aspect see for example S.M. Murshed (2010) and F. 
Stewart et al. (2005). 
9 For a discussion on the methodology and merits of these indices please read F. 
Stewart et al. (2005) and S.M. Murshed (2010).  
10 See e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (2004),  Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et 
al. (2003). 
11 For a discussion of these dyads please refer to chapter 3. 
  
7  
Talibanization, Conflict and 
Recruitment 
 
And he wanted to tell me about history. He says, "You have to 
understand the history." And I said, "No, the history begins today.

 
 
7.1 Introduction 
But of course, history did not start on 9/11. Even if the two centuries of 
western colonialism in Arab lands, and the ideological background of 
Wahabism/Salafi-ism from the 18th century onwards in Arabian 
Peninsula are ignored, history still does not start with 9/11. Profound 
questions of political economy, ideology, identity and geo-strategy 
cannot be overlooked as they have so often been. The results of such a 
superficial black and white approach can only increase the risk of conflict 
as Pakistan has been discovering recently. 
Conflict involving taliban has many identifiable elements in the 
theoretical and analytical frameworks of this thesis. History, identity, 
institutions and presence of large horizontal inequalities are all vital 
components in the previous chapters of this thesis. It will be seen in this 
chapter that these defining features of the social contract assume a 
different character in the taliban conflict and combine to provide a 
different narrative to a wholly different conflict. This chapter therefore 
draws upon these features of the theoretical framework to help us 
understand the structural features of taliban recruitment. And to 
complete the story, at the cost of drifting away from the central themes 
of this thesis, the chapter will also discuss the agency level factors which 
help taliban recruitment. In the process, reliance will be placed on 
journalistic sources, personal interviews and informal talks.  
Protracted conflict in Pakistan today, in which the Pakistani Taliban 
are pitched against the state for almost six years now, is a complex 
phenomenon. Despite continuous recent setbacks on the battlefield and 
                                                 
 Ex-US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage on what he told Pakistani 
General Mahmud, DG Inter Services Intelligence, on September 11, 2001. 
(Frontline 2006)   
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numerous arrests, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has found ever 
more sources of ready recruits. The scope of this chapter is therefore 
limited to the centrality of recruitment question.    
Rebel recruitment is central for understanding the duration, intensity, 
and termination of a conflict (Eck 2005). Without a continuous stream 
of readily available recruits, the taliban, as a movement, will cease to 
exist. Which structures and agencies drive this recruitment? is a question 
seldom get asked. The importance of recruitment is clear when one 
thinks about the roots of the problem. Structures and agencies leading to 
recruitment also point to the divisible and indivisible cakes which are 
contested. This, in turn, leads to possible conflict avoidance or resolution 
policies. As Eck (2005) remarks ‗Rebel recruitment processes may well 
prove to be key in unlocking the black box of conflict dynamics.‘  
There are some pre-requisites to understanding taliban recruitment. 
One must be able to distinguish between taliban as a body of people at 
war and talibanization as a process of their increasing sway. Drawing on 
the theoretical framework in chapter 2, the attempt in this chapter will be 
to trace the roots of talibanization to the history of religio-political 
activism and conflict in the region, the struggles over competing 
identities and the contribution of an overall marshal culture, the health 
of institutions and the socio-economic conditions which generate 
grievances. Apart from these structural issues, this chapter will also look 
at the agency related issues of taliban recruitment. The attempt will be to 
show that the ‗grace of God‘, that recurring theme in this thesis, has had 
a nexus with the breakdown of institutions and its supplanting by taliban 
sponsored institutions for which the bulk of personnel were supplied by 
Madrassahs. These, Madrassahs are connected to religious political 
parties, which protected and sympathised with their own brethren in the 
TTP. The sectarian based Madrassahs also gave the TTP the option of 
outsourcing its talibanization project to other outfits in the country. 
This chapter first gives a brief overview of the history and 
development of the taliban movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 
section 7.2, the structural factors commonly cited in explaining 
talibanization and the current conflict in Pakistan, are discussed. Finally, 
the chapter looks at specific strategies employed by the Taliban in 
recruitment efforts, focusing particularly on their use of religious 
identity, supplanting state institutions and franchising the conflict to its 
subsidiaries and allied organizations. 
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7.1.1 Taliban and Talibanization 
Taliban (plural) is from talib (singular), meaning a student, in Pukhtu 
language. Usually the word taliban is used for the students of religious 
schools (Madrassah). The name was given to the student militia which 
sprang up in Kandahar during the second Afghan war (1992-1994). This 
chapter mostly deals with the Pakistani taliban which is not a distinct 
organization but an alliance of different groups, which have common 
goals but different agendas (Rana 2009a).  
In order to understand the TTP and the sources of its recruitment, it 
is necessary to understand the context of violence in Afghanistan since 
1975. That neighbouring country of Pakistan has been in almost a 
perpetual state of war since that time.  
7.1.2 History of Afghan taliban 
It is difficult to separate the discussion about the history of religious 
extremism and conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan from that of the 
causes that explain the phenomenon. Afghanistan has seen five major 
wars since 1975. The first war was from 1979 to 1985. The signs of 
tension between the radicals (Mostly Afghan students returning from 
Egypt) and the Soviet supported government, had appeared in 1975. The 
former opposed the deployment of Soviet military trainers and the 
increasing Sovietization of society (Kemp 2009). The uprisings in Konar 
and Khost provinces gave the Soviets a ready excuse to deploy its 40th 
army to Afghanistan on the ‗invitation‘ of Afghan government. The 
Afghan national resistance to this Soviet invasion initially had only 
Pakistani support but was later supported with arms, money and training 
by the US, Western Europe and most of the Arab states. For different 
sectarian and ideological reasons the ‗mujahideen‘ organized themselves 
into seven major Sunni groups (based in Pakistan) and eight Shia groups 
(based in Iran). These groups were mostly led by either the Ikhwan ul 
Muslimun (Egyptian) and Jamaat e Islami (Pakistan) linked student 
groups or the traditional mullahs (prayer leaders in the mosques). This 
period of war lasted from 1979 to 1988. The Soviets agreed to withdraw 
as a result of the Geneva accord (1988). The Afghan and Pakistani 
governments were signatories to this agreement while the Soviet and US 
government signed it as guarantors.  
This agreement initiated the protracted second war from 1989 to 
1992 between the ‗mujahideen‘ groups and Kabul government. The fall 
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of Najib government in 1992 was followed by the third phase of the war 
which the Afghans remember as the worse period for Afghanistan. Most 
of the country was carved into fiefdoms of warlords and most of Kabul 
was reduced to rubble. The fighting was on ethnic lines between the 
Tajiks, led by Masood and Rabbani occupying Kabul, and the rest led by 
the Pukhtun, Hikmatyar in alliance with Hazara Shias, bombarding it 
from the outside. The Uzbeks led by Dostam switched sides in 1994 and 
joined Hikmatyar.  
At around the same period the post Soviet Central Asia was opening 
up its oil and gas reserves to the world. The government of 
Turkmenistan had signed an agreement with the Argentinean firm Bridas 
for exploration of gas. Both the Turkmen and Pakistani governments 
wanted to sign a deal for export of gas to Pakistan but the pipeline had 
to pass through Afghanistan. The wrangling between the American 
company Unocal and Bridas led to US arm twisting of both the 
governments. By that time, taliban had risen in Kandahar in response to 
the extreme state of lawlessness and had established their version of 
peace on the country side. With the active support from Pakistan and 
Arab countries, they finally took over Kabul in September 1996 and both 
the companies wooed them for the lucrative contract to build the 
pipeline. Ultimately the contract was awarded to Bridas but the 
competition to build the pipeline continued (Rashid 2001).1 
During this period the taliban made an alliance with the remnants of 
Arab fighters who had settled in Afghanistan and had organized under 
Osama bin Laden‘s Al Qaeda. Taliban identified themselves with the 
Deobandi School of Islamic jurisprudence (Metcalf 2001).2 Al Qaeda was 
influenced by the Salafis of Saudi Arabia and the Ikhwan of Egypt. The 
alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda was initially considered a 
marriage of convenience by the outsiders but the post 9/11 events 
unfolded the intermarriage of radical philosophies. 
The fourth phase of the war was between the taliban and the Tajik led 
northern alliance who were mostly confined to a handful of small 
northern provinces. Two days before 9/11, in the first suicide attack 
inside Afghanistan, two Arab operatives of Al Qaeda managed to kill the 
leader of the northern alliance, Ahmed Shah Masood. 
Finally, after September 11, 2001 the US and NATO overthrew 
taliban and the fifth phase of war between taliban and the international 
allies still continues. The results of this continued warfare are killings, 
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refugees, ethnic divisions and rising influence of radical Islam (Kemp 
2009).  
7.1.3 History of Talibanization and Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) 
In December 2001, the US blitz in Afghanistan had driven the Al Qaeda 
core to the cave complex of Tora bora, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
international border. Resorting to aerial bombardment, the finishing was 
left to the Afghan allies of the US (Kerry 2009). Most of Al Qaeda 
leadership fled to the Pukhtun tribal areas of Pakistan, commonly known 
as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), an area of 27220 sq km 
(Figure 7.1) and with a population of 3.17 million.3 The region had a 
history of being a base camp for the ‗Mujahideen‘ of 1980s. Bin Laden‘s 
original organization, Masada tul Ansar, had its base camp in Sadda, 
Kurram during the 1980s. The nature of these border areas, with their 
rugged hills, warfare and weak government controls still evoke 
stereotypes of Kipling (Kemp 2009). 
Initially the Pakistani state, led by its army, was nonchalant to the 
presence of these elements in FATA.4 The Arab militants were hosted by 
the local tribesmen under the Pukhtun tribal tradition of Melmastya or 
hospitality. These local tribesmen, bypassing the state institution of 
Maliks (Please see section 7.2.2) gave them shelter and provided them 
with their initial local recruits.  
Pressed by US and NATO, Pakistani army first launched a military 
operation against these Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks and their local 
hosts in 2004 in South Waziristan. This was the first of a series of 
conflict-truce cycles. The conflict was escalated by US mounted missile 
strikes and unmanned piloted attacks in FATA. After the death of their 
leader Nek Muhammad in one such drone strike on June 18, 2004 in 
Waziristan, the mercurial Baitullah Mehsud rose to prominence among 
the Wazir and Mehsud tribesmen. In July 2007, taliban and Al Qaeda 
sympathizers in the Red mosque of Islamabad rebelled and the security 
forces had to storm the building. In the fight some girl students of the 
Madrassah were also killed. The incident galvanized Al Qaeda 
sympathizers in Pakistan and with the aid of Afghan Taliban, Mehsud 
wielded together the different factions and sympathizers across FATA 
and Swat to form the TTP in December 2007.5 This led to the de facto 
control of the organization across most of FATA and Swat. The 
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government alternatively cut deals and launched operations till February 
2009 that is when the final Swat deal collapsed and the military launched 
an all out operation against all the TTP groups in the country. The 
conflict still continues and has taken a heavy toll on the civilian 
population. The number of suicide attacks across the country has led to 
2962 deaths and 7507 injured (Figure 7.2). The increase was directly 
related to an increase in the number of suicide bombings over the years 
(Figure 7.3). This increase in suicide bombings is an indication of the 
increase in recruitment for the TTP and suicide bombers, according to 
them are one of their most potent weapons. 
Figure 7.1: Map of FATA and NWFP 
 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan 
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Figure 7.2: Number of dead and injured in suicide bombings in Pakistan 
 
Source: Usmani (2009) 
 
Figure 7.3: Number of Suicide bombings in Pakistan 
 
Source: Usmani (2009) 
 
There has been no systematic attempt at analyzing the composition of 
TTP. According to one source, Pukhtuns provide the bulk of the 
organization at 80%, there are approximately 5% Punjabis and the rest 
are Uzbeks in a total fighting force of about 20000-25000.6 This estimate 
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does not count the TTP sleeper cells and sympathisers in their franchise 
organizations (Please see section 7.3.3 for detail).  
7.2  The Structural determinants of taliban recruitment 
There are three important threads related to the history of Islamic 
extremism in general and that of talibanization in Pakistan in particular; 
namely the ideological, the geo strategic and the socio-economic. For 
most part writers have concentrated on only one of these factors. An 
example is Rashid‘s (2001) thesis which only lays stress on the great 
geostrategic game going on in the region. The ideological and socio-
economic structural determinants of talibanization, although 
acknowledged at the policy and public debate level, are only now 
emerging as an interest in the broader scholarly community. The 
following sub sections will discuss these two factors behind 
talibanization in Pakistan. This will draw on the history of conflict and 
talibanization in Pakistan and Afghanistan as discussed above and on the 
elements of theoretical framework developed in the second chapter of 
this thesis, namely the burden of identity and history, decay of 
institutions and horizontal inequalities contributing to the risk of 
conflict.  
7.2.1 Identity, Culture and History 
The ‗grace of God‘ and the Pukhtun ethnic identity at last found a 
common ground during the days of Afghan ‗Jihad‘, the former at a more 
strategic level and the latter as a tactical tool and supplement‘ in the fight 
against the ‗infidel‘. The phenomenon continues to this day‘s conflict. 
Kemp (2009) thinks that the rise of radical Islam in Pukhtun lands on 
both sides is due to the disintegration of Afghan social structure, the 
increased sway of political Islam especially deobandi and salafi versions 
and the radicalization of Pukhtuns. This process of ‗Islamization‘ was 
encouraged by the Pakistani dictator General Zia ul Haq (1977-88), the 
way he thought fit. This included wholesale changes in school syllabi and 
the state sponsorship of a culture of ‗Jihad‘ and outward religiosity. 
According to one estimate there were 104 violent jihadist and 82 
sectarian groups of varying strength operating in Pakistan before 
September 9, 2001. Afterwards, their number shrank in mainland 
Pakistan and Kashmir to 21 jihad and 39 sectarian groups but grew in 
FATA and NWFP to more than 50 within six years (Rana 2009a). 
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The NWFP and FATA have always been the most religious and 
conservative regions in the whole of Pakistan. When the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, the national resistance was aided by Pakistan and US. From 
1978-1992, $ 66 billion worth of weaponry was introduced into the 
region, which works out at $.134 million per person (Coll 2005).7 But the 
resistance also needed a battle cry and a basis in the social ethos of the 
land and its people. The most convenient and the most effective was 
found to be that of Islam. The increasing influence of radical Islamism in 
the NWFP in part parallels the events occurring in Afghanistan (Kemp 
2009). The Afghan refugees who poured into camps in Pakistan were 
mostly settled in the Pukhtun areas. Mujahideen groups and the 
sponsoring governments wanted a regular supply of troops to replenish 
the fighting cadres. Besides hastily set up schools in these refugee camps, 
another cheap and effective method to educate the young refugees was 
the Madrassah. Their number multiplied and so did the funding and 
support coming from philanthropic sources and Arab governments. 
Most of these Madrassahs were based around the sectarian syllabi of 
particular juristic schools. Some were also sponsored by the religious 
political parties of Pakistan like Jamaat e Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-
e-Islam (JUI)8. After the fall of President Mohammad Najibullah‘s 
regime (1986-1992) in Kabul, Afghanistan descended into chaos. Most 
of Taliban leadership that arose in Kandahar in 1994 consisted of the 
graduates of these Madrassahs of NWFP and FATA. The theme of Jihad 
against the ‗infidels‘ was briefly changed to Jihad against the ‗hypocrites‘. 
After 9/11, when the US invaded, the same old battle cry was re-
invoked. While Taliban today on the Afghan side of the border are 
‗fighting jihad against the invading non-Muslims‘, the taliban on the 
Pakistani side are fighting against ‗a hypocrite and oppressive regime 
which is colluding with the west‘.  
In Swat, the same ‗grace of God‘ had been a part of socio-political life 
for the last two centuries. In 1915, Abdul Jabbar Shah was called from 
outside and installed as King of Swat partly because he was a Syed, a 
descendent of the Prophet (almost the same case as that of the 
Protestant William of Orange acceding to the throne of England in 
1689), only to be replaced by another man of pious repute, Mian Gul 
Abdul Wadud in 1917 (Sultan-i-Rome 2009). To this day, the religious 
identity in politics is manifested through the electoral results. Jamaat i 
Islami has been getting most of its share of seats in the provincial 
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legislature, from this area. They also support a network of schools in the 
district. 
Ethnic Identity at the tactical level 
Taliban are mostly Pukhtuns. This ethnic identity may not be present in 
their overall justification of the war but is all prevalent on ground and in 
their tactics. They invoke the sense of Pukhtun brotherhood when 
calling for arms in their propaganda posters and pamphlets.9 They also 
use the paighor or taunt, that famous article of the code of Pukhtunwali, 10 
It is employed whenever one is seen to be lacking in marshal spirit. The 
initial catalyst for war in Afghanistan was Mullah Omar‘s refusal to hand 
over his ‗guest‘ to the US. As he explained, this would have been against 
the Pukhtun code of melmastya or hospitality. Even Afghans who are part 
of the US supported Karzai government in Kabul are appreciative of this 
staunch adherence to the code of Pukhtunwali.11 The initial emergence 
of TTP was itself a result of refusal of Pukhtun tribal leaders (mostly 
Mullahs) of Waziristan and Bajaur, to ask their Arab and Uzbek ‗guests‘ 
to leave the area.  
Some scholars have also mentioned the rapid pace of modernization 
as a perceived threat to their conservative culture. 
The violent reaction underway along the border, to the point of being a 
Pukhtun-based insurgency, may also be tied to the rapid imposition of 
modernity on what is essentially a rural, traditional, clan-based society. 
Some Pukhtuns may see insurgency as a way to fend off the inroads of 
foreign movies, liberal thought, drugs, and the relaxation of social 
restraints on women. (Kemp 2009) 
The Pukhtun lands have historically resisted invading armies from 
Alexander to the current US led invasion. The terrain and history have 
combined to create a myth which is both romantic and surreal. Adeel A. 
Khan, a fellow Pukhtun is not impressed; 
Although the strategic importance of the NWFP as a gateway to India 
attracted invaders from the north, the inhospitability of the land was such 
that they would only pass through without establishing their rule. Cut 
off from the outside world, Pukhtun society remained dependent on non-
productive economic activities like war and plundering, forcing 
Pukhtuns to be conscious of their survival and security on a daily basis, 
whereas social and cultural isolation made them inward-looking. (A. 
Khan 2005)12 
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 The Pukhtun proudly call their land, the ‗Graveyard of empires‘ 
(Bearden 2001). This has much to do with the mountainous and one of 
the most difficult of terrains in the world which is uniquely suited to the 
demands of guerrilla warfare. This aura of invincibility has instilled 
fearlessness in the Pukhtun which has less to do with the realities of 
modern warfare. The myth of the ‗noble savage‘ has been created and 
sustained in Orientalist writings. Olaf Caroe was perhaps the first of 
them to cast the Pukhtun in this stereotype; 
The force of Pathan13 character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the 
shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the 
forefathers of this people to high positions of authority outside their 
own country. (Caroe 1983)14 
Louise Dupree then takes this torch of stereotyping to new heights; 
The insolence of the Afghan (Pukhtun), however, is not the frustrated 
insolence of urbanised, dehumanised man in western society, but 
insolence without arrogance, the insolence of harsh freedoms set against a 
back drop of rough mountains and deserts, the insolence of equality felt 
and practiced (with an occasional touch of superiority), the insolence of 
bravery past and bravery anticipated.15 
The same stereotypes are peddled, carelessly, even today; 
[TTP, a] rural, ultra-religious, nationalist movement fighting tooth-and-nail 
a corrupt, urban-based government as if they were a post-colonial fantasy 
of the noble tribal savage - a la Rousseau - fighting the colonialist West. 
(Escobar 2009) 
And the Pukhtun has ever since tried to live up to this stereotype. 
From Mullah Omar to Baitullah and Hakeemullah Mehsud to Muslim 
Khan of Swat, their verbal bravado reflects this burden of history.16 
These two identities of ethnicity and conservative Islam were strange 
bedfellows from the start, something that stumped even the most 
perceptive observers; 
Being Pukhtun they (TTP) had the convenience of a common language, 
Pukhtun human force, Hanafi Islam, fundamentalist sympathizers, and 
well established financial and educational institutions already at hand. In 
addition to the popular perceptions of the Taliban as the religious 
movement driven by the zeal of Islamic fundamentalism, the ethnic 
undertones of the movement cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the 
analysis of its social support base. For the ethnic minorities, the Taliban 
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was both a symbol of Islamic conservatism as well as a reflection of 
Pukhtun chauvinism. (Rana 2009a) 
However since the Feb 2008 electoral victory in the province, the 
relationship of the Pukhtun ethnopolitical Awami National Party 
(ANP)17 with the TTP today is one of extreme animosity. Hundreds of 
ANP workers, leaders and legislators have been killed in ambushes and 
suicide attacks. The ANP has been branded as a traitor to the Pukhtun 
cause by siding with the invaders and their puppets (the Pakistan army). 
This intensified campaign was one of the factors that led to the 
increasing unpopularity of taliban and their allies, Al Qaeda. An August 
2009 Pew survey finds that the Taliban and al Qaeda tend to be 
unpopular across regions, including the NWFP, and that people in Sindh 
and in the NWFP are considerably more likely to see the Taliban as a 
threat to Pakistan (85% each) than are those in Punjab (68%) and that 
concerns about al Qaeda and the Taliban are widespread across ethnic 
groups. More than eight-in-ten Pukhtuns (85%) say the Taliban pose a 
serious threat to Pakistan, as do 80% of Muhajirs, 77% of Sindhis and 
71% of Punjabis. Al Qaeda is viewed as a serious threat by nearly seven-
in-ten Muhajirs (68%), and about six-in-ten Punjabis, Sindhis and 
Pukhtuns (62% each) (Pew Global 2009). This is not something clearly 
visible to the casual outside observer. An example is that of Pebe 
Escobar who thinks that an increasing number of Pukhtuns living on 
both sides of the border have seized the opportunity and started to look 
to the Taliban as a convenient facilitator for the emergence of 
Pukhtunistan (Escobar 2009). The dual identities of Islam and 
Pukhtunwali have been influential in providing the taliban with their 
initial success, but the same Pukhtun identity has now boomeranged to 
hurt them, at least on the Pakistani side of the border. 
7.2.2  Institutions (or the lack of it) 
In this section the focus will be on the role of institutions of conflict 
management in FATA and Swat. Both these regions have a unique 
history of evolution of these institutions which is altogether different 
from the rest of the country. The institutions of interest here are the 
political and judicial setups of FATA and Swat.  
In FATA the tribal structure of society was given a formal 
recognition by the colonialists in the shape of the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation (FCR) in 1848. The same was amended in 1873 and 1876 and 
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then re-enacted in 1901. British policy towards the tribal belt was based 
on a mix of persuasion, pressure and armed intervention (Rakistis 2008). 
The legislation was designed to mollify Pukhtun tribesmen and establish 
a system of principal and client in which the responsibility to maintain 
law and order fell upon the tribal elders or Maliks. These Maliks were the 
state sponsored elite under an elaborate system of nikat or hereditary 
entitlement, in which they and their tribe was eligible for government 
cash handouts in proportion to the strength of the tribe, the importance 
of the area and the past record of loyalty to the British. In case of any 
offence against the interests of the British Raj, the concept of ‗Collective 
Responsibility‘ was introduced. So for any misdemeanour of a member 
of tribe, the whole tribe was liable to punishment with blockade, 
property seizure, razing of the house and indefinite detention.18 The 
system called for a ‗Council of elders‘ or Jirga which only had a 
recommending role. While giving their recommendations they were not 
required to consult any statute except that of the code of Pukhtunwali. 
The Government appointed executive official (or a hierarchy of them) 
constituted all the courts of final appeal. The high courts had no 
jurisdiction in FATA. The law still exits and is often applied. It is given 
constitutional protection in Article 247 which states that no Act of 
Parliament applies to FATA unless the president so desires. Only the 
president is authorized to amend laws and promulgate ordinances for the 
tribal areas. The state justifies its failure to meet its obligations to the 
citizens there on the grounds of Pukhtun tribal customs and its ancient 
code (ICG 2006). 
In the past, in case of conflict between the government and the tribes, 
the Maliks would be the first people to intervene, be accused, 
apprehended and set free. Each and every dispute would finally end with 
a jirga between the tribes and the government in which the terms of the 
agreement would be finalized. When the hostilities started in 2004 in 
South Waziristan, the government asked these Maliks to intervene and 
eject the ‗foreigners‘, a term used for Arab, Uzbek and Chechen fighters 
among the taliban ranks. The problem with the approach was that the 
Maliks were not made party to the deal. The government withdrew from 
the area19 despite the absence of any guarantee for future good conduct. 
With this first agreement the government assumed that things will return 
to normal. This was a mistake on part of the government and a factor 
that allowed the TTP to swell ranks with new recruitment (Abbas 2008).  
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FATA has always had its representation in both the houses of the 
legislature. Before 1996, these representatives only needed to secure the 
few hundred votes of Maliks to make it to the assembly. In 1997, the 
people of FATA were given adult franchise for the first time. This was 
done without making other adjustments in the FCR. As a result, the 
political parties were not allowed to enter FATA but the religious parties 
had no such practical bar. De facto, they already had the pulpit in every 
mosque and could turn the Friday prayers into political meetings. Only 
their message could be heard in FATA from 1997 till date. The result was 
all too evident in the elections of 2002 and 2008 when the religious 
political parties swept FATA. With the provincial government of 
neighbouring NWFP in their hands, the alliance of religious parties 
known as Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA) was unchallenged in Pukhtun 
lands. Khalid Aziz thinks that the removal of chief district executive 
official, the Deputy Commissioner, by the local government reforms of 
General Musharraf in 2001, was another factor that weakened the state 
apparatus in the area (K. Aziz 2007). 
With the traditional local leadership sidelined and the government 
negociating directly with the militants and cutting deals, the Pakistani 
Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to 
the traditional tribal elders. By the time the Pakistani government 
realized the changing dynamics and tried to resurrect the tribal jirga 
institution, it was too late. The Taliban had killed approximately 200 of 
the tribal elders under charges of being spies (Abbas 2008). The Pukhtun 
intelligentsia raised its voice against this wholesale slaughter for the 
benefit of an agreement which had no enforcement mechanism but the 
MMA led provincial government would always resist any enforcement of 
the agreements by the government as it would lead to direct pressure on 
their protégés.20 It was convenient for the dictator to keep the 
mainstream parties out of the political system and the regime had no 
interest in introducing full fledged democracy with political parties to 
FATA. The presence of the two religious governments in NWFP and 
Balochistan raised eye brows; many observers were further surprised by 
the military‘s use of JUI (F) influence in Waziristan for brokering two 
agreements with the hostile Taliban in South and North Waziristan (K. 
Aziz 2007).   
The institutional structure erected by the British in FATA served the 
purpose of closed frontier policy against Russian influence in the 
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nineteenth century. It was no match for the asymmetrical warfare of 
‗rebels without borders‘. The collapse of the political institutions was 
hastened with the incomplete reforms which were introduced to the area 
without the requisite environment to sustain them. According to one 
poll conducted in FATA, 34% sought integration with the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), and 20% voiced a preference for a separate 
province. Over 50% wanted the 'Political Parties Act' to be extended to 
FATA. Only 23% preferred things as they were (CAMP 2008). Such 
high dissatisfaction with the prevailing institutional structure weakened 
the social contract between the state and its people. The resulting 
implosion of institutions was a factor which created the taliban myth in 
these areas. It gave them the legitimacy of a victor who could defeat the 
system as old as almost two centuries. The supplanting of these 
institutions with those laid by taliban will be discussed in section 7.3.  
Institutions and conflict in Swat 
The institutional story of Swat is no different than that of FATA. In the 
pre-Swat state era (i.e. before 1917) the region was part of the 
autonomous state of Swat from 1917 to 1969. Between 1947 and 1969, 
the state had internal autonomy while matters related to foreign affairs; 
legislation, defence and currency were dealt with by the state of Pakistan. 
The ruler called Wali then signed the instrument of accession with the 
government of Pakistan. Swat thus became part of Provincially 
Administered Tribal Area (PATA) which was governed under the PATA 
regulations of 1975.  
The pre 1917 era (also known as the Pukhtu era) is knows for the 
absence of a central government in Swat. The people lived under 
Pukhtunwali. The lawlessness and continuous anomic violence of Swat 
was anecdotal and Swat was full of sedition but was greatly moderated 
under the policies of the Swat state rulers after 1917 (Sultan-i-Rome 
2009). There is a commonly held belief today that under the Walis, the 
judicial system was ‗Islamic‘. Sultan-i-Rome (2009) finds little evidence 
for that and concludes that the people‘s nostalgia for that judicial system 
was due to its cost effectiveness and prompt disposal.  
After accession to Pakistan, the constitutional status of this area has 
had a close nexus with conflict. The area‘s constitutional status created 
legislative and administrative confusion as it was under the 
administrative control of the provincial government, but the provincial 
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legislature could not make and promulgate laws for the area. This could 
only be done by the governor of the province and president of the 
country; both of whom are neither part of the provincial government 
nor answerable to it. This created anomalies and institutional 
inefficiency. In 1994, PATA regulations were declared null and void by 
the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the 
government‘s appeal. While the government was mulling introduction of 
the general laws of the rest of the country to the area, a segment of 
Swatis, under the leadership of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of 
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), demanded the 
imposition of ‗Islamic laws‘. This pitted the TNSM in an armed conflict 
against the security forces which led to several deaths on both sides. In 
the end, the provincial government agreed to institute new and separate 
laws for the region. These new regulations which mainly dealt with court 
procedures and nomenclature failed to completely satisfy the TNSM and 
the resentment simmered. A further set of regulations were introduced in 
1999 but those too were of little help to pacify the movement for the 
same reasons. 
The current conflict in Swat started around 2004 when the alliance of 
religious political parties, the MMA, got political control of the province. 
Many of today‘s Swat‘s taliban had voted for them and the MMA was 
more tolerant of their activities as it recognized that like the taliban, it 
was also engaged in a struggle for an Islamic system and could not be 
seen obstructing those advocating the same (Sultan-i-Rome 2009).21 
As Fazlullah, the son in law of Sufi Muhammad started his firebrand 
sermons on his illegal FM radio, the MMA‘s provincial government 
announced that it could not legally stop him from doing so. Since Sufi 
Muhammad himself was in jail for fighting against NATO in 
Afghanistan, the TNSM cadres gathered around Fazlullah which now 
started calling themselves the Swat chapter of TTP. Now the ostensible 
demand of this chapter was the introduction of ‗Sharia‘ in Swat. The 
MMA provincial government supported the demand and did not do 
anything to stop Fazlullah from his funds collection and arms 
acquisition. In fact the police superintendent of the district was asked to 
desist from arresting Fazlullah in 2006.22 After a few months it became 
impossible even if they wanted to arrest him. The civilian head of the 
administration in the district, appointed by the MMA government was so 
sympathetic to the cause of TTP that he would often be found praying in 
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congregations led by Fazlullah himself.23 A cycle of conflict-negotiations-
conflict ensued exactly as happened in FATA. The last accord was 
signed in February 2009 when the government asked Sufi Muhammad to 
intervene. The accord was roundly condemned by human rights 
organizations for its contents but even that could not bring peace to the 
area. It broke almost immediately after the TTP Swat took over the 
district, announced their intention to move to the other parts of the 
country and refused to disarm. 
Now that the army action in Swat has succeeded in restoring peace, 
state institutions and rehabilitation of internally displaced people, a 
pattern of the building and collapse of institutions of conflict 
management emerges which closely follows that of the rise and fall in 
conflict intensity. The period before 1917, one of institutional absence 
(or degraded institutions in the shape of primitive tribal codes) was 
marked by continuous conflict. From 1917 to 1969, the period is known 
for good working state institutions and peace. There was general peace 
till 1994 as the PATA regulations worked but conflict ensued 
immediately as the courts struck down the laws. The legislative vacuum 
existed from 1994 to 2002 and when the capture of political power in the 
province gave an opportunity to the TTP sympathizers in the provincial 
government, they exploited it in order to attain their goals by violence.  
7.2.3 Deprivation and Inequality 
There are some studies which present evidence to suggest that poverty 
does not seem to be the main determinant behind terrorist attacks 
(Krueger 2003), and there are other studies by Krueger and Maleckova 
(2003), Krueger and Laitin (2008) and Sageman (2004) which suggest 
that terrorists are predominantly recruited from a relatively wealthy and 
educated family background. Yet more studies suggest that militants are 
mostly in their twenties with some post-secondary training, mostly in 
technical or engineering fields. After a brief survey of this literature, 
Azam and Thelen (2008) conclude that terrorists are not recruited 
among the poorest segments of their society of origin however at the 
same time they provide empirical evidence for the case that the level of 
foreign aid, especially in education sector, reduces the supply of terrorist 
attacks. 
In the Pakistani context, since there is little comparative data of 
FATA with the rest of Pakistan, as none of the major household surveys 
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included FATA, therefore it would be premature to conclude that 
poverty has a definite connection with militant conflict in FATA. In the 
same vein, Aftab (2008) concludes her study with the observation that 
the data on spatial distribution of poverty does not suggest a link 
between poverty and intense militant activity. She however admits that 
other studies would suggest that poverty is a contributing factor 
provided there is an existing enabling environment.  
Table 7.1: Top TTP commanders and their educational background 
No. Name of TTP 
Commander 
Rank Education 
1 Nek Muhammad Former Chief of tribal 
taliban 
Attended Madrassah for five 
years. 
2 Baitullah 
Mehsud 
Former Chief of TTP Never finished formal 
schooling, Received some 
instruction in Madrassah, Some 
reports suggest he attended 
higher secondary level.24 
3 Hakeemullah 
Mehsud 
Current Chief of TTP Never attended school, Only 
attended Madrassah. 
4 Maulana 
Fazlullah 
Chief of TTP Swat Attended Madrassah, attended 
school up to secondary level. 
5 Qari Hussain Top Commander and 
trainer for suicide 
bombers 
Never attended school. 
Attended Madrassah,  
6 Faqeer 
Muhammad 
Vice Chief of TTP and 
Commander of Bajaur 
TTP 
Never attended school, 
Attended Madrassah. 
7 Mangal Bagh25 Chief of Lashkar-e-
Islam 
No education whatsoever. 
8 Waliur Rehman 
Mehsud 
Chief of South 
Waziristan TTP 
Attended Madrassah, Never 
attended school 
9 Hafiz Gul 
Bahadur 
Chief of his own 
faction of TTP 
Never attended school, 
Attended Madrassah 
10 Tariq Afridi Commander of Khyber 
(Bara) TTP 
Attended Madrassah 
11 Abdul Wali Commander of 
Mohmand TTP 
No education whatsoever. 
Source: Wiki profiles, Interviews with Pakistani journalists. 
 
Contrary to the general agreement on the absence of hard evidence 
linking lack of education and poverty to militant conflict, a cursory look 
at the profiles of the top leaders of TTP (Table 7.1) suggests that almost 
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all of them were either drop outs from school or never attended one. 
None of them come from a wealthy family. Although there is no single 
dataset with comparable statistics for both FATA and the rest of 
Pakistan, yet data made available by the FATA secretariat reveals a gulf 
of horizontal inequalities (Table 7.2). Aftab (2008) points out that similar 
inequalities exist for example between rural Sindh and the rest of 
Pakistan but the same areas have not provided any appreciable number 
of recruits to the militant conflict. She is right but then there is also no 
history of failure of institutions, ‗Jihad‘ and state encouragement of 
radical ideas in these other areas. It is the enabling environment which 
makes the combination so combustible. In view of the profiles presented 
in Table 7.1, it is difficult to de link the absence of formal education 
from militancy in FATA. 
Table 7.2: Horizontal Inequality between FATA and the rest of Pakistan 
Development Indicator In Pakistan In FATA 
Over all literacy Rate 56 % 17.42% 
Female literacy 32.6% 3% 
Population Per doctor26  1225 6993 
Population per  hospital 
Bed 
1517 2325 
Percentage of Population 
below poverty line 
35% 60% 
Income per capita in 
FATA 
is half of $500 national figure. 
Per capita development 
expenditure in FATA 
One third of national average 
Source: FATA (2009) and ICG (2006) 
 
In addition to the horizontal inequalities as indicated in Table 7.2, the 
economy of FATA is underdeveloped. The region is rich in mineral 
resources but remains under exploited. Most locals depend on 
subsistence agriculture since there is little industrial development and few 
jobs. This has given rise to a vast black economy which largely depends 
on smuggling of goods from and to Afghanistan. 15% of the population 
is between the ages of 15 and 22 which makes this an even more 
enabling environment for propaganda as Aziz (2007) and Rakistis (2008) 
point out. Most of the taliban recruits in FATA are poor and strongly 
feel that ‗exploitative system is against them‘.27 According to a poll of 
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2000 adults (with 29.1% women), conducted in seven tribal agencies and 
three Frontier Regions of FATA and using proportionate stratified 
sampling, over 50% respondents expressed dissatisfaction with life in 
FATA. The poll indicated that the people would like the government to 
provide basic services like Justice, education and health (CAMP 2008). 
These structural factors of; a history of conflict, state sponsored 
conservative radicalism, weak or non existing political and judicial 
institutions and the horizontal social inequalities, point towards 
important policy options in reducing militant recruitment. These options 
include the use of force as against more social spending, the carrot and 
stick policies as Frey (2004) calls it. The Pakistani government seems to 
be taking both the routes at the moment as it launched a nine year, $ 2 
billion Sustainable development plan in FATA, in 2006 with substantial 
aid from the US.  
7.2.4 Recruitment and its nexus with Madrassahs 
Taliban use the Madrassahs as their chief recruitment pool. There is 
considerable controversy among researchers regarding the number of 
Madrassahs in Pakistan, the number of students in these Madrassahs and 
their socio-economic background. With the estimates about the number 
of Madrassahs ranging from 7000 (Khalid 2002)28 to 45000 (Singer 
2001), the most authentic study about the number of these Madrassahs is 
that of Rahman (2004). His estimates, based on government and 
Madrassah sources are given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Madrassahs, their affiliation, numbers and growth between 1988 
and 2002 
School 1988 2002 
Deobandi 1779 7000 
Barelvi 717 1585 
Ahle hadith 161 376 
Shia 47 419 
Jamaat e Islami 97 500 
Total 2801 9880 
Source: Rahman (2004)   
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 Refuting an International Crisis group study in 2002, which 
erroneously claimed that one third of all students in Pakistan attended 
Madrassah, another study by Andrabi et al (2006) found that the number 
of students in these Madrassahs is less than 3%. However they neither 
incorporated the data for FATA and some conflict hit areas of NWFP, 
nor adjusted for it.  
There is a general view about Madrassahs being the breeding ground 
for radicalism. Most of these are affiliated with political, sectarian and 
militant organizations (Rana 2009b). The TTP have found the 
Madrassahs a fertile ground for recruitment. They recruit in Madrassahs 
through sympathetic teachers, their syllabus and their role in acting as 
alternatives after the breakdown of state‘s institutions. Tariq Rehman has 
given us a good insight into the worldview of these Madrassah teachers 
and their students. He found that both these groups are considerably 
more intolerant and sympathetic to using violence for their political aims, 
than their counterparts in public or private schools (Rahman 2004). Fair 
(2008), however theorizes that the relationship between Madrassahs and 
these intolerant views may not be so simple and that ‗Madaris might not 
simply produce these students; rather intolerant families might choose 
madaris‘ (Emphasis in original). She suggests that the work of Andrabi et 
al (2006) mitigates this concern. 
How does the Madrassahs become breeding grounds for TTP? 
Consider this; A study based on interviews and survey of Madrassah 
teachers found that although the Madrassahs‘ administration were 
reluctant to disclose their sectarian and militant affiliations, still 18% 
owned up to this connection. With hundreds of students in some of 
these Madrassahs that is a very high number of potential recruits for 
these Jihadi organizations. 100% of Jamaat e Islami‘s, and 82% of 
Deobandi Maddrassahs were inclined towards politics. They routinely 
condemned terrorism as evil but at the same time 103 out of 115 
Madrassahs opposed the military operation in FATA (Rana 2009b). Most 
of the time its not the syllabus but the ideas of right and wrong that the 
students pick from their teachers, from critical incidents and situations 
and the way a particular behaviour is classified as acceptable or 
unacceptable (Vazir 2007). 
The link of present and past TTP leadership with the Madrassahs 
network is evident from Table 7.1. Except some, all the others have 
either been to a Madrassah or have been dropouts from one. However, 
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not all the Madrassahs supplying TTP with its leadership and foot 
soldiers are of the same sect. Those appearing in the above mentioned 
table have all been to the Madrassahs operated by the Deobandi or Salafi 
tradition or its subclass of Panjpiri School. The Barelvis are almost non 
existent in these cadres.  
The TTP has mostly used Madrassahs as their staging points and 
gathering places where they interact and get religious sanction from the 
‗learned‘ for their extremist ideologies. In Bajaur, North and South 
Waziristan, Swat and Orakzai, there is anecdotal evidence that a few of 
these Madrassahs have been used as training camps and for preparing 
suicide bombers.29 The TTP also used the Madrassahs as a counter 
institution to those representing the state as all the parallel courts which 
operated in TTP occupied areas were invariably staffed with Madrassah 
graduates as Qazis (judges) and were mostly run inside these Madrassahs.  
7.3 Agency Factors  
Contextual factors may provide insight into why individuals are easier to 
recruit, but it is necessary to go beyond them to examine the strategies and 
dynamics of recruitment if we are to better understand this crucial process 
(Eck 2005). 
The fact that all the above discussed factors are structural, begs the 
question if the Taliban themselves have any role in expediting or 
facilitating recruitment in their ranks. The contextual factors not only 
give them their motivation but also give them a fertile ground for further 
recruitment. They have thus developed tactics and strategies which 
maximizes the recruitment in the given conditions. To provide a more 
wholesome picture, in the following sub-sections, the focus will be on 
these agent level strategies. They include the exploitation of the 
Madrassah institution, the networking and outsourcing of talibanization, 
supplanting the state institutions and indoctrination of young recruits 
through propaganda and theological training. 
7.3.1 Replacing the State Structure30 
The TTP used a carefully choreographed method for expanding their 
influence inside FATA and then in NWFP. This involves creating Robin 
Hood like affinity with the common people by acts of vigilante justice, 
the demonstration and reinforcement of the perception of weakness of 
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state institutions and local elite, the creation of a parallel institutional 
structure and the consolidation of this structure by creating and assigning 
supporting roles to those who are co-opted. 
In all the seven tribal agencies of FATA and Swat, the first acts of 
Taliban constituted a call for ban on the ‗degenerating‘ influence of 
television, drugs and all things ‗un-Islamic‘ from barber shops to courts. 
In the first step the people involved in these professions are warned to 
desist. Failure to comply results in blowing up the premises of these 
businesses with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Almost at the 
same time, drug peddlers, kidnappers and other criminal elements in the 
area are warned through public announcements that ‗Sharia‘ has now 
been introduced and they must not indulge in these activities again. A 
few of those accused of such crimes are hunted down and killed after 
summary proceedings. This has the dual effect of creating terror and 
garnering sympathies of the local population.  
In the second step the influential of the area are asked to contribute 
to ‗jihad‘ with men or money. Some comply, others who dare not to, are 
assassinated. Either way, the TTP scores success. Their compliance gives 
the TTP valuable support, influence and foothold among the local 
population while a successful assassination sends out the signal that 
those supporting the state are no longer safe and the state cannot protect 
its supporters. Almost in tandem, the schools become a target, especially 
those set up for girls. According to a latest count, at least 473 schools 
have been destroyed in Swat alone (Allbritton 2009). Similar school 
destruction has been witnessed in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and 
Orakzai. Peshawar has also borne the brunt of this tactic which is mostly 
used to terrorize and announce the arrival of a challenge for the writ of 
the state. 
The third step in this talibanization process is the setting up of 
parallel institutions e.g. taliban courts. These courts are all run by 
‗muftis‘, graduates of Madrassahs, and housed in one such Madrassah of 
the area. Due to summary ‗justice‘ dispensed in these courts, the disposal 
of cases is quick. This is a strong attraction to the locals who almost 
always find it cumbersome to approach the legitimate courts, have to pay 
the lawyers and will often wait for a generation to get a verdict. Rana 
(2009a) reports that the taliban court in Bajaur had registered 1400 cases 
of disputes among the local population till August 2008 and had decided 
1000 out of them. In addition to these courts, a parallel system of police 
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and vigilante public morality squads is organized. Any remaining foes are 
rounded up through the morality squads and made to appear before 
these courts.  
The final act in this process is the consolidation and entrenchment of 
talibanization. This involves the setting up of a rudimentary public 
welfare system which is then financed through various taxes. These taxes 
are mostly levied and collected from smugglers plying between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mining is also taxed. People are asked to 
contribute their ‗Zakah‘, Islamic charity, to the TTP. In Orakzai and 
Buner, the TTP asked the non-Muslims (mainly the Sikh community) to 
pay a special tax, ‗Jizya‘. Failure to comply makes them liable to 
punishment including death and exile. Another source of funding for 
these campaigns is through predatory attacks (mainly kidnappings for 
ransom and looting the banks) into the border areas. The ‗taxes‘ which 
are collected are mainly spent in warfare but a small portion is also 
reported to have been spent sometimes to co-opt the local population. 
Rana (2009a) reports that in June 2008, the Taliban in South Waziristan 
distributed 15 million Rupees to help the victims of the military 
operation. According to one government claim, the TTP spent about 3 
billion Rupees a year on these activities (Khattak 2008). Such a 
consolidation strategy routs the last vestiges of state institutions. In 
Bajaur in 2008, the Political Agent in charge of the area and all his 
subordinate staff were essentially trapped inside the small military camp 
and those visiting the officials were killed by the taliban.  
7.3.2 Indoctrination and Propaganda 
And then I asked my fellow teachers and school administrators ―what 
have we been teaching these kids for all these years? What was the 
strength of the message that we imparted to them? All these kids are easily 
influenced now by an ignorant talib and brainwashed in a few days to the 
extent that he becomes a fanatic and a suicide bomber.‖ 31 
The dilemma of one school principal is understandable. He is up 
against formidable odds. The TTP has an elaborate system of 
propaganda and indoctrination. This system includes dissemination of 
timely information through nominated spokesmen for each of the seven 
tribal agencies and Swat, the recording and distribution of militant songs 
and videos and setting up of indoctrination schools for suicide bombers 
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The TTP has a spokesman appointed in each of the tribal agencies 
and even in some districts of NWFP. Almost all of them are fluent Urdu 
speakers and a few can speak English and Arabic. They keep in 
continuous touch with the journalists, TV anchors and opinion makers. 
They are quick to take responsibility for any act of violence and describe 
it as their victory over ‗the hypocrites‘.  
The TTP videotape almost every suicide bombing from a distance 
and these short, often mobile phone quality videos, are then distributed. 
All of these are accompanied with ‗Jihadi‘ songs and music in the 
background in which the bomber and his deed is eulogized. Most of 
these bombers are ideologically motivated and indoctrinated in the 
schools set up for them by the TTP. Qari Hussain, was in charge of one 
such school in South Waziristan (Roggio 2009). A similar camp was 
captured in Swat (Waraich 2009).   
Another favourite with the TTP is the use of cheaply available FM 
radio transmitters. Their whole campaign in Swat was built around 
Fazlullah‘s daily sermons. Every tribal agency and even some areas in the 
NWFP had its own TTP radio transmitter which were difficult for the 
government to trace. In areas where the TTP managed to extend 
appreciable control, the people were forced to listen to these radio 
broadcasts out of fear as the Taliban would routinely name people in 
these broadcasts who were liable to be punished for working against 
them. Nobody wanted to be caught off guard. 
7.3.3 Outsourcing, Franchising and Networking 
From a motley crowd of tribal fighters in FATA to a highly organized 
force across the rest of the country, the TTP‘s transition within five years 
relied on many deliberate strategies. Since these tribal elements shared its 
ideology of ‗Jihad‘ against US and NATO in Afghanistan, with other 
militant elements already present across FATA, NWFP and a few 
pockets in Punjab; they found it convenient to expand by merging, 
networking, outsourcing and franchising its activities and tactics, without 
compromising on its basic ideology or its goals. As many as 40 such 
organizations are now estimated to have become part of the larger TTP 
(Rana 2009a). 
After its formation the TTP has been trying to absorb the cadres and 
services of its ideological allies. The goals of the TTP have been to 
destabilize the state‘s security apparatus, to force the government not to 
192 CHAPTER 7 
 
interfere in TTP controlled areas and to force the government to change 
the law according to their interpretative paradigm of Islam (Rana 2009a). 
The last mentioned goal has always been the stated objective of most of 
the militant organizations in Pakistan. To make itself more appealable to 
sectarian outfits, the TTP also targeted the Shias and the Sufi orders of 
the areas.32 The rivals of these sects and orders existed in these areas 
before the arrival of TTP and there was quite a bit of animosity 
especially in Kurram, Hangu and Orakzai. The sectarian militant outfits 
in these areas quickly allied themselves with the TTP and were branded 
as the local chapters of the organization. The smaller groups, by merging 
with the bigger TTP, suddenly found a very powerful ally and in Kurram, 
Hangu and Orakzai, they forced a militant solution on the long standoffs 
with their local rivals. All they had to do was to express their allegiance 
to the ideals and cause of the parent organization. This was essentially a 
franchising strategy for expansion.  
This franchising strategy gained rich dividends for the TTP‘s fund 
raising efforts. The newly established chapters were instructed to send 
half of all the collected funds to the headquarters in Waziristan and most 
of them often resorted to crime to meet the target (Rana 2009a).  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to explain the Taliban insurgency in 
Pakistan by looking at the structural as well as agency level factors 
contributing to its recruitment. The structural factors are mostly similar 
to those which have been a constant refrain throughout this thesis and 
which were employed in the previous chapters to explain ethnopolitical 
conflict. These find relevance in this chapter as well and despite a paucity 
of data about the conflict hit regions of Pakistan, especially FATA, a 
connection can still be made between the history of the region, the 
conservative religious outlook of its population, its proximity to 
Afghanistan, the weakness of state‘s institutions of conflict management 
and the socio economic conditions of the area. All these structural 
factors provided a fertile ground to the TTP which were able to exploit 
the conditions for more effective recruitment efforts. Both of these have 
to be kept in context for any policy option. 
The discussion about ideology and the preeminence of the ‗Grace of 
God‘ in the life of the people of FATA and NWFP has been a topic of 
much debate and this thesis is not the place to resolve it. As David 
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Kemp observes, this is a debate which is for the larger Muslim world to 
undertake and decide and may take decades (Kemp 2009). One is but 
constrained to observe that without settling this critical debate, the long 
term peace of the conflict hit zones of Pakistan and Afghanistan will be 
an elusive goal, especially given the long history of warfare on the basis 
of these ideological conflicts. Without confronting ideas with more 
powerful ideas, the tribal Pukhtun with his simple, ancient code of 
Pukhtunwali, the history of his region and his black and white world 
around him, is not going to lay down his gun any time soon. For this 
purpose there is a need to desist from immature and hasty conclusions 
about the ethnic aspirations of TTP like for example Escobar‘s (2009) 
observation that an increasing number of Pukhtuns living on both sides 
of the border have started to look to the Taliban as a convenient 
facilitator for the emergence of Pukhtunistan.  
Equally important is the stability of functioning, efficient and adapted 
institutions in the region for resolution and prevention of conflict. For it 
is the weakness or absence of these state institutions which have 
represented the breakdown of the centuries old social contract of the 
people of these areas with the state and has given an opportunity to the 
TTP to play upon the poor socio economic conditions of the populace 
and recruit them in their cause. While it is important to put out the fire 
in the house immediately, counter violence by the state can never be the 
only option for building anew.  
Finally, it is important to look at the agency level TTP recruitment 
strategies for formulating an effective policy response. Again, the power 
of counter ideas cannot be over stressed. It has been a failure of the 
educational system of the area which has given a walkover to the taliban 
in projecting their worldview and finding ready recruits. The semi 
controlled Madrassahs have been allowed to mushroom for too long. It 
has been and still is politically incorrect in Pakistan to question the very 
raison d‘être of this institution but the regulation of their syllabi, student 
population and funding should not be under estimated.    
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 Notes  
  
                                                 
1 For a detailed narrative of events please read Rashid (2001). For a concise 
timeline of events please go to 
http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline_timeline.htm 
2 Dar ul Uloom Deoband is a religious schools of eminence in Utter Pardesh, 
India in the town by the same name. Established in 1866, the school represents 
one of the largest denomination of Indian and Pakistani muslims. 
3 1998 census. 
4 Interview with Brig (Retd) Mehmood Shah, The ex-Secretary for Security of 
FATA. 
5 Interview with Journalist, columnist and TV anchor Saleem Safi. 
6 ibid 
7 P. 238 
8 Both the Fazlur Rehman and Sami ul Haq factions of the party. 
9 Interview with Dr. Tariq Rehman. 
10 Pukhtunwali is the code by which Pukhtuns live. It includes, among others,  
Hospitality, Honour, Revenge and Taunt. 
11 Interview with Waheedullah Sabawoon, minister in Karzai‘s cabinet. 
12 P. 85 
13 Pathan is a name given to Pukhtuns mostly by Urdu or Hindustani speakers. 
The word is never used by the Pukhtuns themselves for self identification.  
14 P. 437 
15 Quoted in A. Khan (2005), P. 87 
16 As a sample of peddling of this historical stereotype, Consider Mullah Omar‘s 
message of felicitation of Eid, November 25, 2009. 
―The people, whom you have chosen for confrontation, have the honor of dismantling 
the arrogant empires. They have good capability and historical experience. Our believing 
people will not allow the Western colonialism to make our country a hotbed against our 
independence and vital values and aggressive designs against regional countries. These are 
the people who before you, have wiped out two empires – the British and Russians 
empires-- from the map of the world.‖ 
http://www.alemarah.info/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic
le&id=623:message-of-felicitation-of-the-esteemed-amir-ul-momineen-on-the-
eve-of-eid-ul-odha&catid=5:statement- 
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17 Formerly known as NAP 
18 Section 21-24 of FCR(1901). 
19 Interview with Brig (Retd) Mehmood Shah, Ex-Secretary Security FATA. 
20 Interviews of Pukhtun intellectuals and academics Fazle Rahim Marwat and 
Afrasiyab Khattak with the International Crisis Group (ICG 2006). 
21 Journalist Shaheen Buneri narrates an interesting conversation with 
Qari Abdul Bais (MMA‘s member, National Assembly,from Swat) who 
contended: ‗Many of the Taliban voted in favor of the MMA in the 2002 
elections; we can‘t annoy them, as they are our vote bank.‘ (Buneri 2008). 
22 Interviews with Police officials of the district 
23 He was later arrested in 2009 for colluding with TTP. 
24 ibid 
25 Mangal Bagh Afridi is not formally allied to TTP but there has been recent 
police evidence to suggest that his organization is providing shelter to the TTP 
men attacking Peshawar with suicide bombers. 
26 Year 2007 figures from 
http://nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/Departments/BOS/fatadev-stat-abs-health.php 
27 Interview with Saleem Safi 
28 Cited in Fair (2008) 
29 Interviews with civilian and military officers who served in the area. Notable 
among these are Fazlullah‘s Madrassah in Swat, Faqeer Muhammad‘s in Bajaur, 
Muhammad Amin in Hangu/Orakzai and Qari Hussain‘s suicide training camp in 
Waziristan. 
30 The discussion in this section is guided by interviews and talks with local 
journalists Mr. Aqeel yousafzai, Mr. Saleem Safi, local administrator Mr. Yousaf 
Rahim, ex-police heads of district Swat, Mr. Yameen Khan and Mr. Akbar Nasir 
and local politicians of ANP Mr. Saqibullah Chamkani and Mr. Hussain Shah. 
31 Mr. Ziauddin, Principal and owner of a private school in Swat in his television 
interview to Dawn TV program ‗Equinox‘. 
32 Notable such cases are those of Pir Samiullah of Swat, whose village was 
attacked and pillaged and the Pir was killed alongwith scores of his disciples; and 
the attacks, kidnappings and killings of shias in Kurram, Orakzai, Hangu and 
Khyber agency.  
  
8  Conclusion 
 
 
Jingoism and a lack of critical self reflection have long occupied the 
minds of many fellow Pakistanis. There is plenty of blame to share 
around and nobody seems willing to look inwards. The security state 
perceives any such attempt a direct threat to its own existence. Threat it 
is, to the misplaced notions of state formation in general, to the fears 
that have reigned for too long now over the hearts and minds, to the 
timid and weak state apparatus, its minions and those insisting on 
constructing new national personas out of thin pious air; that seeks unity 
in uniformity. To come out of their shell, they need only peek at the 
beautiful kaleidoscope and realize that diversity of ethnicities, languages, 
nationalities and races is a gift, not to be feared but to be celebrated. For 
that to happen and for that to be enjoyed, words written and spoken, 
contracts signed and implied; will have to be honoured. Will 
primordialism die? Perhaps not, but honouring contracts is the only 
solution to keep it rational. 
 This thesis began with formulating the question of conflict as a 
product of societal interaction and state construction. The notions of 
peoplehood namely democracy, citizenship and national self 
determination clashed with the ‗Grace of God‘ to give rise to 
ethnopolitical conflicts. This societal interaction, according to Foucault, 
could be seen in two settings, the dominant-repression or the contract-
oppression setting. This thesis investigated the Pakistani conflict in the 
context of the second paradigm.  
The reasons of taking the contractarian route are Pakistan‘s pre-
independence history, the history of its many constitutions and 
constitutional crises. The period under study starts from 1972 because 
that is the cutoff point for a new constitution. The cutoff date is also 
chosen because prior to that, the data for ethnopolitical conflict would 
not have been comparable simply because of the secession of East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh). A short account of this history shows that the 
processes which led to the particular shape of its institutional structure 
and the interplay of contesting identities, fears, compromises and 
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conflict not only produced ethnopolitical conflict but also the one 
between the state and the radical militants today. 
There has been conflict and the intensity of it has varied over the 
years; one could only go thus far in a quest in any meaningful analysis of 
this conflict without a dependable database of conflict. A gap existed in 
our understanding of the empirical nature of this conflict. Hopefully, this 
thesis will pave the way for more such databases. 
The undulations in conflict score for each individual dyadic conflict 
needs further investigation. The issues which make up these conflicts are 
also those which feature in the story of social contract. Since this 
contract gives an institutional structure therefore the conflict over 
institutions was separately studied from that which is outside institutions. 
Violent conflict was separated from the non-violent conflict and that 
over the formal and informal institutions was studied separately for 
political and economic institutions. For the fiscal federalist scheme, the 
NFC and its failure to always evolve a compromise, has led to conflict 
but the trend suggests that the greater the appeasement through the 
NFC, the lesser the conflict. Consociation therefore…has worked in 
Pakistan. The same approach has not been followed in case of provincial 
autonomy and therefore there has been more conflict over this score. 
This is essentially an informal institution for the distribution of legislative 
powers between the centre and the provinces and the non fulfillment of 
the contract provided in the constitution has led to conflict over it.  
Periodic stumbles in democratic process have also influenced this 
conflict. The trend indicates that democracies are better at controlling 
the violent and non violent conflict which is outside an institutional 
setting. To measure the political power an original scheme was devised 
which takes into account the different ways in which political power at 
two levels is substantiated, perceived and projected.  The particular 
intricacies of Pakistani political culture and history are taken into account 
while devising this scheme. In addition to these, some other supporting 
formal and informal institutions of conflict management and the conflict 
over these was analyzed. These included the CCI, the IPCC, the water 
apportionment accord and the constitutional guarantee of free 
movement of goods through out the country. The conflict score 
indicates the conflict over these institutions showing their health.  
The decay of institutions leads to grievances. These grievances arise 
because of perceptions of unjust treatment. These perceptions social 
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exclusion, relative deprivation and horizontal inequality have been linked 
to conflict. Most of the results suggest that political and socio-economic 
horizontal inequality are linked to conflict in Pakistan.  
Finally in chapter 7, the current conflict in Pakistan between the state 
and radical militants is analysed in terms of the structure and agency 
factors facilitating taliban recruitment. The structural factors of identity, 
history, geopolitics, institutions and socioeconomic inequalities largely 
follow the analytical framework of chapter 2; however the agency factors 
are specific to the problem at hand and are given to arrive at a more 
holistic explanation of taliban recruitment. It is found that almost all the 
structural factors mentioned above contribute to TTP‘s recruitment in 
the sense that these provide fertile ground to them. This situation is then 
exploited by the TTP who employ the widespread Madrassah network, 
the media and indoctrination to get their message across to their 
potential recruits.  
Potential and Limitations 
This thesis attempted to find the political economic explanations for 
conflict. Since it is both a qualitative and a quantitative attempt therefore 
there are bound to be issues with the very nature of the attempt.  
To start with, the dual nature of this methodology is both the strength 
and the limitation of this thesis. Without getting into any argument with 
the competing camps, the study takes double shots at the problem at 
hand. If a more complete picture is wished for, then this technique 
should be desirable. If however, the purpose is to look into the miniscule 
crevices of each of the individual corner of this conflict, using only one 
technique would invariably come recommended. That will perhaps be 
more vigorous but may not help us distinguish between the forest and 
the trees.  
In the end it is mostly the scope of the problem which dictates the 
methodology and since this study wanted to keep the canvas wide, the 
resolution of the pixels is a trade off which may well be worth the view.  
 
Looking Ahead 
One wishes conflicts could go away one day. Since this is not happening 
any time soon therefore conflict analysis will always have the luxury of 
forecasting on the basis of Murphy‘s law and then wait for it to come 
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true. Pakistan has a history of conflicts but she also has a history of some 
things work out well. Contracts have been broken but some have 
survived. The democratic regimes have consistently demonstrated a 
superior skill in making the institution of NFC work. Consociational 
federalism has worked to bring down conflict and there is no reason why 
it should not in the future. This will need careful policy options which 
take account of the horizontal inequalities among provinces and allocate 
resources to bridge the gaps. Perceptions of unjust treatment will not 
arise and grievances will be minimized. Similarly the institution of job 
quota in the constitution has worked to a degree in bringing down the 
particular conflict over jobs, but more remains to be done when seen in 
the context of overall conflict. Initially, a narrowing of the gap among 
groups in civil service jobs may exert influence on conflict but with 
passage of time and adherence to the policy may pay dividends in 
reducing conflict.  
 Provincial autonomy is an area in which the policy options on the 
table are limited to either carrying out the contract or continue to silence 
the dissenting voice.  The challenges to the contract will come from 
within as well as from without. It will be a continuous process of choice 
for the policy makers and practitioners in the future. Water and 
environmental issues are quickly gaining prominence and something 
happening in the waters of south pacific (El Nino) will not satisfy the 
farmer getting less water for his crops. The will to stick to the contract 
will be tested. Jobs will continue to be apportioned according to the 
terms of the contract in a culture of political favouritism. Trade will have 
to be free among the provinces as has been agreed in the contract, even 
in times of scarcity and droughts. 
  In addition to the things that worked, there are things that did not or 
were not allowed to work. The penchant of a particular ‗institution‘ for 
dominating all the rest has contributed to the country becoming a 
security state which is occupied with the agenda of the past, for its own 
benefit. This callous disregard for the nation‘s formal social contract has 
been justified in the name of national interests and an identity which is 
anathema to the recognition of diversity in the Pakistani society. Terms 
of the contract which relate to provincial autonomy have been blatantly 
violated to serve vested interests. In order to minimize conflict, the 
illegitimate influence of one particular institution in the political affairs of 
the state will have to be curbed. This cannot be done from the outside 
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and it will be a choice for the army leadership if they want to continue 
with the policy of the past or are prepared to let the nation put her social 
contract in practice. 
 The above choice for army leadership also underwrites some of the 
future conflicts for Pakistan.  The ideological polarization in society is 
strong. The current conflict with Taliban is one outcome in which one 
can clearly see the results of decades of state encouragement of hate for 
all competing identities. In the foreseeable future and without taking the 
bull by its metaphorical horns, piety will continue to be worn on sleeves, 
lashed onto the bodies of women and cut through the jugular of the not 
so pious. All this will invoke the identity that was once based on fear and 
is now based on hate, the identity that is read into the contract by one 
party and disputed by the other. In that case it will not only be a question 
of how to carry out the terms of the social contract but more 
importantly; whose contract? 
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3-A: Text of the Objectives Resolution, 12 March 1949. 
 
 
1. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of 
Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits 
prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. 
2. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen 
representatives of the people. 
3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social 
justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. 
4. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and 
collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in 
the Qur'an and Sunnah. 
5. Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and 
practice their religions and develop their cultures. 
6. Pakistan shall be a federation. 
7. Fundamental rights shall be guaranteed. 
8. The judiciary shall be independent 
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3-B: Excerpts from Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s Address to the 
Lahore session March 23, 1940 wherein he, for the first time 
uses the term Social Contract. 
 
 
We want another kind of declaration. You must declare now and at once 
that India is free and independent with the right to frame its own 
constitution by a Constituent Assembly to be elected on the basis of adult 
franchise or as low a franchise as possible. This Assembly will of course 
satisfy the minorities' legitimate interests." Mr. Gandhi says that if the 
minorities are not satisfied then he is willing that some tribunal of the 
highest character and most impartial should decide the dispute. Now, apart 
from the impracticable character of this proposal and quite apart from the 
fact that it is historically and constitutionally absurd to ask [a] ruling power 
to abdicate in favour of a Constituent Assembly. Apart from all that, 
suppose we do not agree as to the franchise according to which the Central 
Assembly is to be elected, or suppose the solid body of Muslim 
representatives do not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the 
Constituent Assembly, what will happen? It is said that we have no right to 
disagree with regard to anything that this Assembly may do in framing a 
national constitution of this huge sub-continent except those matters which 
may be germane to the safeguards for the minorities. So we are given the 
privilege to disagree only with regard to what may be called strictly safe-
guards of the rights and interests of minorities. We are also given the 
privilege to send our own representatives by separate electorates. Now, this 
proposal is based on the assumption that as soon as this constitution comes 
into operation the British hand will disappear. Otherwise there will be no 
meaning in it. Of course, Mr. Gandhi says that the constitution will decide 
whether the British will disappear, and if so to what extent. In other words, 
his proposal comes to this: First, give me the declaration that we are a free 
and independent nation, then I will decide what I should give you back. 
Does Mr. Gandhi really want the complete independence of India when he 
talks like this? But whether the British disappear or not, it follows that 
extensive powers must be transferred to the people. In the event of there 
being a disagreement between the majority of the Constituent Assembly and 
the Mussalmans, in the first instance, who will appoint the tribunal? And 
suppose an agreed tribunal is possible and the award is made and the 
decision given, who will, may I know, be there to see that this award is 
implemented or carried out in accordance with the terms of that award? 
And who will see that it is honoured in practice, because, we are told, the 
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British will have parted with their power mainly or completely? Then what 
will be the sanction behind the award which will enforce it? We come back 
to the same answer, the Hindu majority would do it; and will it be with the 
help of the British bayonet or the Gandhi's "Ahinsa"? Can we trust them 
any more? Besides, ladies and gentlemen, can you imagine that a question of 
this character, of social contract upon which the future constitution of India 
would be based, affecting 90 million of Mussalmans, can be decided by 
means of a judicial tribunal? Still, that is the proposal of the Congress.  
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4-A: Ethnopolitical Conflicts For Different Dyads and Issues 
Figure 9:  Pukhtun Ethnopolitical Conflict over profits from Hydro power 
 
 
Figure 10: Pukhtuns and the conflict over Kalabagh and Water Share
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Figure 11: Conflict over inter provincial trade (Wheat)
 
Figure 12: Pukhtuns and conflict over the type of polity
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Figure 13: Provincial Rights, Autonomy and Rights of Nationalities
 
Figure 14: Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership and the Conflict over Patriotic 
Credentials
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Figure 15: Subversion, Terrorism and Secession (Done or alleged in the name of 
Pukhtun ethnopolitics)
 
Figure 16: Pukhtun Ethnopolitics and the conflict over Governance, Budget and 
Foreign policy
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Figure 17: Pukhtuns and the conflict over Identity, Culture and change of name of the 
province 
 
Figure 18: Pukhtun ethnopolitical conflict over Rights to life, honour, freedom and 
property, Conflict with state agencies. 
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Figure 19: Baloch Ethnopolitical Conflict over royalty/Control over the income of 
Natural Resources 
 
 
Figure 20: Subversion, Terrorism and Secession in Baloch ethnopolitical Conflict 
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Figure 21: Baloch ethnopolitical conflict and the rights to life, freedom and property 
 
Figure 22: Baloch/Balochistan and the conflict over Provincial Rights, General, 
economic rights, social rights, Provincial autonomy/Nationalities rights. 
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Figure 23: Baloch ethnopolitical conflict over Participation in Governance 
structures/Trade bodies/Power organs 
 
Figure 24: Baloch/Balochistan Ethnopolitical conflict  over Development/ 
Development spending by Federal Government/ Loans to Provinces. 
 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
Non Violent
Violent
Poly. (Non Violent)
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
Non Violent
Poly. (Non Violent)
212 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICT 
 
Figure 25: Baloch/ Balochistan conflict over Share in federal revenues/National 
Finance Commission Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes. 
 
Figure 26: Balochistan and conflict over Quota system of jobs in Government 
services/ Share of jobs, Joblessness 
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Figure 27: Baloch and conflict over Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy. 
 
Figure 28: Baloch and the conflict over Governance / General legislation/ Budget/ 
Foreign policy
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Figure 29: Baloch Conflict over Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity 
 
Figure 30: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Kalabagh dam and Water share from 
Indus river 
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Figure 31: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Provincial rights 
 
 
Figure 32: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Quota in Jobs 
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Figure 33: Sindhi Ethnopolitics and the elements of Secession/Subversion and 
terrorism 
 
Figure 34: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Foreign policy, Budget and governance. 
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Figure 35: Sindhi ethnopolitical conflict over Rights to life, honour, freedom and 
property, Conflict with state agencies. 
 
Figure 36: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity 
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Figure 37: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the state/Punjab on the basis of identity 
 
Figure 38: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with Pukhtuns over issues of identity 
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Figure 39: Subversive/ Secessionist Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the 
state/Punjab 
 
Figure 40: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the state agencies 
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Figure 41: Ethnopolitical Conflict between Punjab and Federal Government. 
 
 
Figure 42: Total Ethnopolitical Conflict Pukhtun/Baloch and/or JUI/ UDF (To the 
extent of supporting NAP or their cause) –Center 
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Figure 43: Ethnopolitical conflict Seraiki-Punjabi in Punjab/Muhajirs/Sindhis in Sindh 
 
Figure 44: Ethnopolitical conflict between Baloch and Pukhtun in Balochistan 
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Figure 45: Ethnopolitical conflict all provinces -Centre 
 
Figure 46: Ethnopolitical conflict between Sindh and Balochistan 
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Figure 47: Ethnopolitical conflict with Pukhtun/Baloch/Sindh -Punjab 
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5-A: Article 160 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. 
 
 
National Finance Commission 
 
(1) Within six months of the commencing day and thereafter at 
intervals not exceeding five years, the President shall constitute 
a National Finance Commission consisting of the Minister of 
Finance of the Federal Government, the Ministers of Finance of 
the Provincial Governments, and such other persons as may be 
appointed by the President after consultation with the Governors 
of the Provinces. 
(2) It shall be the duty of the National Finance Commission to 
make recommendations to the President as to 
(a) the distribution between the Federation and the Provinces of 
the net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3); 
(b) the making of grants-in-aid by the Federal Government to the 
Provincial Governments; 
(c) the exercise by the Federal Government and the Provincial 
Government of the borrowing powers conferred by the 
Constitution; and  
(d) any other matter relating to finance referred to the 
Commission by the President. 
(3) The taxes referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) are the 
following taxes raised under the authority of [Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament)], namely: 
(i) taxes on income, including corporation tax, but not including 
taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of the 
Federal Consolidated Fund; 
[(ii) taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, 
exported, produced, manufactured on consumed;] 
(iii) export duties on cotton, and such other export duties as may 
be specified by the President; 
(iv) such duties of excise as may be specified by the President; 
and 
(v) such other taxes as may be specified by the President. 
(4) As soon as may be after receiving the recommendations of 
the National Finance Commission, the President shall, by Order, 
 Appendices 225 
 
specify, in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Commission under paragraph (a) of clause (2), the share of the 
net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3) which is to be 
allocated to each Province, and that share shall be paid to the 
Government of the Province concerned, and, notwithstanding the 
provision of Article 78 shall not form part of the Federal 
Consolidated Fund. 
(5) The recommendations of the National Finance Commission, 
together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action 
taken thereon, shall be laid before both Houses and the 
Provincial Assemblies.  
(6) At any time before an Order under clause (4) is made, the 
President may, by Order, make such amendments or 
modifications in the law relating to the distribution of revenues 
between the Federal Government and the provincial 
Governments as he may deem necessary or expedient. 
(7) The President may, by Order, make grants-in-aid of the 
revenues of the Provinces in need of assistance and such grants 
shall be charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund. 
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5-B: Fourth Schedule, Article 70(4) of the Constitution of 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
 
 
Federal Legislative List 
PART I 
1. The defence of the Federation or any part thereof in peace or 
war; the military, naval and air forces of the Federation and any 
other armed forces raised or maintained by the Federation; any 
armed forces which are not forces of the Federation but are 
attached to or operating with any of the Armed Forces of the 
Federation including civil armed forces; Federal Intelligence 
Bureau; preventive detention for reasons of State connected with 
defence, external affairs, or the security of Pakistan or any part 
thereof; person subjected to such detention; industries declared 
by Federal law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for 
the prosecution of war.  
2. Military, naval and air force works; local self- government in 
cantonment areas, the constitution and powers within such areas 
of cantonment authorities, the regulation of house 
accommodation in such areas, and the delimitation of such 
areas.  
3. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements, 
including educational and cultural pacts and agreements, with 
other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals 
and accused persons to Governments outside Pakistan.  
4. Nationality, citizenship and naturalization.  
5. Migration from or into, or settlement in, a Province or the 
Federal Capital.  
6. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, Pakistan 
including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in 
Pakistan of persons not domiciled in Pakistan; pilgrimages to 
places beyond Pakistan.  
7. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, 
broadcasting and other like forms of communications; Post Office 
Saving Bank.  
8. Currency, coinage and legal tender.  
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9. Foreign exchange; cheques, bills of exchange, promissory 
notes and other like instruments.  
10. Public debt of the Federation, including the borrowing of 
money on the security of the Federal Consolidated Fund; foreign 
loans and foreign aid.  
11. Federal Public Services and Federal Public Service 
Commission  
12. Federal Pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the 
Federation or out of the Federal Consolidated Fund.  
13. Federal Ombudsmen.  
14. Administrative Courts and Tribunals for Federal subjects.  
15. Libraries, museums, and similar institutions controlled or 
financed by the Federation.  
16. Federal agencies and institutes for the following purposes, 
that is to say, for research, for professional or technical training, 
or for the promotion of special studies.  
17. Education as respects Pakistani students in foreign countries 
and foreign students in Pakistan.  
18. Nuclear energy, including:-  
(a) mineral resources necessary for the generation of nuclear 
energy;  
(b) the production of nuclear fuels and the generation and use of 
nuclear energy, and  
(c) ionizing radiations. 
19. Port quarantine, seamen's and marine hospitals and hospitals 
connected with port quarantine.  
20. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and 
navigation on tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.  
21. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation 
of such ports, and the constitution and powers of port authorities 
therein.  
22. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; 
regulation and organization of air traffic and of aerodromes.  
23. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other 
provisions for the safety of shipping and aircraft.  
24. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.  
25. Copyright, inventions, designs, trademarks and merchandise 
marks.  
26. Opium so far as regards sale for export.  
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27. Import and export across customs frontiers as deemed by the 
Federal Government, inter-provincial trade and commerce, trade 
and commerce with foreign countries; standard of quality of 
goods to be exported out of Pakistan.  
28. State Bank of Pakistan; banking, that is to say, the conduct 
of banking business by corporations other than corporations 
owned or controlled by a Province and carrying on business only 
within that Province.  
29. The law of insurance, except as respects insurance 
undertaken by a Province, and the regulation of the conduct of 
insurance business, except as respects business undertaken by a 
Province, Government insurance, except so far as undertaken by 
a Province by virtue of any matter within the legislative 
competence of the Provincial Assembly.  
30. Stock exchanges and future markets with objects and 
business not confined to one Province.  
31. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation, regulation and 
winding- up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance 
and financial corporations, but not including corporations owned 
or controlled by a Province and carrying on business only within 
that Province, or cooperative societies, and of corporations, 
whether trading or not, with objects not confined to a Province, 
but not including universities.  
32. National planning and national economic coordination 
including planning and coordination of scientific and 
technological research.  
33. State lotteries.  
34. National highways and strategic roads.  
35. Federal surveys including geological surveys and Federal 
meteorological organizations.  
36. Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters.  
37. Works, lands and buildings vested in, or in the possession of 
Government for the purposes of the Federation (not being 
military, naval or air force works), but, as regards property 
situate in a Province, subject always to Provincial legislation, 
save in so far as Federal law otherwise provides.  
38. Census.  
39. Establishment of standards of weights and measures.  
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40. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a 
police force belonging to any Province to any area in another 
Province, but not so as to enable the police of one Province to 
exercise powers and jurisdiction in another Province without the 
consent of the Government of that Province; extension of the 
powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging 
to any Province to railway areas outside that Province.  
41. Elections to the office of President, to the National 
Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies; Chief 
Election Commissioner and Election Commissions.  
42. The salaries, allowances and privileges of the President, 
Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of the Senate, Prime Minister, Federal 
Minister, Ministers of State, the salaries, allowances and 
privileges of the members of the Senate and the National 
Assembly, and the punishment of persons who refuse to give 
evidence or produce documents before committees thereof.  
43. Duties of customs, including export duties.  
44. Duties of exercise, including duties on salt, but not including 
duties on alcoholic liquors, opium and other narcotics.  
45. Duties in respect of succession to property.  
46. Estate duty in respect of property.  
47. Taxes on income other than agricultural income;  
48 Taxes on corporations.  
49. Taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, 
exported, produced, manufactured or consumed.  
50. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, not including taxes 
on capital gains on immovable property.  
51. Taxes on mineral oil, natural gas and minerals for use in 
generation of nuclear energy.  
52. Taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, 
machinery, undertaking, establishment or installation in lieu of 
any one or more of them.  
53. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea 
or air; taxes on their fares and freights.  
54. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this Part, but not 
including fees taken in any court.  
55. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme 
Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list and, to such 
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extent as is expressly authorized by or under the Constitution, 
the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and 
the conferring thereon of supplemental powers.  
56. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in 
this Part.  
57. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters 
in this Part.  
58. Matters which under the Constitution are within the 
legislative competence of Majlis- e-Shoora (Parliament) or relate 
to the Federation.  
59. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in 
this Part.  
 
PART II 
1. Railways.  
2. Mineral oil and natural gas; liquids and substances declared by 
Federal law to be dangerously inflammable.  
3. Development of industries, where development under Federal 
control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public 
interest; institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations 
administered or managed by the Federal Government 
immediately before the commencing day, including the Pakistan 
Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation; all undertakings, projects 
and schemes of such institutions, establishments, bodies and 
corporations, industries, projects and undertakings owned wholly 
or partially by the Federation or by a corporation set up by the 
Federation.  
4. Council of Common Interests.  
5. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this Part but not 
including fees taken in any court.  
6. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in 
this Parts.  
7. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters 
in this Part.  
8. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in 
this Part.  
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Concurrent Legislative List 
 
1. Criminal law, including all matters included in the Pakistan 
Penal Code on the commencing day, but excluding offences 
against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in the 
Federal Legislative List and excluding the use of naval, military 
and air forces in aid of civil power.  
2. Criminal procedure, including all matters included in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, on the commencing day.  
3. Civil procedure, including the law of limitation and all matters 
included in the Code of Civil Procedure on the commencing day, 
the recovery in a Province or the Federal Capital of claims in 
respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of 
land revenue and sums recoverable as such, arising outside that 
Province.  
4. Evidence and oath; recognition of laws, public acts and 
records of judicial proceedings.  
5. Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption.  
6. Wills, intestacy and succession, save as regards agricultural 
land.  
7. Bankruptcy and insolvency, administrators- general and 
official trustees.  
8. Arbitration.  
9. Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of 
carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including 
contracts relating to agricultural land.  
10. Trusts and trustees.  
11. Transfer of property other than agriculture land, registration 
of deeds and documents.  
12. Actionable wrongs, save in so far as included in laws with 
respect to any of the matters specified in the Federal Legislative 
List.  
13. Removal of prisoners and accused persons from one Province 
to another Province.  
14. Preventive detention for reasons connected with the 
maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and 
services essential to the community; persons subjected to such 
detention.  
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15. Persons subjected to preventive detention under Federal 
authority.  
16. Measures to combat certain offences committed in 
connection with matters concerning the Federal and Provincial 
Governments and the establishment of a police force for that 
purpose.  
17. Arms, firearms and ammunition.  
18. Explosives.  
19. Opium, so far as regards cultivation and manufacture.  
20. Drugs and medicines.  
21. Poisons and dangerous drugs.  
22. Prevention of the extension from one Province to another of 
infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting men, animals 
or plants.  
23. Mental illness and mental retardation, including places for 
the reception or treatment of the mentally ill and mentally 
retarded.  
24. Environmental pollution and ecology.  
25. Population planning and social welfare.  
26. Welfare of labor; conditions of labor, provident funds; 
employer's liability and workmen's compensation, health 
insurance including invalidity pensions, old age pensions.  
27. Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes.  
28. The setting up and carrying on of labor exchanges, 
employment information bureaus and training establishments.  
29. Boilers.  
30. Regulation of labor and safety in mines, factories and oil- 
fields.  
31. Unemployment insurance.  
32. Shipping and navigation on inland waterways as regards 
mechanically propelled vessels, and the rule of the road on such 
waterways; carriage of passengers and goods on inland 
waterways.  
33. Mechanically propelled vehicles.  
34. Electricity.  
35. Newspapers, books and printing presses.  
36. Evacuee property.  
37. Ancient and historical monuments, archaeological sites and 
remains.  
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38. Curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centres of excellence 
and standards of education.  
39. Islamic education.  
40. Zakat.  
41. Production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph 
films.  
42. Tourism.  
43. Legal medical and other professions.  
43A. Auqaf.  
44. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not 
including fees taken in any court.  
45. Inquiries and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters 
in this List.  
46. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in 
this List; jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the 
Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.  
47. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in 
this List. 
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